THE JUTLAND MYSTERY.

Waikato Times, Volume 101, Issue 16946, 8 November 1926, Page 4

THE JUTLAND MYSTERY.

HOW DID GERMANS ESCAPE IYIR WILSON’S NOTABLE BOOK. How and why did the German battle fleet, outnumbered and faced with possible, even probable, destruction, succeed in escaping from Jutland? llow was it, however, that it not only succeeded in reaching port, but also inflicted losses about twice as great as those it- suffered? It is safe to say that there will never be any final answer to these problems, however furiously controversy may continue to rage. For Jutland will probably always be the mystery battle of the sea. It xyas fought for the most part in smoke and fog, which revealed little beyond the dim shapes of the heaviest vessels, the dull red flash of the guns, and terrific bursts of flame as the Queen Mary and the other vessels met their doom; and a smoke screen of something of the same kind has hung over the tactics of the two great British admirals and confused the judgment of many naval commentators just as it has mystified the world at large. This haze of controversy is picroed by Mr 11. W. Wilson, the naval historian, in his new and very notable work, “Battleships in Action,” and his conclusions will be as interesting to the general public as they will be stimulating and provocative of controversy among experts. British Tactics. “The British, scheme of tactics, he writes, was not equal to the situation . . . . Beatty lias been blamed for failing to report to Jcilicoo the exact course and position of the German Battle Fleet, though the Admiralty wireless was sending out the correct position of the German Battle Feet, as ascertained by directional ■.wireless, from about 4 p.m. onwards, and though Beatty’s cruisers were making continual reports, which gave a good idea even if there were errors in them. “The conclusion will be that a system of tactics which demands the enemy’s exact course and position before taking up one’s battle formation is not fit for the conditions of a great fleet action. It ignores realities of battle. v

Discussing Admiral Jellicoe’s famous deploying movement, Mr y/ilson says:—“Jellicoe’s deployment, if much delayed, (and made to port instead of starboard, none the less placed the British Battle Fleet in a position of distinct advantage. He states that he waited because in the mist and smoke it was difficult or impossible to know where the German Battle Fleet was, as gun-flashes ran half round the horizon. “He decided to deploy to port, away from the Germans, for two reasons. On his starboard wing was the Ist Battle Squadron, containing a number of older Dreadnoughts with poor armour protection. He also thought that a large German destroyer force was close to that wing, so that a mass torpedo attack as it deployed was to be feared. “In actual fact, the Germans were not particularly near; no destroyers were within effective torpedo range; and three powerful ships of the sth Battle -Squadron, intact in all their turrets, were available to strengthen the head of the British line if Jellicoe had turned to starboard. This was one of the cases where a determination to take the offensive with the. extremest vigour might have yielded precious results.” Heroic Destroyers. The orders issued to the British destroyers on the night of battle were purely defensive: “They were directed at 9.27 to take station five miles astern of the battle fleet; they were not ordered to attack the Germans, nor were they given any information as to the German Fleet’s position or the general situation, or even ordered to keep in touch with the German Fleet. “The theory of some critics, that Hie German Fleet would have won in a close and determined action, has little in its favour. There is no example in history of a fleet maimed by welltrained men with a superiority such as the British possessed being defeated by a weaker antagonist. . . For sheer heroism the conduct of the British destroyers, whether in the daylight or the night fighting, has never been surpassed, and the pity is that such splendid bravery was not used to greater purpose. Chance of Ending the War. Some strategists contend that, since the Germans were forced into their ports, the British tactics were justified. Mr Wilson contests this view: “The absence of any decision and the escape of the German Fleet from so powerful a British force had the gravest effect ou the subsequent history of the war. Had the High Sea Fleet been annihilated or sffered even losses twice as heavy as the British, inslead'of losses only half as great, it would have been easier for the British Navy to open the Baltic and support Russia. , , “The moral effect of a great naval defeat on the German peqple following the repulse of the assault on Verdun. might have been such, accompanied as it would have been by the enormous losses on 'land in the battle of the Somme, as to precipitate a German collapse in i9IG. “Again, had the greater part of the German Fleet been destroyed, want of skilled officers and ratings would have prevented the U-boat war, and it would, have been easy for the British to mine in the Germans in the Bight. Vivid Writing. Mr Wilson’s book, however, is not merely a discussion of tactics. He tells with admirable force, lucidity, and conciseness the whole story of Bus and the oilier great engagements. What could be more vivid than his terse account of the end of the Queen Mary at Jutland? . “Masses of steel with incredible quantities of paper were blown into the air and along with them a boat upside down. The roofs of her turrets were projected upwards to a height of 100 feet. A column of smoko shot up to an enormous he'Hii—looo or 1400 feet —mushroom shaped and intensely black. Her next'astern, Hie Tiger, had to steer through Ihe dreadful shower of wreckage of every kind and to alter course to avoid the smoking, riven hull. As the column of fire and smoke sank, the Queen Mary disappeared; the stern part of ihe ship was the last to go, with the propellers still revolving above the water and men crawling out of the after turret. It vanished in a great final explosion." . While Mr Wilson’s pages on Jutland arc arresting, his descriptions of many other naval actions, notably those at the Dardanelles, arc also full of interest. These volumes, embodying as they do the very iastesl. information, must command the attention of a wide public. )