"SURLY – GRASPING" Soviet Attitude To Allies

Otago Daily Times, Issue 27346, 23 March 1950, Page 7

"SURLY - GRASPING" Soviet Attitude To Allies

CHURCHILL MEMOIRS

By Winston S. Churchill

XXIX. Two months had now passed on the Russian front, and terrific blows had been struck by the German armies. But by now there was another side to the tale. Despite their fearful losses Russian resistance remained tough and unbending. Their soldiers fought to the death, and their armies gained in experience and skill. Partisans rose up behind the German fronts and harassed the communications in a merciless warfare. The captured Russian railway system was proving inadequate, the roads were breaking up under the heavy traffic, and movement off the roads after rain was often impossible. Transport vehicles were showing many signs of wear. Barely three months remained before the dreaded Russian winter. Could Moscow be taken in that time? And if it were, would that be enough? Here then was the fateful question. Though Hitler was still elated by the victory at Kiev, the German generals might well feel that their early misgivings were justified. There had been four weeks of delay on what had now become the decisive front. The task of “ annihilating the forces of the enemy in White Russia ” which had been given to the Central Army Group was still not done.

But as the autumn drew on and the supreme crisis on the Russian front impended, the Soviet demands upon us became more insistent. * * * *

Lord Beaverbrook returned from the United States having stimulated the already powerful forces making for a stupendous increase in production. He now became the champion in the War Cabinet of aid to Russia. In this he rendered valuable service. When we remember the pressures that lay upon us to prepare the battle in the Libyan Desert, and the deep anxieties about Japan which brooded over all our affairs in Malaya and the Far East, and that everything sent to Russia was subtracted from British vital needs, it was needful that the Russian claims should be so vehemently championed at the summit of our war thought. I tried to keep the main proportion evenly presented in my own mind, and shared my stresses with my colleagues. We endured the unpleasant process of exposing our own vital security and projects to failure for the sake of our new ally—surly, snarly, grasping, and so lately indifferent to our survival.

I at once consulted the Cabinet upon the issues raised in this conversation and in Stalin’s message, and that evening sent a reply. Prime Minister to Mr Stalin. September 4, 1941.

On the way home from Iceland I had felt that when Beaverbrook and Averell Harriman got back from Washington and we could survey all the prospects of munitions and supplies th'ey should go to Moscow and offer all’we could spare and dare. Prolonged and painful discussions took place upon the details on the lines of our joint offer. The service departments felt it was like flaying off pieces of their skin. However, we gathered together the utmost in our power, and consented to very large American diversions of all we longed for ourselves in order to make an effective contribution to the resistance of the Soviets. I brought the proposal to send Lord Beaverbrook to Moscow before my colleagues on August 28. The Cabinet was very willing that he should present the case to Stalin, and the President felt himself well represented by Harriman. Russian Disasters On the evening of September 4, Mr Maisky called to see, me to deliver Mr_ Stalin’s reply. This was the first personal message since July. Premier Stalin to Prime Minister Sept. 4, 1941. Personal message of Premier Stalin to Premier Churchill.

I express'thanks for promise to sell to Soviet Union a further 200 fighters in addition to the 200 previously promised. I do not doubt that the Soviet aviators will succeed in mastering them and putting them into use. I have, however, to say that these aeroplanes, which apparently cannot be put to use quickly ana at once, but at different periods and in separate groups, will be incapable of effecting serious changes on the Eastern front. They will be unable to effect serious changes, not only because of the large scale on which the war is being waged, which necessitates the continuous supply of a large quantity of aeroplanes, but chiefly because the situation of tne Soviet forces during the last three weeks has considerably deteriorated in such important areas as the Ukraine and Leningrad. As a matter of fact, the relative stabilisation at the front which we succeeded in achieving about three weeks ago has broken down during the last week owing to transfer to Eastern front of 30 to 34 fresh German infantry divisions and of an enormous quantity of tanks and aircraft as well as a large increase in activities of the 20 Finnish and 26 Rumanian divisions. Germans consider danger in the West a bluff and are transferring all their forces to the East with impunity, being convinced that no second front exists in the West, and that none will exist. Germans consider it quite possible to smash their enemies singly; first Russia, then the English.

1. I reply at once in the spirit of your message. Although we should shrink from no exertion, there is _ in fact no,possibility of any British action in the West, except air action, which would draw the German forces from the East before the winter sets in. There is no chance whatever of a second front being formed in the Balkans without the help of Turkey. I will, if your Excellency desires, give all the reasons. which have led our Chiefs of Staff to these conclusions. They have already been discussed with your Ambassador in conference today with the Foreign Secretary and the Chiefs of Staff. Action, however well meant, leading only to costly fiascos, would be no help to anyone but Hitler. 2. The information at my disposal gives me the impression .that the culminating violence of the German invasion is already over, and that winter will give your heroic armies a breathing space. This, however, is a personal opinion. 3. About supplies. We are well aware of the grievous losses which Russian industry has sustained, and every effort has been, and will be made by us to help you. I am cabling President Roosevelt to expedite the arrival here in London of Mr Harriman’s Mission, and we shall try even before the Moscow Conference to tell you the numbers of aircraft and tanks we can jointly promise to send each month, together with supplies of rubber, aluminium, cloth, etc. For our part, we are now’ prepared’ to send you, from British production, one-half of the monthly total for which you ask ip aircraft and tanks. We hope the United States will supply the other half of your requirements. We shall use every endeavouf to start the flow of equipment to you immediately. 6. In your first paragraph you used the word “sell.” We had not viewed the matter in such terms, and have never thought of payment. Any assistance we can give you would better be upon the same basis of comradeship as the American Lend-Lease Bill, of which no formal account is kept in money. ... On September 15 I received another telegram from Stalin: ... It seems to me that Great Britain could without risk land in Archangel 25 to 30 divisions, or transport them across Iran to the southern regions of USSR. In this way there could be established military collaboration, between the Soviet and British troops on the territory of the USSR. A similar situation existed during the last war in France. The arrangement mentioned would constitute a great help. It would be a serious blow against the Hitler aggression. Stalin's Unrealism

It is almost incredible that the head of the Russian Government,-with all the advice of their military experts, could have committed himself to such absurdities. It seemed hopeless to argue with a man thinking in terms of utter unreality. On September 25 I replied to the Ambassador about the fantastic proposals of 25 to 30 British divisions being landed at Archangel or Basra.

Prime Minister to Sir Stafford Cripps (Moscow). October 25, 1941.

As a result, we have lost more than one-half of the Ukraine, and in addition the enemy is at the gates of Leningrad. These circumstances have resulted in our losing Krivoi Rog iron ore basin and a number of metallurgical works in the Ukraine; we have evacuated one aluminium works on Dnieper River and a further aluminium works at Tikhvin, one motor and two aircraft works in the Ukraine, two motor, and two aircraft works at Leningrad. I think there Is only one means of egress from this situation—to establish in the present year a second front somewhere in the Balkans *or France, capable of drawing away from the Eastern front 30 to 40 divisions, and at the same time of ensuring to the Soviet Union 30,000 tons of aluminium by the beginning of October next, and a monthly minimum of aid amounting to 400 aircraft and 500 tanks (of small or medium size.

1. You were, of course, right to say that the idea of sending “ 25 to 30 divisions to fight on the Russian front ” is a physical absurdity. It took eight months to build up 10 divisions in France, across the Channel, when shipping was plentiful and U-boats were few. It is with the greatest difficulty that we have managed to send the 50th Division to the Middle ( East in the last six months. We are now sending the 18th Division by extraordinary measures. All our shipping is fully engaged, and any saving can only be made at the expense of our vital upkeep convoys to the Middle East or , of ships engaged in carrying Russian supplies. The margin by which we live and make munitions of war has only narrowly been maintained. Any troops sent to Murmansk now would be frozen in darkness for the winter. . . . * * * *

Meanwhile, the Beaverbrook-Harri-man talks in London were completed, and on September 22 the AngloAmerican Supply Mission set off in the * cruiser London from . Scapa Flow through the Arctic Sea to Archangel, and thence by air to Moscow. * * * *

Without these two forms of help, the Soviet Union will either suffer defeat or be weakened to such an extent that it will lose for a long period any capacity to render assistance to its Allies by its actual operations on the fronts of the struggle against Hitlerism.

I realise that this present message will cause dismay to your Excellency. But what is one to do? Experience has taught me to look facts in the face, however unpleasant they are, and not to fear to express the truth, however unwelcome it may be. * * * *

The Soviet Ambassador, who was accompanied by Mr Eden, stayed and talked with me for an hour and a-half. He emphasised in bitter terms how for the last 11 weeks Russia had been bearing the brunt of the German onslaught virtually alone. The Russian Armies were now enduring a weight of attack never equalled before. He said that he did not wish to use dramatic language, but this might be a turning point in history. If Soviet Russia were defeated how could we win the war? M. Maisky exphasised the extreme gravity of the crisis on the Russian front in poignant terms which commanded my sympathy. But when presently I sensed an underlying air of menace in his appeal I was angered. I said to the Ambassador, whom I had known for many years, “ Remember that only four months ago we in this island did not know whether you were not coming in against us on the German side. Indeed, we thought it quite likely that you would. Even then we felt sure we should win in the end. “We never thought our survival was dependent on your action either way. Whatever happens, and whatever you do, you of all people have no right to make reproaches to us.” As I warmed to the topic, the Ambassador exclaimed, “ More calm, please, my dear Mr Churchill.” but thereafter his tone perceptibly changed.

On September 28 our Mission arrived in Moscow. Their reception was bleak, and discussions not at allfriendly. It might almost have been thought that the plight in which tne Soviets now found themselves was our fault. The Soviet generals and officials gave no information of any kind to their British and American colleagues. They did not even inform them of the basis on which Russian needs of our precious war materials had been estimated. The Mission was given no formal entertainment until almost the last night, when they were invited to dinner at the Kremlin, it must not be thought that such an occasion among men preoccupied with the gravest affairs may not de helpful to the progress of business. On the contrary, many of the private interchanges which occur bring about that atmosphere where agreements can be reached. But there was little of this mood now, and it might almost have been we who had come to ask for favours.

One incident preserved by General Ismay in an apocryphal and somewhat lively form may be allowed to lighten the narrative. His orderly, a Royal Marine, was shown the sights of Moscow by one of the Intourist guides. “ This,” said the Russian, “ is the Eden Hotel, formerly Ribbentrop Hotel. Here is Churchill street, formerly Hitler street. Here is the Beaverbrook Railway Station, formerly Goering Railway Station. Will you have a cigarette, comrade? ” The marine replied, “Thank you. comrade, formerly bastard! ” This tale, though jocular, illustrates none the less the strange atmosphere of these meetings.

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In the end a friendly agreement was reached in Moscow. A protocol was signed setting out the supplies which Great Britain and the United States could make available to Russia within the period October, 1941, to June, 1942. This involved much derangement of our military plans, already hampered by the tormenting shortage of munitions. All fell upon us, because we not only gave our own production, but had to forgo most important munitions which the Americans would otherwise have sent to us. Neither the Americans nor ourselves made any promise about the transportation of these supplies across the difficult and perilous ocean and Arctic routes. In view of the insulting reproaches which Stalin uttered when we suggested that the convoys should not sail till the the ice had receded, it should be noted that all we guaranteed was that the supplies would “be made available at British and United States centres of production.’’ The preamble of the protocol ended with the words. “ Great Britain and the United States will give aid to the transportation of these materials to the Soviet Union, and will help with the delivery.” . . . It was already late autumn. On October 2 the Central Army Group of von Bock renewed its advance on Moscow, with its two armies moving direct on the capital from the southwest and a Panzer group swinging wide on either flank. Orel on October 8 and a week later Kalinin on the Moscow-Leningrad road were taken. With his flanks thus endangered and under strong pressure from the central German advance, Marshal Timoshenko withdrew his forces to a line 40 miles west of Moscow, where he again stood to fight. The Russian position at this moment was grave in the extreme. The Soviet Government, the Diplomatic Corps, and all industry that could be removed were evacuated from the city over 500 miles farther east to Kuibyshev. The end of October brought a marked stiffening in Russian resistance and a definite cneck to the German advance.

Copyright, 1950, in USA by the New York Tirhes Company and Time, Inc. (publisher of Time and Life); in the British Empire by the Daily Telegraph, Ltd.; elsewhere by International Cooperation Press Service, Inc. World rights reserved. Reproduction in full or in part in any language strictly prohibited. Establishment of the Persian supply bridge to Russia is described in tomorrow’s instalment.