DAIRY CONTROL

Timaru Herald, Volume CXXIII, 3 June 1926, Page 8

DAIRY CONTROL

APPLICATION BY .PROPRIETARY COMPANIES. SUPREME COURT DECLINES TO s AC 1 AS COUNSEL. 1 By Telegraph —Press Association AVELLINGTON, June 2. The reserved decision of the Supremo ’ Courc announced to-day declines to ' give a declaratory judgment on tho ’ quest.ons put by the Dairy Proprietary ’ Association and the Waitaki Daily Company in regard to the powers ot 3 the New Zealand Dairy Produce Control Board. . . 'The Court consisted of their Honours , the Chief Justice (Air C. P. Skerrett) and Mr Justice Reed. . The judgment, delivered by the Chier 1 Justice, states, inter alia: “The material placed betorc us is ’ meagre, but it appears to be common J ground that after the issue of an orig- ’ mating summons the Board, about -itn . May, 1926, passed a resolution that it should assume control over the export 1 of dairy produce as from midnight on ; 31st August, 1926. 'The policy of the " Board in taking this absolute contro- ’ has naturally been the subject of considerable controversy. Many (it not ' all) of the owners of proprietary factories, brokers and merchants, and ex- ' porters of dairy produce, are opposed 1 to control. Co-opcrativo companies ’ (which are either directly or indirectly the largest exporters ot produce), al- ' though In the main favourable to con--1 trol "are not unanimous. It is asked 1 whether the effect of the resolution 1 was that a'l dairy produce manufac--1 tured and owned by plaintiffs, then in existence or thereafter to come into - existence, passed without further act ‘ of the Board under its absolute control. ' It is dear that it was intended to re- - late to produce of all proprietary companies. . , , . , “All the. other questions relate to ■ produce; generally, and it. in conceded : that if the question was answered in I the affirmative, it is desired that the ‘ Court should answer the other ques--1 t'ons stated in the summons. In. this event- it , would be necessary for the Court to determine the qucsUons which traverse the whole operative powers of the statute, mam- of which re'ate to detailed machinery by which flic. Board may put into operation such powers ' of control as it may be held,to possess. 1 ]t-is dear that the Court lms discretion as to giving or making a declaratory judgment or order, and may on any grounds which it deems .sufficient refuse to give or make ativ such judgment or order. The present case is not an action for a "declaratory judgment, but is an application under Section 3 of the Act for a declaratory judgment determining a question or questions as to the construction of a •statute. Even where a declaratory judgment has been sought in an action, and not by an originating summons, discretion to exercise jurisdiction lias been exorcised with great caution. In the present ease it is not disguised that the object of the summons is to obtain a judicial opinion as to the general powers of the Board. Nothing short of that will suit the purpose of plaintiffs. No concrete facts have been placed before us to show that the question of right has arisen between either of the p aintill's and the Board as to the specific produce intended to be exported. The reason, of course, is that the parties seek an abstract opinion in the nature of advice as to the interpretation of the whole statutp. We are- satisfied that the Court ought not to place itself (as it is invited to do) practically in the position of counsel advising the owners of proprietary factories or exporters of dairy produce upon the interpretation of the statute. 'The application Dias the’ grave objection that the Court, if it granted it. would he compelled to define statutory powers in the abstract without knowledge of the facts and circumstances under which such powers might be exorcised, and without any certitude, that many of the powers about which questions nre asked will ever he exercised. Moreover, if the Court were to vic’d to the application it might be called upon to give an anticipatory interpretation of many kinds of documents. such as deeds, wills, memoranda, and articles of association, by-laws of local authorities, and regulations made by the Oovrrnor-in-Coiineil. Furthermore, plaintiffs are not the only persons, nor even the most, numerous body of persons, interested' in the questions raised as to the interpretation of the Act. Co-opefntive factories and suppliers to co-operative factories are vitallv interested in the questions if pronr’etary companies can export their produce. Tt affects ad co-operative and I other factories who are subject to conI trol. Tt is clear, therefore, that all i factories who favour absolute control j and their suppliers are interested in I the questions asked to ho determined. If the'- are not mad,' parties to the ! proceedings they will not he hound bonr determination. • All interested part ; os would require to ho joined, and in face of the numerous conflicting interests this would be a most inconvenient proceeding. Tt has been held that the Court ought not on an originatin''‘ summons to decide the question of construction which, wliichinv it was deeirhul. d ; d not -(wc. sarilv put an end to litin-ntion. On the whole, therefore, ive think that the Court in its discretion should refuse ito answer these questions. Our dn- | e-sion places no real difficulty in j pbrntifiV way. They can obtain the docipion of tho Court’ upon aov notion contemplated by the Board, which they claim to contravene their rights. The--e.annot. hoivovoi-, in such an action ns the present obtain the opinion of tho Court on interpretation of sulistnntir'U- all provisions of the statute. The application for direction as to I rervicc may stand over, in nrd«r that j the nartios mav. if so ■'dvi=pd. tab" Die matter to a ld"hov Court. As a] 1 ! Dio Parties desired ihe Court to doI terminp the ouestidns raised by originatin'' "iimmons, we do not allow I any costs.”