Ashburton Guardian Magna est Veritas et Prævalebit FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 1905. THE JAPANESE LIMITATIONS.

Ashburton Guardian, Volume XXII, Issue 6486, 3 February 1905, Page 2

Ashburton Guardian Magna est Veritas et Prævalebit FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 1905. THE JAPANESE LIMITATIONS.

A recent number of the Fortnightly Review contains an instructive article by that well informed contributor: who conceals his identity under the name of " Calchas," m whioh he deals with the limits of . Japanese capacity as revealed m the present war. Before the outbreak of hostilities between the two rivals for supremacy m the Far East, Japan represented the unknown quantity among the forces of the world. She has now proved herself to be a formidable factor m international politics, and the question which "Calchas " sets out to examine is whether any definite limit to her powers has been revealed by military operations as far as they have progressed up to the present. Incidentally he refers to the much discussed " Yellow Peril," and he maintains that for all practical purposes it does not exist. The reason on which he bases this opinion is that there is a law revealed m history that "strength must call forth strength." When a danger begins to become a dominant one, it calls into being coalitions which only urgent necessity can give rise to. Aggression, as a general rule } calls forth a resisting power by which it is' first checked and then suppressed, and if the "Yellow Peril" ever threatened to become a reality, it would, m the opinion of the Fortnightly Review contributor, be opposed by a coalition of the white races. Even the untold millions of China, directed by the nerve and brain of Japan,would not, he holds, be able to mobilise the forces or strike the blows that a white solidarity would be oapableof any time within the next hundred yeats. After discussing the character of the Russian nation m general and the troops now m Manchuria m particular," Calchas" sums up the situation m the form of a double question—'• Why m spite of unfathomable inefficiency m many respects has the Russiau defence not fared worse, and why have the apparently irresistible advantages of Japan not proved altogether de» structiva 1" He declares that through the Island Empire possesses what is m so many obvious respects the finest fighting material m the world and the most complete organisation ever employed m the field, the leading nation of the East has not come anywhere near the standard of Western military achievment. He admits that the personal bravery of th 9 Japanese soldier has probably never been matched before m any campaign known to history, The tenacity and fury of the Japanese attack have been a revelation to observers,.and probably the Mikado's troops will prova absolutely un conquerable m defence. But m spite of all this, there appears to be something lacking somewhere. Leaving the naval aspect of the question on one side, " Calchas " holds that " the campaign justifies the impression that m one quality, and that one the least mechanical but most vital factor m the conduct of war, tha military capacity of our allies shows some unexpected and eig nificant limitations," No military critic, ifc appears, has failed to point out that the quality of the Japanese leadership cannot be compared to the quality of the discipline and tone of the troops and the manner m which the campaign has been organised. The campaign has been a continuous series of " soldiers' battles." The Japanese leaders have shown a lack of strategical power and invention that has been little short of astonishing, and the movements of their troops are declared to have been inconceivably slow, cautious, and careful. What they have displayed is military stoicism, but not military science. Time and again when the world expected the Russian troops to be cut to pieces, they have merely been driven back, with severe losses, it is truej but not m that complete rout which a vigorous pursuit would have brought about. " Calchas'' considers that the Japanese generals use their troops like a living battering ram to break through their opponents' positions at a terrific cost to the attackers. But this does not' prove the possession of the superior military brain. The marvellous military instrument m the hands of the Japanese is not used with anything like an equivalent military ability. Kuropatkin, for instance, left the field of Liaoyang defeated, but unpursned, and only after he had inflicted greater losses than he suffered. Summing up, the Fortnightly Review writer says that everything that can be accomplished by system is done admirably by the Japanese, but where system ends, their limitations begin. •Some of these conclusions have, no doubt, . been considerably modified by the latest battles of the campaign; but still they are interesting, coming as they do from a writer who has no great admiration for the Russian people or their military efficiency.