SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 21,1970. N.Z. butter in an enlarged E.E.C.

Press, Volume CX, Issue 32460, 21 November 1970, Page 16

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 21,1970. N.Z. butter in an enlarged E.E.C.

The report from Brussels on the proposed reduction in imports of butter from New Zealand is the first concrete evidence that the European Economic Community is prepared to make concessions on this point during negotiations on the terms of British entry. The report discloses the outline of a plan prepared by the E.E.C. Commission, the permanent secretariat of the Community. It should be emphasised that the Commission, like a Government department reporting on a controversial matter to the Cabinet, has no authority to commit the E.E.C.; the Council of Ministers, or even the Government of any E.E.C. member, could veto the Commission's proposals. It is reasonable to assume, however, that the Commission would not put up a report which was likely to suffer this fate; it is reasonble, even, to assume that the report was “checked out” with influential E.E.C. politicians before it was circulated. The observation of the New Zealand Press Association’s Brussels correspondent that “this is “ merely a first position from the commission ” should also be noted. The important thing is that the E.E.C. has acknowledged that New Zealand’s is, indeed, a “ special case ”; that its “ first positibn ” is a long way short of New Zealand’s expectations is hardly surprising. Thanks largely to the efforts of the energetic and persuasive Minister of Trade, Mr Marshall, New Zealand may have jumped the first hurdle. From now on New Zealand’s—and Mr Marshall's —efforts must be directed mainly at Britain. It is Britain, not New Zealand, which is negotiating to enter the E.E.C. For France, the prospect of, selling surplus butter to Britain is a compelling economic inducement to allow Britain into the E.E.C. Any further reduction or postponement of that inducement must make Britain a less attractive partner for France in the E.E.C. However sympathetic Mr Rippon may be towards New Zealand, he will surely find that pressing New Zealand’s claims for a larger or more permanent share of the United Kingdom market for butter merely stiffens the resistance of the French. He may even find that the French will expect Britain to pay for further concessions to New Zealand in the form of stiffer terms of entry in other respects. This is not to say that all New Zealand can expect Britain to do is to drop New Zealand’s legitimate claims as soon as the expected opposition appears. Seldom is the “first position” stated by one party to an international trade agreement so firmly held that it cannot be modified by negotiation. In this case Britain will be able to argue, with some justification, that the E.E.C. owes this “ concession ” to New Zealand, not to Britain; that the concession so far offered is not enough; and that in any event the E.E.C., not Britain, should meet the cost of the concession. (This statement, too, would be a “ first “ position ”, subject to possible modification by negotiation.) The commission’s recommendation that action should be taken to try to improve conditions of the world dairy produce market in the five-year transition period probably raised hollow laughter in the offices of the New Zealand Dairy Board. New Zealand has been trying to do just this since the early days of the Kennedy Round negotiations—and the E.E.C. members have been among the most obstructive opponents of the New Zealand proposals. This may be the opportunity, however, to extract a promise from the recalcitrant Europeans of better behaviour during the next round of talks among butter exporters. In short, the Commission’s proposals—if adopted by the Council of Ministers and accepted by Britain—would deal the New Zealand dairy industry a heavy blow. But the proposals may yet be substantially modified; the production of the report, however chilling its contents to New Zealand readers, is encouraging in itself. New Zealand is now on the E.E.C.’s agenda, as well as on Britain’s.