Russia and the West

Press, Volume CX, Issue 32460, 21 November 1970, Page 16

Russia and the West

The agreement reached in Warsaw between Poland and West Germany completes the second stage of Chancellor Brandt’s drive for better relations with the East European Governments. The West German Foreign Minister, Mr Scheel, appears to have accepted Mr Gomulka’s terms for the “normalisa- “ tion ” of relations between the two countries. Recognition by Bonn of the permanence of the OderNeisse frontier seemed inevitable after the BonnMoscow pact; signed in August, this pact recognised existing European frontiers as final. Now Mr Brandt will presumably want to get on with his planned approaches to Czechoslovakia and East Germany, encouraged by the substantial support given the Free Democrats in the Hesse state elections. It was clear before Mr Scheel left for Warsaw for the final stage of the treaty negotiations that, on the border issue, he would have no room for manoeuvre. Mr Gomulka had said uncompromisingly that Poland’s western frontier must stand. Whether any concession was made on the question of the German minority in Poland is not yet clear. The Poles argued that expulsions and emigration after the war had virtually solved that problem. They had, indeed, refused to regard it as relevant to the treaty talks; but they may have agreed, nevertheless, to make it easier for German-born Poles to emigrate. Even that concession, however, would be made reluctantly. German authorities estimated that 270,000 Germans remained in Poland; 200,000 had sought exit visas. The Poles protested that the loss of all these workers would greatly harm their economy, particularly farming. Already, the Poles said, there were serious shortages of grain and meat. Mr Brandt will no doubt be pleased with the progress he is making, despite the uneasiness in West Germany over the implications of the BonnMoscow pact. This uneasiness cannot have been allayed by Mr Brandt’s apparent surrender, after 25 years, of any hope of recovering the territories lost to Poland. With East Germany the bargaining should be even harder. Mr Ulbricht will be satisfied with nothing less than full international recognition. It is unlikely that Mr Brandt will go any further than he has already gone in acknowledging the existence of “two Germanys within one nation”— which certainly comes pretty close to recognition. The signs are that neither the Russians nor the East Germans are willing to admit that Berlin has a special position. Here, it seems, Mr Brandt will have to be firm in his refusal to ratify the Moscow pact until Berlin’s status has been determined to the satisfaction of the Western Powers.