FEDERAL POLICY

Ashburton Guardian, Volume 70, Issue 124, 10 March 1950, Page 3

FEDERAL POLICY

AIMS DEFINED

PRESERVATION OF PEACE (N.Z.P. A.—Copy right) CANBERRA, March 9. “The aims of Australian foreign policy are self-evident and unchanging,” said the Minister of External Affairs (Mr P. C. Spender), in a statement on Australia’s external relations delivered to-night in the Federal House of Representatives. “They are essentially the preservation of peace and our way of life. Inseparable from these aims is the closest possible co-operation within the British Commonwealth and with the United States and other nations friendly to the Commonwealth.

“It is a fundamental fallacy to imagine that different areas of the world admit of a solution of their special problems without regard to all other areas.”

Mr Spender announced the Government’s intention of establishing a standing committee, similar to those existing in Canada and New Zealand since the Second World War. The committee would have a broad mandate to study external affairs in the widest sense, and would comprise the best minds in both Houses, both Government and Opposition. . The establishment of the committee would not affect the responsibility of the Government for the determination and conduct of foreign policy, but the committee would be able to give a lead to the policy-makers. Support for British Empire

Australia should give first consideration to her own defence, but since her security was, to a large extent dependent upon the strength and influence of Britain in world affairs, Australia must be vitally concerned in Britain’s interests and safety. There were also special duties to the British Commonwealth, to each of its members, and to the United States as the greatest Pacific Power. “We believe that the Msis of the struggle which has developed since the war lies in the Soviet foreign policy,” continued Mr Spender. He described the apparent Soviet policy in a series of propositions which he challenged Russia to deny. These were:—

(1) That Russian policy was essentially global in character, with a necessary inter-dependence between its European and Asiatic policies. (2) The ultimate objective of Russian policy was world Communism, with Moscow as the controlling centre. The policy was “either inspired by a belief that only by the destruction of other forms of government can Communism be secured, or inspired by no other motive than aggression,” (3) The immediate purpose of Russian policy was to work towards its ultimate objective by Communist infiltration in all democratic countries. This infiltration was organised from Moscow. Its aim was to create unrest, economic disruption, and the destruction of Governments.

(4) This purpose would be pursued in the belief that the so-called capitalist countries possessed no inherent internal cohesion, and would separately collapse; that they could be divided within themselves, and that time worked in the Russian interest.

Western Independence

“The peoples of the Wester© democracies have no wish to interfere with tjj'e internal organisation of any country,” continued Mr Spender. “They are irrevocably opposed to any attempt, by whatever means, by any one country to impose its will or organisation on any other.

“The Western democracies are opposed to aggression in . any form—whether it emanates from the socalled Right or the Left.” The position was no different, whether In Europe or the Western Pacific. Southeast Asian policy must be seen in this world perspective. Part of the Soviet domestic policy, which undoubtedly formed part of Russia’s foreign policy, was a deliberate attempt to build up capital structures and divert resources into developmental projects at the expense of the people. Those complacent about the relatively advanced stage of Western industrial development should remember how quickly relative circumstances changed. Mr Spender advocated immediate international efforts to stabilise the South-east Asian Governments, and to create conditions and living standards in the South-east Asian countries under which the false ideological attraction of Communism would lose its force. He did not think that Communist China would in the near future be able to make a tangible move towards raising living standards in its-areas.. This opportunity for action must, be seized by the Western Powers.

Referring to the Japanese question, Mr Spender said; “We have to make up our minds whether we are going to support the policy of holding the'Japanese people down indefinitely, or let them, under necessary safeguards, resume their place as an industrial nation.”

The Australian people had made it clear that every necessary precaution must be taken against any resurgence of Japanese militarism, but it was difficult to escape the conclusion that Japan would have to be allowed to become self-supporting by her industrial production and trade, “whether we like it or not.” It Avas the view of the present as well as of the former Australian Government that the peace settlement with Japan should be made as soon as possible, said Mr Spender. The Japanese problem was supremely important to Australia, and should be accorded a full debate in its own righf. Of equal importance was the concept of a regional pact for defence and security, the nucleus of which, ho hoped, would be formed by Commonwealth countries, Mr Spender said. Irrespective of this, it was essential that nothing occurred in the island areas adjacent to Australia which could in any* way offer a threat to Australian security.

Relations With U.S.

It was hoped, by taxation adjustments, to stimulate the flow of American capital to Australia, but this alone was not enough. It was the Australian

objective to build up with the United States a similar relationship as existed with the British Commonwealth, with a full exchange of information on all important matters and consultation on questions of mutual Interest. “We are sure that it is to our interest to provide to'the maximum extent of our capacity those resources which will help to consolidate the Governments of South-East Asia on such a sound democratic basis that no extremism can flourish,” concluded JVIr Spender. “But 1 now wish to go further.

“On the assumptions I have made regarding Soviet foreign polic.v, it is our duty to develop our "security policy. At the same time, this precaution is taken without hostility or vindictiveness, with no thoughts of aggression or destruction of another economic system, and always with the hope that the assumptions will be demonstrated without doubt to be wrong.

“It is taken 'in the belief that cooperation in the urgent task of peace can be secured as in war, but with the reservation that failing co-operation, there will be a situation against yvhich we have a duty to protect ourselves.”