Ashburton Guardian. Magna est Veritas et Prævalebit. WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 21, 1906. CRITICS OF THE NAVY.

Ashburton Guardian, Volume xxviii, Issue 7032, 21 November 1906, Page 2

Ashburton Guardian. Magna est Veritas et Prævalebit. WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 21, 1906. CRITICS OF THE NAVY.

The British Navy is a subject of much controversy—so much so that ii is hard to get at the real truth concerning it. One set of crifcios from time to time declare it to be in a bad way, and quite unfit for its great task of safe-guarding, under all contingencies, our far-spread Empire. On the other hand, these gentlemen are desoribed as panic-mongers and jingo terrorists by critics who hold opposite views, The first set take a special pleasure in dwelling constantly upon what Germany has done, is doing, and intends to do in the matter of naval architecture. It is true that, in this connection, the statistical faots enable them to state that in the year 1900 Germany's home battle fleet had a tonnage of 51,320 tons, 192 guns, and 3224 men ; while to-day her active battle fleet consists of sixteen battleships and eleven cruisers, of a total disp'acemeat of 241,4.00 tons, with 936 guns, and 14,174 men. Then, during the year 1906-7 the German active fleet will be raised to eighteen first-class battleships, which will constantly oruiee in the North Sea, The eighteen will consist of eight homogeneous vessels of the Deutschland type and ten of the Kaiser and Wettin class, so that, practically speaking, there will be only two types in the active fleet. Besides, there will be four of the older battleships in reserve, to cover secondary movements. Then, it is added, two new armoured cruisers of the Scharnhorst class are also to be completed in the coming year, when the German Admiralty will have at its disposal eight good armoured cruisers, and ten smaller cruisers of the Berlin type, all capable of steaming twenty-three knots or thereabouts, and fifty-five very large and powerful destroyers. This home battle fleet of Germany's is, say the adverse critics of the British Navy, more powerful than the British Channel Flee. Bat, after all, this is only a partial comparison—a favourite device with special pleaders and alarmists. At, any rate, in respect to the two navies, each as a separate whole, a well-informed writer of the other sohool observes that "the British Navy is beyond doubt or dispute more than three times as strong as the German. In May, 1906, the Dilke Return gave fiPty-five first-class battleships to Gre it Britain and eighteen to Germany, twenty-eight armoured oruisers to Great Britain and six to Germany. Further, our total naval expenditure is about two and a half times (bat of Germany, and our expenditure on new construction is also much in excess of the German expenditure on the same head. Lnstly, it should be mentioned that the English battleships are much larger, heavier, and in every way more formidable than the German."

This is, we believe, a trustworthy statement o? the facts. At the same time there are, in connection with the British Navy, certain things which are calculated to cause uneasiness throughout the Empire, and especially in these colonies. The recently made and still uncontradicted statement that eleven first-class and two secondclass battleships and twelve oruisers are at Devonporfc awaiting repairs or re-fitting, and that, with the exception of the Majestic, every ship iv the reserve fleet at Portemouth is in urgent need of repairs, is one of very grave significance. On the i face of it, it seems to show that the Navy | was sadly neglected by the SalisWyBalfour Governments, and that the present Government has been remissly slow in rectifying then negligence. This is a thing to which the colonies cannot be indifferent, without, at the same time, being most unwise, for they have not a Fraction less interest than the people o? the Old Country in the efficiency of the Navy. Commercially, politically and racially, the colonies stand to gain on the great scale by continuing integral units of the Paa Brittann'C Federation, and as tne effective continuity of thi-s dnpendsnpon the continuous efficiency of the British Navy, everything that tells for or against this efficiency is of supreme importance to the colonies. This is one of the strong reasons why the parliaments of the colonies and of the Old Country BhoulJ be brought into more intimate touch with each other, and why the colonies should be invested with some constitutional share in the Imperial Administration. It is also an argument in favour of a cumulative advance towards the creation of a bona fide Australian Fleet, which —ne^er ceasing to be a unit of the British Navy—would be a portion of that Navy, of which Australasians would have special knowledge, in which they would take spaoial priif\ and which it would be specifically their privilege and duty to keep up to a high standard of efficiency, in their own interest and in that of the Empire at large; for in proportion as they thus ensured their own protection, the colonies would ndditionally assure that of the Em-' pire of which they are an essential portion. It io a progressive policy on these lineß and, in this spirit that is needed more than anything else to assure the efficiency of the British Navy and the consolidation of the Pan-B ri ttannic Federat ion.