TARIFF DEADLOCK AT GENEVA

Press, Volume LXXXIII, Issue 25306, 4 October 1947, Page 9

TARIFF DEADLOCK AT GENEVA

American Attitude To Preferences COMMENT - BY “THE TIMES” (N.Z. Press Association—Copyright) (Rec. 11.20 p.m.) LONDON, Oct. 3. “The British-American’ discussions at Geneva over the draft tariff agreement have reached a deadlock not because Britain or the Commonwealth generally is unbending in defence of Empire preferences, but because there are signs that United States opinion has not fully appreciated how the Commonwealth prizes these institutions,” says “The Times” in a leading article. “At no time have the tariff concessions offered by the United States appeared substantisl enough in terms of additional trade to justify the elimination of any large number of preferences. America seems to have insisted that even a reduction was not everywhere enough, and that the elimination of many preferences wss required. “In many respects the United States proposed no more than roughly a return to the 1922 tariff, which was itself considered very high. It was hardly likely that the Commonwealth representatives, particularly those of the United Kingdom, would feel they were offered a reasonable exchange. “The United Kingdom is more than ever unwilling to sacrifice, without due recompense, something which at any rate keeps her closer to her own kin and assures her of an element of stability and security in an' uncertain world.

The Ottawa Agreements “There are grounds for believing thst the effect of the 1332 Ottawa agreements was not to restrict the total of world trade, but possibly even slightly to increase it. When the agreements were due for revision in 1937, however, there was little desire to expand them. The Commonwealth countries found that the United Kingdom, though a good market, was not really an expanding market for primary products, and the United Kingdom found that the preferences on manufactured goods were being to some extent nullified by tariffs erected for the protection of infant industries in the Dominions.

“The natural course was to maintain the preferences but not to increase the ties. The undertakings to reduce preferences are regarded, with ample justification from past experience, as a real sacrifice.

“It may not be easily intelligible why American opinion should see nothing'but good in a European customs union and nothing but evil in customs links within the Empire, but Britain will be none the less willing to make concessions to that opinion for the sake of amity, if she cannot dispel it. “A Limit to Sacrifices”

“There is, however, a limit tc the real and material sacrifices which can be made ih the cause of conciliation. The Commonwealth is asked to embark on the ‘elimination’ of a system which, though it may not have produced miracles, is not cheaply valued and serves in some degree as an anchor when economic storms threaten. “It must be clear that the Empire cannot be asked lightly to give up such a proud and prized possession, nor will the states of the Commonwealth easily believe arty suggestion that the small measure of mutual preference they now enjoy has had any damaging effect on world trade as a whole in the past or can threaten any such effect in the future. “In fact, there can be no retreat from the general principle which has been propounded all along—that if any Considerable part of the Empire preference system is to be abandoned it C*n be only in return for tariff concessions Which offer the certain prospect of substantial and expanding markets elsewhere.”