HISTORY OF HOSTILITIES

Waikato Times, Volume 125, Issue 20916, 22 September 1939, Page 8

HISTORY OF HOSTILITIES

BRITISH WHITE PAPER ISSUED HITLER’S BITTER TIRADES AGAINST BRITAIN HELD TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE WAR (Official Wireless) (Received Sept. 22, 11 a.m.) RUGBY, Sept. 21 A white Paper of 200 page?, entitled ‘“Document Concerning German-Polish Relations and the Outbreak of Hostilities between Britain and Germany,” contains 144 separate documents, starting with the 1934 German-Polish agreement, which was the governing factor in German-Polish relations to January, 1939, and ending with Mr Chamberlain's broadcast to the German people after the outbreak of war. The documents are grouped under headings which themselves tell much of the story of the past six months—- “ Deterioration of the European situation resulting from the German action against Czechoslovakia,” “German-Polish discussion in April and May,” “Anglo-Polish Agreement,” “Developments in Anglo-German relations and the British attitude to the international situation in April and June,” “Deterioration of the local Danzig situation on June 3 and July 3,” “The British attitude from July 10 to July 15.” “Temporary easing of the Danzig situation from July 19 to August 1,” “Further deterioration of the Danzig situation from August 4 to 15,” and “Treatment of the German minority in Poland from August 24 to 27.” A section is devoted to attempts at mediation by other States, the longest section comprising 66 documents, of which fourteen were already published on September 1. The White Paper deals with “developments leading immediately to the outbreak of hostilities,” while the earlier sections of great importance and interest will centre on the diplomatic correspondence revealing the background of events during the last nine fateful days of August.

Revelations by Ambassador The section opens with the now famous letter which the Prime Minister addressed on behalf of the British Government to Hitler on August 22, after the news of the Soviet-Nazi non-aggression pact, and in which Mr Chamberlain again gave a clear statement of British obligations to Poland and stated: “Whatever may prove to be the nature of the German-Soviet agreement it cannot alter Britain’s obligations.” A telegram on August 22 from the British ambassador in Berlin, published for the first time, reveals that some difficulty was made about the granting of Sir Nevile Henderson an interview at Berchtesgaden to deliver the letter. Bir Nevile reported that Hitler “wae excitable and uncompromising/* and his language violent and exaggerated both as regards England end Poland. He began by asserting that the Kollsh question would have been settled on the most generous terms but for England’s unwarranted support. The telegram proceeded: “I drew attention to the inaccuracies of this statement, our guarantee having been March 31 and the Polish reply on March 26. Hitler retorted by saying that the latter had been inspired by a British press campaign, which had invented a German threat to Poland a week before. Germany had not moved in war any more than she had done during a similar fallacious press campaign about Czechoslovakia on May 20, 1938. Violent Attacks on Poles Hitler then violently attacked the Poles and talked of 100,000 German refugees from Poland, excesses against Germans, the closing of German institutions, and Polish systematic persecution of German nationals generally. “Hitler’s next tirade was against the British support of the Czechs and Poles. He asserted that the former would be independent today if England had not encouraged them in a policy hostile to Germany. He insinuated that the Poles would be independent tomorrow, if Britain ceased to encourage them today. “He followed this with with a tirade against England, whose friendship he had sought for twenty years, only to see every offer turned down with contempt. The British Press was also vehemently abused. “I contested every point and kept calling his statements inaccurate,” said the Ambassador, “but the only effect was to launch him on some fresh tirade.” Germany Nothing to Lose Most of the conversation was recrimination, according to the Ambassador. “At the end Hitler observed, in reply to my repeated warnings that the action by Germany would mean war, that Germany had nothing to lose and Britain much to lose, that he did not desire war but would not shrink from it if it were necessary, and that his peoples were much more behind him than in last September. *‘l replied that I hoped and was convinced that some solution was still possible without war, and asked why contact with the Poles could not be renewed. Hitler’s retort was that as long as England gave Poland a blank cheque Polish unreasonableness would render any negotiation impossible. 1 denied a blank cheque, but this only started Hitler off again.” Britain Blamed for War Hitler was calmer at a second talk reported in the telegram next day, but no less uncompromising. He put the whole responsibility for the war on Britain and maintained that Britain was determined to destroy and exterminate Germany. He was, he said, fifty years old. He preferred war now to when he would be 55 or 60. Hitler said: “England is lighting for

the lesser races, whereas I am fighting for only Germany.” When the Chancellor spoke several times of the contentions and rejection of his offers of friendship to England, Sir Nevile Henderson referred to Mr Chamberlain’s efforts for peace and friendship with'Germany. He said that he believed in Mr Chamberlain’s goodwill at the time, but, and especially since the encirclement efforts of the last few months, he did so no longer. “I pointed out the fallacy of this view,” said Sir Nevile, “but his answer was that he was now finally convinced of the rightness of the views held formerly by others that England and Germany could never agree.” Pact with Russia In referring to the Russian nonaggression pact, Hitler observed that it was England which had forced him into an agreement with Russia. He did not seem enthusiastic over it, but added that once he made an agreement it would be for a long period. “The text of the agreement signed today confirms this,” said Hitler, “and I shall be surprised if it is not supplemented later by something more than mere nonaggression.” Britain Must Change Policy “I took the line at the end that war seemed to be quite inevitable if Hitler persistd in direct action against Poland,” said Sir Nevile, “and expressed regret at the failure of my mission in general to Berlin and my visit to him. Hitler’s attitude was that it was England’s fault, and nothing short of a complete change of her policy towards Germany could now ever convince him of the British desire for good relations.” The first German reply to Mr Chamberlain’s letter is given as August 21, the day of the signature of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, and on August "25 Hitler sent, for Sir Nevile Henderson and asked him to fiy to London to “put the case” to the British Government’. The case, which included an offer of friendship with Britain once the Polish question was solved, was contained in a verbal communication which, along with the first German reply and subsequent exchanges with the two Governments have already been published in a White Paper on September 1. The present White Paper, however, contains a telegram from Sir Nevile Henderson describing an interview at which the communication was handed over. He reported that the Chancellor was absolutely calm and normal and spoke with great earnestness and apparent sincerity. Policy Not Altered “The conversation lasted an hour.” said Sir Nevile, “my attitude being that the Russian Pact in no way altered the standpoint of the British Government and that I must tell him quite honestly that Britain could not go back on her word to Poland and that I knew that his offer would not be considered unless It meant a negotiated settlement of the Polish question. , “Hitler refused to guarantee this, on the grounds that Polish provocation might at any moment render German intervention to protect German nationals inevitable. I again regretted this point but always got the same answer.” Increasing Tension Meantime, there was increasing tenson at Danzig following the appointment of Herr Foerster as head of the Free Cityj Co/mel Beck told the British Ambassador at Warsaw that he considered the situation most grave. In a telegram the British Ambassador to Poland added: “Colonel Beck has, as requested, instructed the Polish Ambassador in Berlin to seek an immediate interview with the State Secretary, and unless he found that the attitude of Ilerr von Weizacker was unsatisfactory he would attempt to examine all the points at issue, with a ■view to ascertaining whether

anything can be done to relieve the present tension.” Goering’s Diminished Influence A late telegram the same day from the Ambassador reads: “The Foreign Minister informs me that the Polish Ambassador in Berlin had an interview with Field Marshal Goering this afternoon. The interview was most cordial and he told me that Field Marshal Goering expressed regret that his policy of maintaining friendly relations with Poland should come to nought, and admitted that he no longer had influence to do much in the matter. “Field Marslial Goering had, 'however, no concrete suggestion to make beyond what had struck Colonel Beck as a most, significant remark which he requested me to convey to you most confidentially. Field Marshal Goering stated that the questions of Danzig and so forth were relatively small matters, but the main obstacle to any dimunition of tension between I'he two countries was Poland’s alliance with Britain.” Answer In the Negative The Ambassador’s telegram proceeds: “Colonel Beck had . consulted the President and General SmiglyRydz and it had been decided that if the German Government should put forward a suggestion in any other way the answer could be categorically in the negative, as Colonel Beck feels that Germany may make every effort to secure a free hand in Eastern Europe by such methods and he feels that it should be clearly understood that Poland will not be drawn into an intrigue of this nature. “The telegram adds that Germany was Informed that Britain’s clear view was that a direct discussion on equal terms between the parties was the proper means of negotiation. Poland enjoys the protection of the Anglo-Polish treaty and Britain has already made it plain and is repeating in reply to Hitler today that any settlement of the German-Polish differences must safeguard Poland’s essential interests and must be secured by an international guarantee. “We have, of course, seen reports of Hitler's reply to M. Daladier, but we should not consider an intimation by Poland of her readiness to hold direct discussions as in any way implying that they will have to be examined in the light of the principles we have stated. “A significant document is a long telegram from Berlin reporting the interview at which Sir Neville Henderson delivered the reply of the British Cabinet. “Sir Neville Henderson repeated British readiness to reach an understanding. It was now or never and it rested with Hitler.” LOSS OF SUBMARINES SUCCESS OF BRITISH PATROL (United Press Assn.—Elec. Tel. Copyright) •LONDON, Sept. 21 The Ministry of Information states that Hie number of German submarines sunk during the past fortnight—given by Mr Chamberlain as six or seven—compares with an average of just over one a week in 1917 and three a fortnight in 1918. It is believed Germany possesses 30 submarines of over 500 tons ready for sea before the present war. A Danish trade delegation is going to Loudon shortly.