U.S. MILITARY POLICY

Ashburton Guardian, Volume 70, Issue 124, 10 March 1950, Page 3

U.S. MILITARY POLICY

GENERAL BRADLEY’S REVIEW ASSEMBLING OF FORCES (N.Z.P. A.—Copyright) WASHINGTON, March 8. General Omar Bradley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said' to-day that its present forces coukl not give the United States an absolute guarantee against “a disastrous blow.” However, he felt that the United States would achieve the necessary forces to prevent a disastrous attack from crippling the United States.

“I also believe that our forces in being and our mobilisation base will be sufficient, together with the forces and potential of friendly nations, to win a war if it comes.”

General Bradley said that the Navy’s anti-submarine preparations should continue as fast, as facilities for research and development' t permitted. Rapid progress, he said, was being made.

He added: “Our stockpile of atomic bombs and our ability to deliver them afford us an immediate but inconclusive blow of retaliation. Our research and development programme, not only in bombs and missiles but also in other weapons, and techniques, if properly maintained and supported, should continue to improve the position of the United States and its friends.” General Bradley said that the United States over a long period of peace should not expect to match Russia aeroplane for aeroplane, ship for ship, and division for division without lowering its living standard. “It is the desire of some American people to assemble forces that statistically would give the United States a preponderance of military power next year. Then we would have become aii armed camp. Such action would be a drain not only on our economy, but also on democracy and its many freedoms. This, nation bad adopted a longrange policy of international peace and international security. This policy needs the support of a sound longrange • military policy that cannot be bent by each shift in the wind and tempered or softened from day to day.” General Bradley said that if military preparations behind the Iron Curtain became the yardstick of those policies the likelihood of peace became as unpredictable as spring weather. American military planning, tie added, called for three commitments: (d) The maintenance of sufficient strength t<s prevent disaster in (he event of an attack and to strike a retaliatory blow strong enough slow down the aggressor while the United States mobilised. (2) The provision of educational training, and logistical facilities to assure the quick expansion of the armed forces when it was needed. (3) The maintenance of sufficient forces Avith sufficient arms to protect the United States and hold bases which the United States would need m case of Avar.