The Waikato Times With which is incorporated The Waikato Argus. SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 2, 1916. PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Waikato Times, Volume 87, Issue 13275, 2 September 1916, Page 4

The Waikato Times With which is incorporated The Waikato Argus. SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 2, 1916. PROGRESS OF THE WAR

It is to. be feared that there is a certain amount of disappointment that the progress of the allied troops is not faster, and that the advance which we are making against the (iermans is limited in actual distances. Such disappointment is perfectly natural, hut at the same time there is no justiiication for it, as will be admitted by those who give the matter a little consideration. It has been pointed out to us on numberless occasions that with modern weapons the defence is at a great advantage. We found the truth of this in 1914, and the first half of 1915, when the Germans with greater numbers of men and an overwhelming superiority of artillery were yet unable to advance their lines from the positions they fell into after the first clash of arms. In the same way the Germans have hammered at Verdun for six months, but are still outside it. Is it then to be wondered at that after our first rush the advance has been slow? It must be borne in mind that it is continuous, and that successes are being scored all along the line, even though such successes are each but small in area. We want to go back occasionally to the early days of the war to realise the immense change in the position between now and then. Lord Kitchener's statement, made in the beginning of the conflict, that it was to be a war of attrition, and to last three years, was not generally credited at the time, but is more and more coming to be recognised as an instance of the keenest military instinct and foresight. It is emphatically a war of attrition in which the forces of either side are gradually worn away against those of the other, and the power that can stand longest must be triumphant in the end. We have, therefore, only to consider the relative resources of the AustroGermans and the allied nations to see the wide differences therein. In the matter of men, the Russians have numbers sufficient to enable them to put millions in the field long after every other nation has reached the end of its tether. Hut this is not all; it must be remembered that an immense proportion of Great Britain's army was enlisted during the present year, and that six months' training is requisite at the least. They will provide reinforcements for long after the Central Powers fall short, and we expect that the colonies will continue to And the contingents promised. In the matter of munitions the increase in the output of Great Britain and of France has been enormous, and they have already come to the stage of surpassing Germany's output, though the full measure of production has not yet been reached. In the one particular of heavy field artillery the Germans are still ahead; for the manufacture of the largest size cannons is a matter which takes six months, and no amount of organisation

(mm (io much to shorten the time. The food question tries every combatant alike, but the Central Powers suffer much more keenly than the Allies; the financial question, too, tries every combatant, but here again the Central Powers suffer most. Twelve months ago they still hoped for further allies; to-day no nation would throw in its lot with them. Roumania, which seemed uncertain for a long time, has joined the Allies, and Greece will probably do

The Americans, as detached observers, have always maintained that Germany's cause was ultimately hopeless, and have sometimes been inclined to sneer at the length of time which it takes to bring the facts to bear. They have in their own history a civil war which bears in many respects a most striking resemblance to the present conllict. There, as here, an aristocratic State, with centralised power and the worst of causes, declared war against a Democracy, which, like the British, had made but slight preparation for a conflict. There, as here, the Southern States had the advantage of being armed and provided with officers, when the Northern States had to form an army from the start. There the Southern States, as here the Central Powers, were animated with the keenest enthusiasm, and women worked and all submitted to privations in a wonderful way. There as here the naval power was in democratic hands, and from the start of war a blockade was established, which prevented trade with the outside world, and crippled the Southern States in money and necessities. The advantage of numbers was on the side of the North, and gradually the advantage told. There, as in Great Liritain, conscription was resorted 10, and met with bitter opposition from those who refused to see the claims of necessity. There, as in Great Britain, the political party which opposed the Government was carried off its feet in the first rush of war, but returned to its party politics as the contlict wore on. There, as here, the North were slow in bringing their undoubted advantages to bear, and for the first two years had few successes, and many defeats. The support of the President came from a variety of parties with conflicting aims and interests, and the support of every one of them was necessary. Lincoln's claim to be considered a statesman is based on the fact that he managed to keep the parties together, for he was not a good executive chief, or disciplinarian, and the eminently attractive personal character of the man must not blind us to errors in policy. It may be that the close similarity of conditions lias tended to convince Americans that the war can end but in one way. It should at the same time have taught them that the most obvious advantages of numbers, supplies, wealth, and a good cause, require time to operate. Those of us who can only sympathise, and cannot bear a hand must learn patience, and it may well be that the object we have in view—namely, to convince the Germans that war is unprofitable as well as dishonest—will be best served by a long drawn-out agony.