BRITAIN’S PART.

Waikato Times, Volume 113, Issue 18849, 20 January 1933, Page 3

BRITAIN’S PART.

A SEEKER OF PEACE. OFFICIA LREVELATIONS. A CONSISTENT POLICY. The eighth volume of “British Documents on the Origins of the War” is a book that if it were biography instead of history, might be described as “the record of a blameless life in eight hundred large pages,” writes Captain Liddell Hart, in the London Daily Telegraph.

11 offers little excitement even to the reader who is sensitive to thethrill of historical exploration. He will rarely feel here that sense of nirama of momentous currents converging' to a cataclysmic issue, which was created by some of the earlier volumes. The very title of the volume, “Arbitration, Neutrality, and Security,” gives the clue not only to its contents but to their tranquil nature. Yet if insignificant in one sense, it is perhaps the most significant in another, That significance is likely to impress itself gradually on the minds of those, probably few, who take the trouble to read through the massive collection of letters and minutes. For in it, running through it like an interwoven thread, is to be caught the essential spirit of British policy in the years before the war. A spirit that is patently and patiently pacific, watchful to remove bits of grit from the cogs of civilisation. Never perhaps boldly constructive, yet ever ready to cement the crevices or cracks in the dwelling-place of nations, and careful [o avoid building any castles in the air. A practical policy, pacifically purpnscTul. The worst that could be charged against it was its slowness, at a time when clouds were gathering fast.

Storms Faster. Storms rise quicker than tranquil atmosphere spreads. The “climatic” difllcultics that hinder peaceful construction are here well illustrated in the documents relating to the second Hague Peace Conference of 1907. Those protracted discussions have a discomforting resemblance, not merely in their unfruitful duration, to those during 1932 at Geneva. In this volume, also, we can follow the more promising yet how easily hindered pursuit of a General Arbitration Treaty with the United Stales. Capping conversations between Mr (later Lord) Bryce and President Taft Sir Edward Grey wrote to the former In March 1911: “We are very anxious to have an arbitration treaty which shall bear on the front of it an article stating that, however grave a dispute between the two countries may be, it shall be settled by arbitration, and not by war. The moral effect of such a 'Statement, would be considerable, and would, l think. Increase. . . . The example would spread, and. .’ . . would have a real effect on armaments and the morale of international politics.” Nor was desire lacking on the other side of tho Atlantic. But internal difficulties delayed its realisation. One. factor was American dislike of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. This volume shows how careful were British statesmen in renewing the alliance to eliminate any risk of being drawn into a possible conflict with the- United States. Indeed, while anxious for practical reasons to preserve the alliance. they put it second to the cementing of Anglo-American concord. Too Many Limitations.

Thus, in a telegram to our Ambassador in Tokio, April i, 1911, Sir Edward Grey emphasised that there would be the “gravest objection to allow any Japanese Alliance to he an obstacle foe four years to an unlimited Arbitration Tready with America.” The limitations and exceptions rose from the other side. And proposed Senatorial amendments stretched so far in trying to cover the rock of the Monroe Doctrine that Sir Edward Grey was driven to remark: "It seems to me that Root’s words are so wide that they are almost tantamount to saying that, nothing is to be arbitrated under the Treaty if jl is not in the interests of the United States to arbitrate it.” ,But the Senate persisted in its reservations. despite President Taft’s

earnest appeals. The documents relating to \ngtoAmerican rotations, like those tti.it deal ■with European affairs, arc really more significant in their tone than in their text. They offer such a pleasitur contrast of spirit, to the suspicious, jealous and often malicious note that jp struck in many of the pre-war diplomatic documents that have been published in Continental countries since the war. They reveal British diplomacy as genuinely seeking peace bv accommodation, not merely uum-

oeuvring for position. Even when slight lapses from this spirit creep into comments of subordinates, the wisdom and balance of the statesman is seen correcting them. The Small Countries. So unblemished is the attitude shown that it might seem too good to be true. But the reputation of the editors, Dr. Cooch and Dr. Temperley, is sufficient contradiction of any such suspicion, especially in view of the condition on which they accepted the charge—that they would “resign if any attempt were made to insist on the omission of any document which is .in their view vital or essential” to history. To their other qualifications for the task this volume bears witness.

The only parts that have any approach to a mild sensation interest are those relating to Belgium and Swiss neutrality. We learn that in 1908 Sir Edward Grey asked for guidance as to Britain’s # obligations under the Treaties of 1839. Mr (later Sir) Eyre Crowe, then Senior Clerk at the Foreign Office, at the end of a long memorandum, defined it thus:— “Great Britain is liable for the maintenance of Belgian neutrality whenever either Belgium or any of the guaranteeing Powers are in need of, and demand, assistance in opposing any violation.” While emphasising the “ difficulties of execution,” he concluded that they were “not sufficient ground, legally or morally, for repudiating an obligation freely undertaken, though they may justify extreme caution in choosing the mode and time of action.”

Decided by Policy. A minute by Sir Charles Hardinge (Lord Hardinge of Penshurst), the Permanent Under-Secretary, suggested that our action “must ne'cessarily depend upon our policy at the time. . . Supposing that France violated the neutrality of Belgium in a war against Germany, jt is. . . doubtful whether England or Russia would move a finger to maintain Belgian neutrality,” whereas “the converse would be the case if Germany were the violator.” The Foreign Secretary added the comment, “1 am much obliged for this useful minute; I think it sums up this situation very well, though Sir G. Ifardinge’s reflection is also to the point.” The problem complicated by growing reports that the Belgians might assist a German passage, and were hoping that “the French would be the first to cross the frontier,” as an excuse. It is made clear, moreover, that since the Entente Cordiale Britain had become suspect as a third potential violator. In 1912 the Belgian War Minister declared that “Great Britain, in stepping down from her position of isolation, lost prestige ail over the world.” Sir Edward Grey made a minute on this report: “If Germany does not violate the neutrality of Belgium no one else will do so.”

In the case of 'Holland, another of the “little countries” concerned, diplomatic apprehension arose around the projected fortification of Flushing, and the alleged threat of the ex-Kaiser that “unless she strengthened certain Dutch fortresses he would be compelled to occupy them with German troops.” The “threat” was categorically denied, but the defensive measures proposed by the Government of Holland were not unnaturally assumed to be directed against Epgland.

Passage by Switzerland. There are* also a number of rather startling disclosures as to the possibility of the Swiss assisting a German passage by ttic south. The reports emphasise the predominantly German cult, among the younger Swiss, and especially among the Swiss ' Army chiefs. It is said that the Swiss manoeuvres of 1908 "represented nothing less than the operations of the Swiss Army, in combination with the German Army, advancing against French forces. . . ." Mr Eyre Crowe minuted: T "it is difficult to resist the conclusion that a powerful party in Switzerland is indeed preparing to abandon the old policy of strict neutrality, and to join openly the forces of Germany and Austria.” Indeed, in the dispatch of one British agent at this time, Switzerland is described as being” in everything but name the ally of the Austrians and tile Germans.” The event would dispel these fears, yet there were such military possibilities in such a move that it is rather curious that in German records which have been published since the war there is nothing which suggests that it was ever seriously considered.