MANCHUKUO.

Waikato Times, Volume 112, Issue 18802, 25 November 1932, Page 5

MANCHUKUO.

THE LYTTON REPORT. IF NOT ABIDED BY. WORLD-WIDE REPERCUSSIONS. Japan anticipated the report of the Lytton Commission on Manchuria by officially “recognising" Manchukuo, the new State which has declared its independence of China, states . Hie Afanches'ter Guardian editorially. Thereby Japan announced to ail and sundry ihat a Alan'churian problem no longer existed; the fact was accomplished; China, the United States, the League could like it or, as the coarse say, lump it. If Hie terms of the Lytton report make Japan's action more intelligible, they also make it more ominous. The report is studiously moderate and reasonable. It freely admits the special economic interests which Japan has in Alanchuria; it admits the pinpricks which her pursuit of them has produced from Chinese hands; it even speaks respectfully of the far-fetched strategic argument by which Japan, already provided with the handsome Korean buffer, maintains that she must control Alanchuria as a means of self-defence. But this consideration for Japanese interests and feelings is only the first stage out of three in the report. Japan Condemned.

The second amounts to a clear condemnation of Japan’s actions. The system which she has set up in Manchuria is "not. compatible with the fundamental principle of existing international obligations”: it is opposed to the interests of China; it disregards the wishes of the people of Alanchuria, about which “there can really be no doubt”; its continuance would be a source of permanent illwill between Japan and China, and, in all probability, between Japan and Russia too.

In its third stage the report proposes a new form of administration in Alanchuria which, while preserving the Interests of China and the obligations of international law, would carefully recognise also the special position of Japan. That this would be the general characater of the report was known in Japan long ago. If. then, the recognition of Manchukuo followed, as it did,, wo can only draw the most unfavourable inferences as '■to the future intentions of Japan. Those intentions can now be tested. The recognition of Manchukuo Itv Japan need not, and must not, bo allowed to achieve what was its principal aim—the defeat of the report. The Commission’s statement of the principles that have to be upheld is. as sound as could be wished. It insists that it is as necessary now as it was in 1922, the year of the NineDower Treaty, that the integrity of China should 'bo preserved arid that she should he given time to bring betown house inlo order; it insists that IT Hie Covenant of the League suffer injury in any one direction its moral authority will be weakened everywhere; and throughout both its criticism's'’ and its recommendations it rigidly urges Ihat a fruitful and permanent sell lenient is not to lie had unless it is based on a good understanding between China and Japan. Special Regime Proposed.

It has worked out a detailed scheme for the consideration of the League. The essence of this is that a special regime should he set up in Manchuria which would be agreeable to both China and Japan, would rest on tire consent of the people of the country, and would be served by foreign advisers indireVlly provided by the League, among whom Japanese would have a prominent plaffo. There would be guarantees that Japan’s interests would he considered; there would be concilia'tion machinery to deal with future disputes; peace would be assured by the absence of all military forces except a special gendarmery with foreign inspectors and the conclusion of a non-aggression pact in which it is suggested Russia might Join. The scheme, though it may be criticised in detail, would form an admirable basis for discussion on one assumption: that both China and Japan are aiming, in good faith, at the same objects as the Commission. The Japnaesc reply, unofficial but frequent, lias always been the same; that “self-defence” by Japan and ‘‘self-determination” by the people of Manchuria have brought about the present position, from which Japan will never budge. It will bo for the League, which will be supported at every slep by the United States, now to discover whether Japan will make I lie same answer officially when the judgments of the Lytton report arc brought before her. Much depends on whether she can lake a long view. Flouting of Covenant. The Commission is right in saying that. Japan's present success In Manchuria is not for her own good; apart from all moral reasons, it creates antagonisms, especially tho permanent alienation of China, which will be extremely serious for her future. In any event the League cannot acquiesce in llio position willi which Japan has presented it. China demands her (coaly rights. The authority of the Covenant and the Kellogg Pact, if limited in the Far East, is universally diminished.

If the* authority of 'treaties, especially nr Ihe treaties designed lo prevent aggression, is insufficient, if the machinery built up since Ihc war is openly inadei pin Ic. Ilieu arms arc slill, and everywhere will lie recognised to lie, Ihc arhiler. That fatal conclusion at all costs wc must resist. Tf we do not. its repercussions will ho fell, in the West not less than in the Ha s l.