THE FRANCO-RUSSIAN TREATY.

Lyttelton Times, Volume XCIX, Issue 11558, 20 April 1898, Page 5

THE FRANCO-RUSSIAN TREATY.

United Presa-Associafion—Br SdeetrioTeiegraph— l Copyright. PARIS, Annn IS. Speaking at Remiremont, M. Meline said that the Eussian alliance opened out to Erance an infinite horizon, and gave to the French a foreign policy of incomparable security, and force in the councils- of Europe. The Paris correspondent of 'the' LondonC “ Daily News,” telegraphing to ’that joumat a few weeks ago, said; M. Paul Deschanel, Vice-president-of'"the. Chamber, who is' believed to aim at the Foreign Secretaryship, speaking at the inaugural banquet of a new club, uttered the s most momentous words yet spoken on the Franco-Russian Alliance. A curious fact about the Franco-Russian Treaty is tbat aloneof all the instruments now governing the relations of European States, it is still secret. Even the Triple Alliance Treaty is known in its main lines. The solitary exception of the Franco-Russian Treaty to this rule of publicity is all the more striking, as this fact of secrecy makes the Treaty unconstitutional m France. However, as the French Parliament does not object, nobody else will. Now M. Deschanel breaks the rule of silence observed by French statesmen, and raises a corner of the veil that has up till now shrouded in mystery the treaty, entente,military agreement, or whatever it may be, that binds Prance and Russia. We are indebted to M. Deschanel for knowing that the Bill of Exchange for service between France and Russia is what brokers would call a long bill 11 provides for no less an eventuahty than the break up of tbe Austrian monarchy. On the death of the Emperor Francis Joseph, it is believed that the German provinces will return to the unity of the German Empire. I shall not attempt to prophesy wbat other territorial changes will follow. France and Russia may object, but more probably ask to compound. ■ France, of coarse, is always open to receive Alsace-Lorraine, if Germany can see her way to give them back, but then, as Prince Bismarck said to the Emperor Napoleon in 1866. “ The German public feel an invincible repugnance to cede any portion of Gexman soil.” Napoleon, I may explain, wanted compensation after Sadowa, including the left bank of the Rhine to Mayence, Bismarck in return suggested that he should take Belgium. Perhaps, should the question of compensation arise, the Emperor William may repeat this offer,, unless he finds it better policy to square Russia alone. Biit to come to M. Descbanel’s speech, or that paragraph relating to foreign policy. He spoke as follows : —“ We have discharged a most noble task, which may be spoken of as an historical mission. The first years of the twentieth century must witness by the effect of natural vicissitudes in the House of Austria, a decisive drama. It is easy even now to foresee at arty rate the prologue and the first acts. The part France will play is traced out beforehand. The book of destiny lies open before our eyes. But to act our part well there must be no trusting to improvised expedients. We must begin our preparations at once. But how to do so if France is to be absorbed and distracted by miserable quarrels? The springs of her policy should, to be successful, tend to intervention when those natural vicissitudes have npened the Austrian question. That intervention should be her great present aim. But again, how prepare for it if our eternal dissensions go on, with the instability and weakness, that must be the consequence? Such dissensions leave statesmen withofftthe power to develop the new Franco-Russian policy, which is held in germ in the Treaty of Alliance, or to draw from that agreement by attention a vigilant, a proud diplomacy, and all the consequences that two great nations expect for their own grandeur and the general.good of civilisation.”