INDONESIA WHAT WILL COME FROM A SOBERED SUKARNO?

Press, Volume CIV, Issue 30939, 21 December 1965, Page 20

INDONESIA WHAT WILL COME FROM A SOBERED SUKARNO?

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MICHAEL GARDNER

of the "IcooonUet ")

{Freni the "Zeoaomirt" IMelNoenee DattJ How often do you read of an Asian mob shouting; "Long live the United States?” Yet that was the unlikely atofan rained by aome of the demonstrators after the failure of a Communist coup in Indonesia on September 30. Now that the dust has begun to settle, what can we expect of this nation of 100 million people Whose President Sukarno once told the American ambassador, “Go to hell with your aid ?”

It would be foolish to offer a clear-cut answer. Though they are certainly being blamMr it, it is still not Quite n that it was the Communists who planned the coup. It is not certain that the coup was in fact aimed against Sukarno: it may pave been aimed chiefly against the anti Communist generals who represented the only seri-

ous opposition to Communist ambitions. It is not even certain that Sukarno did not know of the coup in advance. All that is certain is that Sukarno is still, nominally, on top; and that, beneath him, power is now held by the generals. The three million strong Communist party is being mercilessly harried, and has been banned in many parts of Indonesia. Its leader, Mr Aidit. has been reported “shot while trying to escape.** More likely, he is still in hiding. “Nasakom” Principle Sukarno is still trying desperately to preserve the “Nasakom’’ principle—the balance of nationalism, religion and communism—which has been both the theory and (surprisingly) the practice of his rule. The future depends very much on how far the generals will push their determination to remove Communism from the balance. There is no sign that Sukarno is a spent force. Outside his own country, his bombastic speeches, his self-advert-ised and probably justified reputation as a woman-chaser, and the inefficiency of his regime have combined to make him something of a figure of fun. He is not He seems to be still Immensely popular, and he has not remained the leader of Indonesia for twenty years by being a fool.

What happens vitally concerns the British, who now have 50,000 troops and the vast British base at Singapore defending Malaysia against Indonesian “confrontation.” It also concerns the United States, which both values the British presence in Singapore and has regarded Indonesia as the best long-term counterweight in South-east Asia to Communist China. Will Quarrel End? What Britain hopes for is an end to “confrontation.” WIU Indonesia stop it? It U not impossible. Part of the quarrel has been about the f ormer British colonies in the island of Borneo. When these colonies became part of Malaysia, President Sukarno complained that their inhabitants had not been properly consulted first—meaning, 1

suspect, that he had not been property consulted. The suspicion in British minds was that if he got his way with the north Borneo territories he would go on to “confront” the rest of Malaysia—just as after his success in Dutch West Guinea he proceeded to turn bis eyes on Borneo. Luft to themselves, Malaysia and a Sukarno sobered up by his generals should be able to come to some agreement But will he be sobered up? Anti-Communist they may be. but the Indonesian army leaders have never shown any lack of enthusiasm for Sukarno’s war. War. after all, is how annles justify their existence, and their claim for funds.

The real obstacle may be Singapore. There Britain has a decided interest tad intends to maintain it Sukarno regards the British base as an imperialist dagger aimed at his own country in particular and the “new emerging forces” in general. Over Singapore Britain’s intierest links up with the wider interests of the United States. The two Governments believe

they have a joint responsibility for acting as the guardian of southern Asia, mainly against the Chinese, and the British base at Singapore is an important element in their more-oNess joint strategy. Net Pro-Western Will Indonesian distrust of China overcome Indonesian distrust of the neottnperiaUst ambitions (which la how they claim to see it) of Britain and the United States? The generals at present are angry enough with the Chinese, whom they accuse of aiding the September 50 plot But neither that, nor their anticommunism, makes them prowestern, as they are sometimes wrongly described. They are Indonesian nationalists. Even if the generals maintain their present dominance in Indonesia, it looks as if Britain and the United States will be very lucky to achieve more than an uneasy peace with them. And in any case that is a very big if: remember that Chiang Kai-shek once thought he had crushed the Chinese Communist Party.