THE INDIAN DEADLOCK

Press, Volume LXXIX, Issue 23881, 25 February 1943, Page 6

THE INDIAN DEADLOCK

Sir,—l do not think that your leading article, and many other public utterances, condemn Gandhi’s threat with sufficient boldness. There is no essential difference between Gandhi’s action and that of a man who mutilates himself to excite the compassion of others and thereby to obtain from them what he desires. Such action is criminal. Had Gandhi’s fast been purely religious in intention, then the Government offer of temporary release was sufficient. By refusing the offer, Gandhi plainly declares that his object is political coercion. If the Government surrendered to this it would be condoning criminal action.—Yours, etc itOBT. LAWSON. February 23, 1943.

Sir.—One cannot but feel grave concern at your short-term view of the Indian situation. Your arguments cease to possess the value of historical realism when read in conjunction with the British Government’s assurance of independence immediately the war terminates. If the war ended in six months, do you actually mean to assert that all the problems you so eloquently array as being insuperable obstacles against granting independence now, would miraculously vanish? Certainly not. Then what stands in the way? Economic, commercial, and strategic considerations —bastions upholding Empire. You know the present deplorable deadlock is not the outcome of recent events but of a long and painful, shortsighted British policy sponsored by unrealistic politicians whose sole aim has been holding India by force of arms for reasons not primarily humanitarian. —Yours, etc., C. R. N. MACKIE. February 23, 1943.