STOCKS AND BOOTY FAILING

Evening Star, Issue 23831, 11 March 1941, Page 9

STOCKS AND BOOTY FAILING

GERMANY FEELS THE PINCH NAZI OIL LEVEL LOW The British blockade of Germany temporarily faded from news while the Nazi locust swarms fed upon the industrial stocks and' stores of occupied territories, leaving them as bare as they had earlier left Austria and Czecho Slovakia. Already the victims are publicly groaning that “ stocks of imported raw materials are now exhausted.” (‘ Vaderland,’ Holland, February 11, 1941.) To-day few lands remain' on which Nazi swarms can settle in search of an easy bellyful. Once more the German news sources reveal that the Reich is feeling the pinch, particularly in some important industrial raw materials.

Rubber, being a tropical product, was the object of‘Germany’s biggest ersatz pusji, but buna —the substitute-—can-not fill the whole needs of German industry. In particular there is nut nearly enough for tyres. Thus all spares have been impounded, not only in the Reich, but in occupied territories. Even Rumanians have been told by decree Hamburger Fremdenblatt,’ Fcbruary_ 9, 1941) that they must restrict their use of private cars, “ thereby reducing Rumania’s rubber consumption.” Inside the Reich, where private cars have long since disappeared, the injunctions are reserved for bicyclists, orders and appeals to whom are almost daily published in the Rress. Boys must not be boys; “ Don’t give lifts to your friends. This is forbidden, as it overstrains your tyres ” (December, 19-10). Even the Hitler Youth leader receives a permit for a new tyro only when out spying. “ Members of the Hitler Jugend can obtain a permit only if the bicycle is absolutely necessary for service purposes—for example, for watching members of his group in country districts.” (German Official News Agency, October 1, 1940.) The acute shortage of tin is reflected in alarming warnings against poison by food packed in black-plate (lacquered sheet steel) that is used as a substitute. A container that looks like a dirty penny is not an appetiser when opened in conjunction with announcements that “ food packed in black-plate tins must be eaten before the end of the month” (‘ Wostfaliscbe Landerszeitung,’ February 16, 1941), or that “ after two months your sausage will turn black , and may taste of iron t‘ Ekstrabladet,’ Denmark, November I, The ferro-a I loving metals—that is, the special materials required for strengthening the resistance of special steels—are in short supply, but Jess is heard of this important shortage. Because it does not affect consumption goods, only the expert is aware of this crucial gap in the Nazi defences. The German public, whose confidence must he maintained, can be kept in the dark. But better-informed peoples outside Germany are keenly aware' that the Axis can buy no nickel and next to no chrome, while from Portugal and Spain come stories of lengths to which German Buyers will go to scrape up such wolfram as is available. Petroleum and lubricants are the heel of Achilles. They represent the crux of the Axis’s supply problem, both because the fountain heads are limited and because delivery at bases stretching from northern Norway to southern Sicily is presenting a distribution problem of magnitude. Briefly, the position is as follows :■ — The peacetime consumption of Germany and Italy was about 16,000,060 tons per annum. Their homo production of natural and synthetic oil (ignoring 11. A.F. damage to plant) plus the yield of Albanian and Polish wells, comes to about 4,(XX),(XX) tons per annum. More than half of their needs (even calculated on a peacetime basis) must, therefore, come from elsewhere. Oil is unique in that its transport requires special facilities. It cannot be carried cheaply except by pipe line or by ship, and as 85 per cent, of the world’s oil production (1938) comes from the America or the Indian Ocean, a power that is denied access to the sea is seriously handicapped. The best illustration of this home truth is_ that whereas private motoring is forbidden in Germany, in England it has not been necessary to alter the petrol ration for the private motorist since it was first instituted, September, 1939. The Axis is, therefore, left to get what it can carry from the only available- sources—namely, Russia and Rumania. The former, though infinitely the greater producer, is a rapidly declining exporter, ami anyway must send its chief contribution by a route that is already proving unequal to the burden of Rumanian export. Rumania, therefore, is the Axis’s chief

hope of the foreign oil that both Germany and Italy must secure. Can (Rumania fill the bill? The answer is: Not entirely. Axis Powers themselves produce well tinder half their peacetime requirements. .Rumania’s total export in 1940 did not amount to the balance. Production in 1941 is expected to be slightly less, for output of Rumanian wells is declining. It has done so steadily in every year since 1936. Germany received from Rumania in 1940 only 1,482,000 tons of oil. (By stinting Rumania’s other customers— Hungary, Switzerland, Yugo-Slavia. and Bulgaria— she hopes to raise the figure to 3,000,000 tons in the current year, but 3,000,000 tons is not enough for an Axis war, and, anyway, the carrying problem looms large since the existing Danube tanker fleet can at maximum manage 1,250,000 tons per annum and carriage by rail is difficult owing to overwork on the limited number of lines which connect the new Balkan Reichwehr with home. Oil tank cars,- because they must return empty, 'are an uneconomic feature of railway goods traffic. They cannot on return carry the sauerkraut and munitions to Germany’s new outposts. There may he something in the contention that one motive behind Hitler’s latest exploit was to move his army nearer to his oil. Stocks and booty don’t last for ever. Even primed with the not wholly sufficient Rumanian supply, the Nazi oil level is low. Without it the danger mark would be passed. (Rumania’s wells, refineries, and supply lines constitute one of the most vital targets in Europe.