Deadlock at Naval Talks

Manawatu Times, Volume 59, Issue 273, 21 November 1934, Page 7

Deadlock at Naval Talks

Demands by Japanese

NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUE

(British Official Wireless.) RUGBY, Nov. 19.

The reply of the Japanese Government to the British suggestions for overcoming the deadlock in the naval talks in London was communicated this evening by the Japanese Ambassador in London to the Foreign Secretary, Sir Jolin Simon.

The reply cannot be regarded as offering an immediate solution of the difficulties, but it carries the conversations a-step further, and it, will be followed by further interviews between Britain and Japan.

Meanwhile*, the Foreign Secretary will naturally report to Cabinet, and an early opportunity, either to-morrow or on the following day, will be sought to inform the American delegation of the Japanese attitude. It is anticipated that there will be further Anglo-Japanesc conversations before the end of the week. It will be recalled that the British suggestions were directed towards reaching an alternative form of agreement in view of the refusal of the Japanese to accept a continuance of the rigidly-defined 5-5-3 ratio of naval strengths, as laid down in the Washington Treaty for Britain, America, and Japan respectively. Building Up to “The Ceiling.’’ The Japanese proposals demanded the acceptance of two principles as a basis of agreement, namely, first, non-aggres-sion and non-menace, and, secondly, equality in national security. In developing these demands during the conversations, the Japanese delegation urged that the upper limit in naval construction, picturesquely, called “the ceiling,’’ might be fixed to apply to all parties, which, however, would not necessarily build up to it. Japan, for example, conceded that Britain’s overseas responsibilities might well involve building up to “the ceiling,’’ whereas she, while being freo to do so, might not in fact undertake such a heavy programme. Japan, on tho other hand, questioned America’s need for naval superiority hitherto conceded. As parity between Britain and America's naval strength is recognised here as axiomatic, the effect of Japan’s claim to equal naval strength with America would apparently involve Japanese building tip to “the ceiling,” and would place Britain -with all the special responsibilities of her Empire in the position of being unable to make any special naval provision beyond that made by other Powers with less responsibilities. Britain had, therefore, indicated that she could not accept the principles of a common upper limit.

Other Important Problems. Suggestions put forward in the Anglo’-Japanese conversations included the possibility of a general acknowledgment of equal status among the Naval Powers, coupled with a continuance of the regulation of the size of navies and an agreement among the Powers to declare their programmes for a certain number of years in advance and thus cheek unregulated competition. There are other points of difference between the parties to the conversations, for instance, in regard to the size and types of capital ships, and the abolition of aircraft carriers and submarines.

It was with a view to overcoming some of these formidable differences that the suggestions referred to above were made by the British delegates when the Japanese proposals were under consideration,