U.S.A. RELATIONS.

Auckland Star, Volume LXXI, Issue 154, 1 July 1940, Page 5

U.S.A. RELATIONS.

HOARE-SIMON GROUP.

BRITAIN'S EVIL GENIUSES.

CHANGE ON DISMISSAL. (By JOSEPH ALSOP and ROBERT KINTXER.) WASHINGTON, May 20. On the topic of foreign affaire, too many American political leaders sound like Xeville Chamberlain on a bad day; this country hae no right to feel excessively superior about the English leadership. Yet it is a fact distinctly worth recording that the retirement from the Cabinet of Sir Samuel Hoare and Sir John Simon will make a marked difference in the relations between the English and American Governments.

Of Chamberlain himself, the opinion of the President and the men around him has simply been that he was a wellmeaning old man earnestly doing his tragically inadequate ibest. But of Simon and Hoare, clever, cold and short-sighted, the American policy-makers have always been deeply suspicious. They have thought that the extreme defeatist viewpoint of Ambassador Joseph P. Kennedy reflected the thinking of theoe two men, and they have blamed them for the dank half-heartedness which has sometimes afflicted the British war effort. As Chancellor of the Exchequer, Simon was the real bete noire. Early this winter, in this space, it was recorded that in the highest Treasury and State Department quarters, the "theorv was held that the English were attempting to "crowd" the United States on the question of credits. Treasury and State Department officials joined in accusing the English Treasury of "playing poor."

At the time, this theory appeared to be the result of mere over-sensitivity on the part of American officials. Now "that the whole story is known, however, it

becomes much mors easy to understand. A man like Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, jun., who was desperately anxious to do everything in his power to help the Allies, could not help making his own conclusions when he saw the niggling policies imposed on the Anglo-French purchasing mission from London. The head of the purchasing mission, the able Arthur Purvis, and his equally well-equipped French colleagues, were anxious to use the resources of American industry to the full on behalf of the Allies. But they could hardly hope to do so when, for example, their air contracts calling for construction of 10,000 war 'planes were cut in London to 4600 'planes, or more than in half. Real Suspicions. From varioue signs, such as the constant objections from London to the clause in the air contracts requiring payment for the 'planes whether or not the war was over, the American policymakers even deduced than an appeasement of negotiated peace was still favourably looked on in some quarters. They may have been right or wrong in this. They may also have been right or wrong in blaming Simon and Hoare. Certainly someone was bitterly to blame, for from the first hour of that war it was clear the Allies needed as many 'planes as they could buy, borrow or steal; and the real effort to get all the 'planes deliverable has only just begun.

The important pofnt is that this suspicion of the half-heartedness of the Allies has now utterly disappeared. The old proverb, "The Lord helps them who help themselves," applies to others besides the Almighty. The converse application of it, unwilingness to do much for people who seemed unable to do much for themselves, has been extremely visible in American publicopinion. It has also been visible, even more significantly, within the administration. Its disappearance is a great jrain. I Too Damned Smart. One reason for the niggling Allied purchasing policy was, of course, the! English and French fear that when! their cash resources gave out this j country would simply let them goj under. But here, it se#ms clear, men like Simon and Hoare were guilty of the kind of miscalculation

which originates in being too smart. Xow that the Allies really are' helping themselves, the desire in this country to help them if necessary is growing by leaps and bounds. In the past two or three days, your correspondents have talked to ostensibly isolationist Republican Senators, extreme New Dealers, moderates in the Administration and in Congress—in fact to men of every political colour. From all sides in a virtually unanimous chorus, has come the admission, sometimes grudging, but always frank, that if and when the time came this country ought to help the Allies by supplying the sinews of war. There is no emotion behind thie admission. It arises from the conviction that in the end helping the Allies by all methods short of sending an expedition* ary force will be the cheapest and safest thing to do.

It is important in another respect that the admission is being made bo soon. For as the sense of our true position becomes more widespread, the demand for immediate rearmament grows more urgent. And while national preparedness is vital, it is also vital that this preparedness should not be accomplished at the expense of the Allies, whose need for war supplies is far more pressing than ours.— (N.A.N JL)