BRITAIN AND UNITED STATES

Waikato Times, Volume 123, Issue 20693, 31 December 1938, Page 13 (Supplement)

BRITAIN AND UNITED STATES

The Trade Treaties : : Are Closer Ties Emerging)

(American Paper.)

WITH ALL the solemn implications of a closer binding of the British and American democracies in an unstable world the Anglo-Ameri-can trade treaty was signed at Washington on November 17. Together with the signing of a new Canadian trade treaty at the same time and the speeding of a second joint agreement between the two nations — on the re-settlement of German Jewish refugees—the ceremony of signature created new and weighty factors in a world of crisis which has lacked the steadying influence of the closest co-operation between Washington and London for the past few years. The signing is of “historic significance” said the Secretary of State, Mr Cordell Hull, and the tgreements, in his words, “will furnish concrete and powerful support for a future understanding and cooperation among nations.” The trade agreement Links the Great Economic Orbits of the two nation.s more closely togethei and strengthens vastly the weight and influence of free trade doctrines against the rival autarchic trade doctrines of totalitarian states. Only second in importance as an instance of co-operation is the common search for drastic and early solution to the German refugee problem, a search which under the goading of heavy persecution in Germany has driven the two Governments toward a meeting of minds which until the past few days had appeared hopeless. The intrinsic importance of the trade agreement signing was heightened by deliberate dramatisation. What in previous similar instances was treated as a routine step was to-day transformed in the event of the British agreement into a diplomatic spectacle such as Washington has not seen in a decade or more. By evhry means available the stage setting expressed the basic feeling in diplomatic circles that conclusion of these trade agreements over which negotiators have laboured for more than a year signalises something far more than a mere whittling away here and there of trade barriers between Britain and the United States. Tables were set up in the spacious East Room of the White House. President Roosevelt sat in the middle facing the long '*orridor of the main floor, through which emerged ati imposing array of diplomats to participate in the ceremony. W r . L. Mackenzie King, Prime Minister of the Dominion of Canada, went to the President’s right. Sir Ronald Lindsey, Ambassador of His Brittanic Maiesty, went to his left. Next to Sir Ronald was Mr Cordell Hull, Secretary of State. To either side went 75 other officials of the United States, Britain, and Canada, whose presence contributed an implication of unusual import to the event. Secretary Hull signed the document for the United States. The President's presence w?s not necessary. It served only to lend Dignity and Importance to the Spectacle. The trade benefits may be important commercially. Long-choked American markets in Britain will be reopened. The American farmer is scheduled lo regain much of his lost ground overseas. And the United States will take down some of the barricades which have destroyed old Brit ish markets on this side of the Atlantic. Yet there is no ignoring the fact that today when the agreements are signed these romm.eicia l prospects weigh less heavily than the intangible political implications. The.-c cannot be expressed categorically. No one knows iust what lies ahead. What is certain is that for the first time in many months there is a solid foundation under diplomatic relations between Washington a common field qf interest. The very absence of. any s.ich common meeting ground has been a major factor in world events since the resignation of Mi Anthony Eden from the British Cabinet. All do.-- to the workings of diplomacy ar< familiar with the cross purposes which have impacted the channels between Washington and Lon lon. Many efforts h? \e been jradfe from both siJes f u rioc’i cn-<per%-_

tion. But the fact remains that from the day Mr Ed'in left the Foreign Office Washington has felt that London was pursuing policies which could not be neartily approved or seconded from here. There haa been a conscious effort in Washington to avoid upsetting British policies, but no enthusiasm, no feeling that the United States could have any part in them other than that of a judicious observer. The trade agreements do not wipe all this out at once. But they create a Broad New Field of Common Interest at the same time when equal reactioofl throughout both nations to persecution of minorities in Germany is forcing the two Governments to co-operation on that issus as well. Trade, and sympathy for the Jewish tragedy, open up fields of mutual interest which may become the basis of • real and significant enlarging of the orbit of co-operation. It would be a mistake to assume too much at this stage. There remain many vital conflicts of viewpoint and interest between the two capitals. Britain signed its accord with Italy only yesterday—a step which is viewed coldly here. It is an open secret that London was told expressly that tha two documents should not be signed on the same day. Washington wants no part by even remote implication in the Italian accord and feels that London’s action in signing the Italian document just one day in advance of the American trade agreement was pressing matters a bit hard. The whole Chamberlain programme of appeasement with Germany has been looked upon here with an attitude which varied at times from tolerant scepticism to resentful disapproval. The suspicion that London was planning to offer Germany some colonies on the West Coast of Africa has been current in the State Department and the cause of deep concern for months. With many exceptions American diplomacy has tended consistently to feel that the Chamberlain policy was a policy with which the United States could not co-operate. Now the situation shows signs of beginning to change. London reports indicate a changed attitude there towards colonies and a developing feeling that appeasement with Germany may no longer be possible. Such reports serve to stimulate at once an assumption of greater potential common interest with London, of new and opening horizons. But it is premature to speculate on whpt lies beyond those opening horizons. For anyone to jump to the conclusion that repeal of the Johnson Act, or any other such tangible step such as liquidation of the war debt question, is now in sight would be foolish. All that is certain is that two solid points of common inferwd forged which appear to change the atmosphere between London and V* in this improved atmosphere much could be done. The degree of difference of point of view in past days has probably not been appreciated outside of quarters close to the State Department and White House. The fact is that President Roosevelt’s extraordinary criticism of Germany’s persecution of Jews and Catholics was intended incidentally as a Challenge to the Chamberlain Policy of appeasement with Germany. The implications to the internal political situation in England was appreciated and weighed before the statement was issued. There would be no regrets at the White House if Prime Minister Chamberlain were forced either to reorientate his policy toward Germany or resign. Thus the ability of the two Government* to come to terms on a trade agreement Is not only encouraging, but an extraordinary accomplishment in view' of the obstacles to a general meeting of minds. Despite all these differences they have gotten together on a trade agreement. It can lead, if there is a continued desire on both sides, to far closer relations. Such a development has implications to the general world situation which are momentous. They rema n in the future. But Washington to-day recognises the potential importance of this new meeting of minds by dressing up the signing of the new trade agreement with all the trappings of diplomacy — a tribute to the importance of Anglo-American relations the world, whether good or bad.