THE WAR IN NEW ZEALAND.

Wellington Independent, Volume XVI, Issue 1592, 18 June 1861, Page 4

THE WAR IN NEW ZEALAND.

BY WILLIAM FOX, M.H.R. Auckand, New Zealand, Sept. 4th, 1860. We have only within the last week or two receiveti a copy of a pamphlel written by Mr. Fox in September last, while at Auckland, for publication in London. Its reprint in our columns jus! now is most opportune, as it shows clearly what the opposition of the three Fs lasl Session really was — an opposition which, fpr party purposes, has been systematically distorted by their opponents. Chapter i. There are two sides to every story and one tale is good, till another is told Down to the date ' at which I write, the English public has only heard one side of the story of the New Zealand war, and that, as many think, not the right side 'I^he Governor has, iv official documents told his own tale in his own way ; anc even iv the Colony it is only now thai we have the means of testing its truth The Governor drifted into this war ie February, 1860, and it was not till the General Assembly met at the end o July, that the colonists had the opportunity of discussing its merits, with acdesi , to authentio information. It may sounc strange that a war should be raging foi six months, iti. a country possessing representative institutions, and iis Legis lature never be oalled together for al! that time. But it was so, and it account! for the Governor's tale of the war reaching home so long before the tale of tht colonists. The latter had no tale to tell till they had sifted the oase through thi ! sieve of publio discussion. But noi ! there are many among us who do uo concur in the Governor's version, an. we wish 10 tell the story our own way. We have another reason for wishinj to do so. We do uot think the Goveruo t an unprejudiced witness. If it shouh 3 turn out that this war is an unjust one • and ought not to have begun, the Gover } nor is solely to blame ; and with tha ' fact before us, he can hardly be regardet » as an impartial narrator. We colonist i speak as parties, deieply irUerested^ bu f not responsible,, and in no oase culpa r ble; and we feel, moreover, above ol

j. things, that it is our iute^|9tf that' the :- truth should be knowi^for i^|t bnjy^.are^ £•' our characters as colonists at stake, but r » unless the truth be kuown there is little $ hope of a remedy ;b.o.iilg l applied. 7.X _ V ® Some will be surprised to hear us say } ' in the~^saq}e ? rbre.att», that we:* have the institution 4 o.A'self*-|orvernrn'ent, -and yet t ar iWVa'ri 'We wili c explain. , 1 -. *; 4 . „. i l , 1 Parliament gave uW'' , a n ©6 I n^tit^l'ibtf ' iri' 1 1852, which contained " the fullest powers of self-goVer^tne^t|ins,a.ll uf-j j fairs." B(it the principle of'ministerfa. r responsibility was not embodied in it/ ) and had to be supplemented by oonsent 3 1 of the Crown, just as it was added practically to the British Constitution' aftar ; 1 the Revolution of 1688, and-rests 'to this • j day on custom only. l\x- ! 'assenting to' ithe introduction of that practibe 1 into the. s ©oibii^Uha'Honie'G.overnnieint attached - i but one condition — that we should ' pen* 1 } sion' the 1 retiring' officers ! of > the old Exer r cutive Council. But Governor Browne 3 added another condition, unauthorised by the Home Government — that we r should surrender to him the entire adJ ministration of all affairs relating to the \ natives. It was robbing us of exactly j half our Cohstitution ; but the Assembly was hot for responsible government in . other matters, and yielded; though not ! without strong remonstrance and pre- ! diction of evil result from those who ' foresaw divided rule and conflict of authority. ( , Thu3 the Governor took the entire management of native affairs into his t own hands, and to use his own words, I assumed " the sole responsibility lo the I Crowd for maintaining the tranquility of ' the Colony." We colonists, at least [ many of us, are very anxious to have , this known. For we bave had nothing . to do with this war ; m«ny of us think , it an unjust war, and believe that it has • , been unnecessarily provoked, and might 1 have been easijy avoided. So. we are 1 particularly desirous that it should not t be supposed that we had any hand in { bringing about, or that our representa- ; tive institutions are in any way answer--1 able for it. Tn the conduot of native ■ affairs the Governor has a special de- ' partment of his own, not responsible in ; any way to the Legislature. By its , advice and through its instrumentality , he acts. If he ever consults his respon- > sible ministers on native affairs, it is.only as he might consult his private friend, or ' an unofficial person. He is not bound by their advioe and they are not bound . to give it. Practically, in native affairs, ( he enjoys absolute power, and to . its ; exerciae we attribute the present unhappy crisis. Before I tell how the war was brought j about, I must make some general \ remarks on the past history of the . Colony, otherwise it will hardly be under- ; stood bow a war became possible between races whose relations had been for many . : years those of amity and good will. At the period of tho foundation of the ' Colony (1839), and for some time after- • wards, there existed in the minds of this [ native race, a great respeot for British power, and a belief iv the unquestioned f superiority of our military foroe. The vacillating conduct of Governor Fitzroy ■ in reference to the Wairau massacre, and (he outbreak at tbe Bay of Islands, un- , deceived (hem. The two wars which occurred under Governor Grey's administration taught them that the naked savage, active as a squirrel, cunning as a monkey, and ferocious as a tiger, was more than a matoh in bush warfare , for our troops, stiffened with drill, and conspicuous with pipe-clay. On every . occasion on which our brave soldiers b encountered them, the natives claimed . the victory : and in most instances with truth. Those wars ceased through no £ suooess of ours ; but beoause the chiefs T engaged in them had little sympathy l among their fellows, were contending for no principle, got tired of fighting, as ' schoolboys get tired of a gahae,. and gave it up. But from that time there was no more fear of British soldiers : our prestige was gone. " You white people," said the natives, "are good at building houses, and ships ; you are like the rats, , always at work ; but you are like them, 3 also^ — you know how to run." j 'In another respect, Governor Grey's strength was weakness. He gained immense and well merited influence withthe ] natives, by personally ingiatialing himt self among them. But he utterly failed in attaching tbem to our laws aud institu- \ tions. . Under him they continued a se--3 parate people, almost as much as when f 'Gasman or Cook saw the first canoe. . But this personal link was one which B neoessarily suapped when, he left the j Colony. No permanent or' stable bond r of union had been established between the native raoe aud British authority. He ._ .sacrificed our national position to his j personal position ; and when he departed s he left the natives without helm .or pilot. But more than this he did towards a weakening our relations. He had a long [ struggle with the colonists on the subject q of Representative Institutions. In his N despatches to the Home Government, he lt failed not to declare that their.iutroduod tion was a measure fraught with danger to the native race. These despatches got „ reprinted in tbe Colony; nor, probably were subordinate officers, of the Govern(j ment slow to instil iuto the native mind, j the ideas of their chief. At all events, .1 there is unmistakeable evidenoe of the k t existence of suoh ideas to be found in native documents, printed in Parliamen- „ tary Blue Books, It was probably to this tt feeliug that the origin of the "King im ; movement/ of which I shall presently lj say more, is attributable. It was about

this \WO Jt originated; and before .fGover'tf&f (^y^.gft the Colony there were notions of national independence, Seething in the native mind, which have! siri6o dovelbpad tliQoiselves, and oome to a dangerous maturity. y%his pio^ement coTOSncedvjn J852. It hecameT prominent in 1854, imtiaedtotery aftfer the departure or Governor Grey. .Its i .avowed, objects were to pre- ! Vent me atfenat'ion'of the wild lands from theJMaori racg, and to a legislative and' executive gojernr&ent of their own. A widespread agitation ensued. (Emissaries, earnest men, travelled through every part of the islands, stirring the native mind and educating it,, for the 'fifat tiWife, : ihtb ! th' 6 :f i'de^ ; 6f W" United n atioh ali tyi^ <At- I'eh'gth, •' id ; JjpWel; / 1858, 'they el'eoteid a kingi wh6 Yodk^ttptftJ him- | S6lf the functions 'of ; &p\\f, ' kp^inting; 'm'agteiratßs; ; i * tirid ■ prtf ittUljg'aliiig' laws 'enacitedby'hik^Connoil, ani* ratified by himself. A national flag was" hoisted, and floated over hundreds of villages ; and prubably two-thirds of the native race, south of Auckland, favoured, if they did not openly join the league.; Te Whero-Whero. under the name of Potatau, was installed the Robert Bruce of the Maories. This great national movement (as remarkable as any in history when we consider who the actors were), was in its infaucy when Governor Browne arrived in the Colony, Originating under Governor Grey's administration, and amounting then to little more than an idea, it became a great fact under that of Governor Browue. And to the course pursued by him its growth is mainly attributable. What that course was I shall relate in the next chapter. Chapter ii. Bishop Selwyn has the credit of having said " that the Government House in New Zealand ought to be oii board of ship." There is no doubt that if the Governor divided his time between the ship and the saddle, in other words, in going about among the cojonists and glhe Natives, he would do a wise thing. But there is another story to the effect that Governor Browne shortly after his arrival in the Colony told a deputation that " they would find him the laziest Governor they had ever had/'-r-probabiy alluding to thepart he would constitutionally play under responsible government. Many a true word however is spoken in jest, and the truth of his His Excellency's remark has been proved by bia almost entire abstinence from both saddle and ship. No Governor whom we have ever had, has exhibited so large an amount of the organ of " habitancy," or made himself so little acquainted with either the European or Native Settlements. As regards tbe latter, if Sir George Grey acquired (aslhavebeforeexplained) au uudue personal influenoe over the native mind, Governor Browne has entirely neglected that means of conciliation. By far the larger part of the native territory has never beeu visited by him. His visits to those portions of it which are easily accessible from the coast, have been few, hasty, and far betweeu j while to those natives who have visited him at the seat of Government, his courtesies are said to have been few and soanty. In by far the larger part of tbe islands, his person is unknown to the natives, and even the mast friendly of them speak 1 of him iv terms by no means either affectionate or respectful. Much of the existing disaffection of the native mind at the present moment is attiibutable to the neglect of the Governor to cultivate their sympathies by personal intercourse. He has gone as far wrong in one direotion, as Sir George Grey went in the other. But the rapid growth of the " King movement" under his administration, is owing still more to his neglect of a fine political opportunity whioh afforded him means of attaching the natives to us, — an opportunity, whioh it is due to his predecessor to say he did not possess. The 71st section of the Constitution Act placed in Governor Browne's hands, the power of constituting native districts, within which " as between themselves," native laws and customs might prevail. Here was an opening, which) -sagaciously used, would have turned the daugerous "King movement" into a . source of strength, and a bond of union. The uame, changed as il easily might have been, and its Amotions subordinated to the Queen's prerogatives, I aken in short under the shelter of the Constitution, the "King movement" would h*ve proved a most fortunate event, and under the semblance of separation, hava afforded the means of bringing about a permanent political union between tbe raoes. The Governor seems entirely to have overlooked this importance of the great national movement which was for five years fermenting in tho Native mind. Till the date of the Taranaki war, he tells us that he regarded it "as mere talk." As if the crowning of a King, with the concurrence of at least half the raoe, the exercise of royal functions for upwards of two years, and the daily progress of the movement in every part ofthe islands, were words only, and not events of the most portentous significance. It says little for the sagacity of either His Excellency or his non responsible advisers, that they oould shut their eyes to the importance of a great political agitation such as this. Another oause. which gave great impulse to tbe movement, was the declared policy of the Governor not to interfere in armed feuds betweeu native tribes. Suoh feuds had, beooma rara, but one was raging at Taranaki, at the date of his arrival. He then laid down the priuci-

I pie, that unless; when thp confliot aotually j occurred within the limits of an Euroj p'e&ix i settle men tr atd 1, eMkn'gWti&lAa pdace;, he^ould^ $esia.i.e ;opnseqt]i9n^^^ • jfe*} fo^rjnteftribal, wars were . raging ;in> dif* ferent parts of the island during" the following year; while His YEkoeljetifetPli chief adviser in one mstanoe, and „t^ljy ,9jdiuate, officers of the native department in others, actually stood by, and h looked oir- as "■' spdMatoifef. of" iJ_\^O^t:^ r y^iat dd^ld'tbi^n^ IH§ \$ ihem (^ declaration, that t ttyey were an»t independeDt people, 1 neither controlled mot oftredfOf b^'BrftiSh^bW^. joining; , t,hs „K,tpg .jpqsemenjtm"! laefcuUp have a King, of our own^thea these feuds will be stopped."; TH^Que&ir'fe' 'ghttH-b see us kilfb'atih 1 bihyr. When we ar© gdhe'^lie'wiirt'ake ; p^r,. lands. , and have nothing to pay." They would gladly have seen, the Qoyerpor interfere, to prevent their fighting, ahd any suoh interference on his part would have met with general support among them. Well then, having neglected personal and political influences— having by aotji far more potent than words, taught tho natives to regard themselves as anrindependent people, they were next invited to arm themselves for the ooming struggle. The warmest political opponeritfl of Governor Grey have always admitted that be did one statesmanlike act, and did it well. By enacting and striotly enforcing laws against the sale of arms and ammunition to the native raoe, he practically disarmed them, and at the date of his departure, they possessed comparatively small supplies Of either, while the quality of such as they had, had been deteriorated by rust and damp. Their resources in case of a war at that date, would have proved insignificant. In 1857, hpwever, Governor Browne, Jn. a. moment of infatuation, which admits of no excuse, relaxed by proclamation Sir George Grey's wise restrictions. There was an immediate rush by the natives to the traders iv arms and ammunition. The importation to the Colony reoeiyed an immertse impulse. 'It appears from the Custom House returns for J 1857 and and 1859, and from an estimate based upon them for 1858, that there have beea imported into the northern island, sinoe the relaxation of the restrictions, about six thousand stand of arms, and between thirty and. forty thousand pounds of gunpowder, with shot and caps in proportion. As scarcely a weapon or a pound of powder has been imported into tbe middle, island, where there are hardly auy na? tives, the inference is, that that theae 1 large importations into the northern^ island have been almost exclusively for the native market, and iufaot it is known: to be so. At the Custom House valuations, the natives there have in three years paid no less than twentyeight pounds for munitions of war. But as the Custom' House valuation is less than half the price at whioh retail dealers supply the natives, the aotual amount expended, , by them in three years exceeds fifty-five thousand pounds sterling, a fact whioh will rather startle the tax-payers of England,* who are now called upon to find troops to put down a rebellion of natives, . provided with the means of carrying it on by the aot of the Governor himself. It lias been stated in the House of Commons (by Lord Alfred Churchill), that Sir George Grey's restrictions had become a dead letter, and therefore (the - logical force of this is not very clear), were repealed. But that suoh was : not the ease is proved by the rush ;for arms and ammunition which occurred the moment the restrictions were relaxed. Potatau, the late Maori King; was so convinced of the impolicy of the aot, that acoompanied by another high chief, he came from the Waikato country to Auckland, to remonstrate withthe Governor about it. " Without arms," said he, " the natives are like a pent-up torrent whioh oannot find vent, but put arms into their hands, and, the torrent will burst its banks, and sweep all before it." A Board of Commissioners, appointed by the Governor to, investigate native affairs, also strongly advised Sir George Grey's • restrictions to be maintained. And it will oreate surprise to learn that while arms have been thus freely placed within reach of the natives, large quan* titles of excellent percuisioa muskets have, been sent- by the Government from the Colony to England, as many as 1500 it|i^ reported, bince the issue oftheproclamation of the martial law. , I state the fact as currently reported} and substan- ; tially admitted by the Government, ,v?ltoi£J; I lately asked for a return on the sii(Bj|of^ in the House of Representatives, which; <• however, though promised, has not yet been produced. I hope the faot will be: enquired into at home, as four-fifths pf . the colonists are at this moment without weapons of any sort, who might to som* extent have been armed if this exporta- : tion had not been made. The blame will : probably be laid on the military authorities, but there is no doubt that it must have been kuown to the civil government and oould have been prevented. Suoh then was the temper and position of the natives, when the attempted purchase of a blook ot 900 acres of land at ' Taranaki, against the reraonstranoe'of a ohief olaiming both tribal and individual rights, led to that outbreak whioh has already oost many lives, and which it is to be feared may yet merge in a general war of extermination. I shall now relate tho history Of the events oonneoted with that purohase, I (To be continued in ournext).

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of property, would soon follow, the steady advance of British arm 9 would soon hecom 6 the highway of civilization. These quotations suffice to prove that the difficulties of the Governor's position are not overlooked by the Auckland public, and that the course to be pursued is a most difficult one. Here we might stop, but the view presented to our readers would be incomplete without the following from the Nciu Zealander. The one great difficulty or the Waikato question is a difficulty which, although most certainly visible and appreciable, is so subtle and so intangihlens alnustto defy any-grappling with if. It will elude the keen edge of the sword as it does the sharp wit of diplomacy. The gallant General who brings us a name belonging to an illustrious band of heroes, woulil no more be able to get hold of it than the Ablest of Governors, or the most experienced of Secretarios in the Native Office, or the most self-sufficient of Maori Doctors in the House; to say notliidtr ofthe most splenetic of Archdeacons in the Church. It lies simply here : you have not any one to deal with. • ''.When, we make a demand, on any people withi a recognised Government, we know from whom we are to get an answer. . Even at the Waitara. we were, dealing specifically with one 4ribe_ Yet what happened there P. The Ngatinwa insurrection broke to- pieces, and we were fain to receive the sepa-site submission of Hapurona and Patukakariki, letting William King go eff with his tail, between his legs. At Waikato this difficulty is indefinitely multiplied. Mr. Fenton's list of 150 tribes and ha pus, in the , Appendix to the Waikat o Committee's report, is of itself sufficient to negative the expectation of being able to get a categorical answer there

from any one to .whom we may apply. at first

negotiation is tried : what Chief or Chiefs of Waikato can at the present moment bind the tribes, or give hs any rea). security f° r their submission to the Queen ? We know ihat Tamati Ngapora, that Wiremu Nera, with many others of nearly equal rank, have alwayß been on the Queen's side; but their loyalty is no guarantee against the designs of the land leaguers, nor the slightest hostage for the con tinuance. of peace. We know that e,ven Tamehana professes loyalty and a desire for law, and that.King Matutaera himself is to his people i_o great sovereign ; yet it would be nonsense to call tbese men good subjects. Or suppose the matter is handed- over to the General ; whom is he to attack ? No one in his senses supposes that a movement of the troops upon • Waikato can be made without occupying the country of friends as well as^foes, and without therefore making it quite uncertain whether the blow would first fall on the heads of rebels. We may find ourselves commencing the establishment of the Queen's supremacy, by destroying those who have all along been most desirous of it. '••*•'

Now fully understanding the Auckland estimation of the difficulties of the

present position of native affairs, our readers will, perhaps, be somewhat inclined to doubt the sincerity of the Governors^ * terms ' to the Waikato, before alluded to and published in our last, and disposed to look upon that document more as one issued under the advice of the Ministry for clap trap speeches in

tKfe Assembly, than as exhibiting any fixed intention of His Excellency. All we can say is, that if he be sincere — if war i^ to be pushed into the Waikato

Country, we hope very large reinforcements for the protection of ali the Northern Island provinces have been applied for. Lord Palmerston is stated by the Southern Cross to have said that the King Movement must be put down 'even if it should take 20,000 men to bring ahout that result V We trust that the Governor has drawn largely upon this promise ofthe English Premier, since

his Excellency must be firmly persuaded that a very much greater force than New Zealand yet possesses, will be necessary to eary on such a war as that which the invasion of Waikato may necessitate. Mr. Fitzherbert once said that * a general war would necessitate •the borrowing of the whole British Army,

and the quotations we have this day brought under the notice of our readers, from- the best informed Northern journals, lead to the belief that the difficulty which. Mr. Fitzherbert's figure of speech was intended to indicate, is now being at last appreciated even by the Ministry who at that time so greatly underrated it.