The Press MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 14, 1942. The Chinese Puzzle

Press, Volume LXXVIII, Issue 23742, 14 September 1942, Page 4

The Press MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 14, 1942. The Chinese Puzzle

Recent military developments m the Chekiang and Kiangsi provinces of China are at the moment arousing keen interest among students of Japanese strategy. In May of this year Japanese forces estimated at 100,000 men were landed at various points on the Chekiang coast and drove inland until they were astride the strategically-important Chekiang-Kiangsi railway. It was assumed that this offensive had two main objectives: to get the Che-kiang-Kiangsi railway back into working order, thereby stabilising the Japanese position in Kiangsi, which is China’s key province, and to capture the Chekiang aerodromes, which are within bomber range of Japan’s main cities and from one of which General Doolittle’s raid on Tokyo was organised. Many observers argued, however, that the Japanese army in Chekiang was much larger than was warranted by these limited objectives and that the offensive must be regarded as part of an attempt to knock China out of the war. At this time, it will be recalled, the British forces in central and northern Burma were in full retreat and another Japanese offensive was battering at China’s back door—the Buripa Road province of Yunnan. However that may be, it is certain that Japan at this time waged war more vigorously bn the Chinese mainland than at any time since the fall of the Wuhan cities and that in June Washington and London regarded the collapse of Chinese resistance as an imminent possibility. In the brief space of about two months the situation has changed dramatically. Throughout Chekiang and Kiangsi the Japanese are in full retreat; and, if it is true that Kinhwa has fallen, the military position is now what it was before Japan’s May offensive. The question arises why the Japanese command has chosen to give up ground for which it has paid heavily in men and material and which has an even greater strategic importance now than it had three months ago. For clearly what has happened is in the main a withdrawal; the Chinese armies, even now that they have air support, are not yet capable of pushing back the main Japanese armies. The airfields at Lishui and Chuhsien, now in Chinese hands, are 600 miles from the Japanese naval base at Nagasaki; and there must now be scores of United States bombers in China capable of operating at this range. To abandon these airfields just when the air power of th? United Nations in the Chinese theatre is beginning to develop striking power seems strangely inconsequent. The Japanese official communique says enigmatically that forces are being withdrawn from Chekiang and Kiangsi “ to secure a “position for future actions.’’ All this would make sense if it could be assumed that Japan was preparin to strike at Russia; for in that event any threat to the Japanese cities from the Chekiang airfields would be negligible compared with the threat from Soviet airfields in the Vladivostok area. Indeed, it may well be that United Nations air resources in China are still too small to stand the heavy wastage which would be involved in regular bombing of Japan. But there is solid satisfaction in the thought that, whatever interpretation is placed on recent military developments in China, it is at least certain that Japan’s long-term plans have gone awry.