BRITAIN’S WAR TACTICS.

Wairarapa Age, 6 January 1926, Page 5

BRITAIN’S WAR TACTICS.

CRITICISED BY TIRPITZ. DURATION WAS FAULT OF ALLIES. SHOULD HAVE SMASHED GERMAN FLEET. LONDON, Jan. 4.—The “Daily Express’’ features an extraordinary article from the pen of the German Admiral von Tirpitz, in which, the writer declares that the juration of the war was the fault of the Allies, who were ' seeking a military decision when they must have realised that Germany, as regarded land warfare, was not only able to hold her own, but was capable of inflicting severe punishment. Nu- ; merically, Germany was. superior to her adversaries the Allies, and her superiority was increasing yearly. I ‘ ‘ Therefore, ’ ’ says the writer, ‘ * the Allies should have attempted peace' by conciliation, being aware that Ger- I many was willing to negotiate on a basis which left every nation the right of existence. Such a peace in 1915 would have been of infinite advantage to Europe and England. There would not have been debts which ■ cannot be paid either by vie- ' tors or vanquished; there would have been no danger of Bolshevism, np mil- I lions of workless, no Dawes Plan, 1 which is certain finally to collapse; , America would not dominate the world; and coloured nations wouldl not menace European civilisation. |

“The brains of the Allies before the war and more so in wartime,’’ he continues, “were centred in London, and the struggle became more and more between England and Germany. British statesmen did not foresee thst the complete disintegration of Germany would carry the victors into the abyss. They did not realise that their own interests demanded a short war and a just peace by conciliation. It was plain to everyone in 1915 that a short decision on land was impossible, but the annihilation qf the German fleet was not absolutely hopeless at the time. It is difficult to tell why Britain did not force battle with every single ship at her command, having the additional advantage associated with the attacking force.’’

Admiral von Tirpitz proceeds to declare that the Battles of Coronel and Falklands constituted warnings to Britain not to underestimate the fighting qualities of the German fleet, while Jutland effectively proved German superiority. “History,” he says, “will decide whether Britain was right in favouringta war of attrition in preference to risking her fleet in a contest in which the result might have been doubtful. When the German fleet emerged in 1916 it had another purpose. The Battle of Jutland resulted as the merest chance. It was a surprise to both sides.”

The writer proceeds to describe in detail the movements of the battle, and repeats his opinion that Admiral Jellicoe acted correctly.—(A. and N.Z.)