TANGLED PROBLEM OF ARMAMENTS.

Timaru Herald, Volume CXXIII, 7 April 1927, Page 9

TANGLED PROBLEM OF ARMAMENTS.

Discussion at Geneva.

BRITAIN’S ATTITUDE CRITICISED

By Cable—Press Association —Copyright. Australian and N.Z. Cable Association. (Received April 6, 10.0 p.m.) GENEVA, April 6. The complexity and difficulties of the disarmament problem were revealed, when the Preparatory Commission began the discussion on naval armaments. Viscount Cecil, opening the debate, contested the French viewpoint, as expressed in their draft plan, that if armies are numerically limited, so must naval personnel be limited. He said that the British Government’s view was that the proper way to limit the strength of the Fleet was to limit the number, size and power of the ships. This Britain was prepared to do drastically, and very completely, but Britain saw no necessity for limiting -effectives, which would occur automatically with the decrease of tonnage. The French proposal would complicate the Convention, and render ratification less likely. He added that navies could not be made more formidable by increasing the man power beyond actual needs. Viscount Cecil finally sprang a surprise by saying that lie was not prepared to discuss the point further, as he had telegraphed to liis Government for fresh instructions. M. Boncour (France) rather sarcastically remarked that this was the second time the discussion had been suspended owing to Viscount Cecil’s necessity for getting instructions. He proceeded to argue that naval, military and aerial strength, coast defence and expeditionary forces, were inevitably bound up, and if a single category were ignored, wholesale deception would be possible by camouflaging the nature of certain forces. He recalled the part played in war time by sailors, who were not merely employed as crews, but as landing parties. The Americans and Japanese supported Viscount Cecil’s viewpoint.

The Germans and Swedes approved of M. Boncour’s viewpoint, pending the receipt of instructions regarding effectives. Viscount Cecil proceeded to discuss the limitation of material. He emphasised that the whole existence of the British Empire depended on the security of communications. The cessation of seaborne commerce would mean Britain’s starvation, therefore, the question was of vital importance to the British, whose programme envisaged an agreement which would -

(1) Forestall naval competition; (2) Secure the fullest publicity so that every nation would be aware of the naval strength of its neighbours; (3) Strengthen the psychology of security by eliminating ‘‘The Surprise Element.” Viscount Cecil contended that a limitation of the number of ships was more important than the limitation of tonnage, numbers being the essential element in. the strength of the Fleets (the French proposal is the limitation of the total gross tonnage). Viscount Cecil added that Britain was convinced that the only effective measure was the fixing of the number of ships in each category. Unless such was known, competition was inevitable, and surprises not impossible. Viscount Sato (Japan) favoured limitation by categories, and lie opposed fixing of the size of ships in each category. M. Boncour said that France favoured limitation by gross tonnage, because she wishes to retain the right of the disposal of smaller classes of ships, according to her special needs. The Swedish representative suggested, firstly, the limitation of total tonnage by all nations; secondly, the categorical limitation of tonnage by the Great Poxvers; thirdly, the advance publication of all naval programmes. This proposal appeared to evoke a spirit of compromise, and the Commission adjourned on M. Boncour’s promise to submit new proposals.