Air Superiority

Press, Volume LXXVIII, Issue 23742, 14 September 1942, Page 4

Air Superiority

Emphasis on stich total figures as those of the United States aeroplane production programme, which promises 6Q,000 machines this year and 125,000 next year, tends to create the impression that the struggle for air superiority is essentially a struggle for superiority in numbers. Numerical superiority is of course one aim; but it cannot be disconnected, without enormous danger, from the effort to hold or gain or widen superiority in performance and tactical design. Mr Churchill, in his statement to the House of Commons, referred to the British fighter-bombers which, in the desert battle, have achieved “results at least equal to those of “ the Stukas, without the latter’s “ vulnerability.” The “ Aeroplane,” last week, reported the first appearance over England of the new German bomber, the Heinkel 177; and recently, when a Messerschmitt 210 was brought dov/n almost intact, British experts had the opportunity to examine minutely the latest German fighter-bomber. Mr Churchill’s comment, not casually introduced, points straight to the one advantage with which Britain began the war in the air, and which has never been lost. The Battle of Britain fully revealed it; Hurricanes and Spitfires against Stukas were hawks against pigeons, and could outspeed, out-manoeuvre, and outshoot the escorting Messerschmitts. Ever since, although Stukas, in combination with other arms, have contributed to German successes, their limitations have been apparent. It may be an exaggeration to say that these cost the Germans a decisive battle. It is not an exaggeration to say that, though the possession and use of dive-bombers would have helped the Royal Air Force from time to time, in suitable conditions, it has lost little and gained much by using ordinary bombers and cannon-fighters instead; and there is some reason to believe that the German loss-rate in the Battle of Britain, renewed in the early months of the Russian campaign, compelled the Germans to continue the mass production of inferior types, impeding factory change-over to improved and new ones. This delay has to some extent assisted British design and production to maintain superiority and advance it. Only the German FockeWulf 190, a fighter/Jdesigned in 1939, has till now narrowed the margin

held by the improved Hurricanes and Spitfires; but it is estimated to lag well behind the Typhoon or the American Thunderbolt. Little is known of the Messerschmitt 210 or the new Heinkel; but no German bomber in service, till now, is comparable with the Halifax. Stirling, and Lancaster types, far surpassing the Blenheim and the Wellington, which represented a two years’ lead on German design. Superiority also rests with such American types as the fast Martin Marauder; and even Liberators and Fortresses are only the size of giants like the Boeing 829 and Consolidated 832, whose production is under way. Still newer types, fighter, bomber, and fighter-bomber, are reported to embody enormous but still wholly secret improvements in design and function. There, however, as in the references to delays in German change-over and to Britain’s two-year lead, appears one of the most anxious factors in the problem of establishing qualitative superiority. From first design to service production, years rather than months intervene. Hurricanes and Spitfires were designed in 1933 and adopted in 1934: squadron production was not achieved till 1938. 'The Typhoon was designed in 1937; it was not expected to be in largescale production till late this year or early next. The combatant who succeeds best in reducing the time between building an idea and building the squadrons that use it will hold a lead—or wrest it. In air warfare, says Major de Seversky, the American expert, quality is relatively more decisive than quantity; and that is why a much-heralded new enemy type, such as the Heinkel and the Messerschmitt which the Germans are apparently just putting into service, is watched for with great concern. Unless the Germans have made the qualitative leap that alone can redress the balance for them, the Luftwaffe will be fighting an irretrievably lost battle.