IMPLICATIONS OF ATLANTIC PACT BRUSSELS AGREEMENT

Wanganui Chronicle, 27 December 1950, Page 5

IMPLICATIONS OF ATLANTIC PACT BRUSSELS AGREEMENT

It Will Take Months To Get The Germans Into The Scheme LONDON, December 26 (Recd. 6 p.m.).—Let no one imagine that the agreement reached in Brussels by the Atlantic Pact conference means anything more than overcoming of differences betwven the allies themselves,” says ‘‘The Economist,” in an article on “Germans and Russians.”

It continues: “It does not mean i that Europe is any eloser to having its 50 divisions than it was last September. Everything prac-| tical to that end has still to be j done. It will be many many, months before the first German i “combat team is equipped and ' trained to take its plaee on the ■ frontier of its own country. | “And :t may be many months before any German Government can be persuaded to accept terms for parlicipa*ion in a common defence that will .rrn be offered in Bonn. All that happened Is that the paper problem of i major difficulty has been solved—on paper." After recapitulating the events! leading up to the Brussels agreement, j “The Economist" says that months! have been used by the Germans to hid ! up threefold the price of German aid and the Americans and their Allies now find themselves not very far from where they started in Sep ember. The Russians have now taken a hand in stirring the pot, and have declared that the par the British and French played in the Atlantic Pact and planning German rearmament is a breach of the treaties of alliance signed with the Soviet. This had led to French arguments that the Russians are genuinely frightened that an independent Western Germany wltn control of its own forces and arms and industries will rise up as America's main ally in Europe; that in the long

run the Germans will break loose and plan a war of revenge, dragging their allies with them. If the Russians are to stop such a process beginning—argue the French—now is the time when the West is relatively weak and somewhat divided on this question. In short, to persist with planning a German force of 10 divisions is to run the risk of a world war and to wreck the prospect of four-power talks. Now clearly in this argument there is the kernel o f sense and many layers of exaggeration, says “The Economist.” At no time has it been suggested that an independent Wehrmacht should arise and that Germany’s armaments and industries should be set up again. On the contrary, the question of keeping the German effort within bounds has been given such attention that three precious months have been wasted in arguing about it. and a chance of getting that effort quickly and willingly, probably has been lost “The Economist’’ declares that the Russians have no real cause for alarm or complaint, and says that to hesitate about bringing Germany into the Western defence effort—or appear to hesitate—because of the Russian attitude, would be quite fatal. The task now is to get on as quickly as possible with the job of multiplying the American, British, French, Dutch and Belgian Divisions, of equipping them and of moving them up to the defence line. That, and that alone, will provide the partnership within which the German can make, loyally and freely, the contribution for which they will be asked.