The Wanganui Chronicle. TUESDAY, OCTOBER 17, 1950. RUSSIA MAKES AN APPEAL

Wanganui Chronicle, 17 October 1950, Page 4

The Wanganui Chronicle. TUESDAY, OCTOBER 17, 1950. RUSSIA MAKES AN APPEAL

lUIR. VYSHINSKY’S appeal to the United States to renew its 1 wartime co-operation with the Soviet Union may he taken as sincere. That co-operation consisted of the United States sending equipment and supplies to the Soviet Union. Any further contributions along that line would assuredly be welcomed at the receiving end.

Mr. Vyshinsky’s aim, however, is not to restore that sort of eo-operation, for he knows that no such proposal could, or would be, entertained. Why then did he make the proposal which has all the elements of farce? Was it purely a propaganda move, or an effort to divert the public of his own country from the overwhelming defeat of a Soviet sponsored essay in arms? On the face of things it would appear to be but part of the propaganda effort which is being made by the Russian delegation in the United Nations Organisation to slow down the co-operative defensive effort that is now being implemented as a result of the Soviet, inspired attack upon Southern Korea and the adventurous and troublesome policy which the Russians are now pursuing both in Berlin and in Vienna. It must be apparent to the Russians that a surprise attack may not be completely successful, although all soldiers arc agreed that the element of surprise is a good ally. It must also be apparent to the Kremlin that the coup-d’etat may succeed under given conditions, but there is no certainty Hint such conditions are present nowadays. Korea looked like a sitting bird when the attack opened. The American Army did not want to take up the fight at the 38th parallel because it was in no condition to sustain a position there: the defence was, however, undertaken not for military but for political reasons. It was hard on the American Army to have the conditions of fighting determined for it by the politicians, but even so it is probable that the hard retreat—fully publicised through being without benefit of censor—did make a valuable contribution to the ultimate victory. From the Russian angle, however, the lesson to b? learned from Korea is that the most likely situation may prove th be disappointing to the attacker, surprise or no surprise. This having so recently been proved, is there any prospect of the Russian commands in Germany and Austria undertaking a lightning attack against Western Europe? It is admitted that the preponderance of troops under arms is with the “pacific” Soviet Union and that all of the initial advantages are one the side of the Big Battalions so beloved of Napoleon, the Kaiser, and Hitler. True, in the west, there is Yugoslavia, which has defied the Kremlin and lived as yet not to rue the day. Why then with all these advantages in the field and with a reverse to cover up by a success, if that be possible, does Mr. Vyshinsky talk of renewing wartime co-operation with the United States of America It should, however, be observed that he does not propose any mutuality in this co-operalion, only that the American policy of “getting tough” should be relinquished. The first reaction to such hollow talk is that, it is designed to foster a false sense of security in the minds of Westerners and to give those simple minded people for whom all things Russian are right, some further material on which to build their house of cards. It, may he that this first reaction is the right one, hut it can hardly be denied that there is an insufficiency about this explanation. Russia has 'not intervened in Korea, sinee the defeat, she has not attacked Yugoslavia, hut she has contented herself with a dummy election in Eastern Berlin, which has drawn from the Germans themselves unqualified denunciations. She has engaged in promoting trouble in the Soviet Zone in Vienna, but has as yet not carried such tactics further. It is believed that the explanation of the Vienna incident is that it is but a pilot operation to see how the attack would work when it is launched in earnest. . But with the movement towards co-ordination ’ and quick action, gathering momentum at Lake Success why should Russia not. strike now?. Hannibal’s habit of looking into the camp of his enemy in order to discover his likely aetion is likely to prove helpful today when dealing with Russia. Seeing that it is the war potential that determines an aggressor’s timing and programme, any information that reveals the supply situation inside Russia is likely to be of very great value in assessing Russian policy and evaluating the statements of her spokesmen. It will be remembered that the German classical date for opening a campaign was September 1 because by then the harvest had been gathered in. Russia, for all her large domain, must still give thought to the gathering of her harvests, for it was the dearth of bread that caused the downfall of the Tsarist regime and it is likely that the Soviet. regime will fall from the same cause. That this is realised is evidenced by the propaganda effort launched in respect to the gathering of this year’s harvest. Tn the Kiev area trucks taking the grain to the centres during July and August carried such slogans as “Bread is Peace!” “Each pound of grain to the State is a blow against the warmongers!” or “Bread is the strength and the power of the Soviet State!” It. should be remembered that the Ukraine was for a considerable time the only area outside Russia which was capable of exporting grain to other parts of the Soviet Union. In order to strengthen this situation the grain growing activities, of other districts have been given special attention. The collective farms were inspired by the idea of applying American broadacre methods to Russian lands for corn-growing purposes. Reports published by the Soviet Union itself indicate that the grain harvest was not promising too well. The first half-year report published on July 28 stated that crop prospects were good only in the Ukraine and hi Moldavia. In Siberia, the Urals eastern and northern territories, “the fields with some exceptions look good.” In the North Caucasus, the Crimea, the Volga provinces, prospects are called “satisfactory.” “In some regions.” the report adds, “because of unfavourable meteorological conditions, the crop is likely to bo less than in 1949. The estimates of the crop yield provide the basis for the demands of the State upon the peasants and any shortage in realising the estimates falls upon the peasants. Ihe Government had determined to get tin crop into its hands with increased speed this year, which was most probably due not to a desire to engage in a war exercise but m order to forestall trouble with the peas: nts themselves who may now only retain for themselves 15 per cent, of their own crop. The actual crop is usually from 20 to 25 per cent, below the official estimate on which the quota which must be delivered to the Government, is With this weak harvest and. with a low gram rescue Russia is to be regarded as weak in the stomach. Looking back over the past growing season in the Northern Hemisphere it, is to be observed that Russia has given less. to aggressive action as the crop situation deteriorated. The withdrawal from I N.O. wns possibly associated with this important domestic weakness. The return'to Lake Success, there to engage in a propaganda enrol t, to delav the consolidation of forces against future Soviet, intervention all fit in with the thesis that because Bread ts the strength and power of the Soviet State” an unsatisfactory gram Imrv'st has caused Russia to change her tune. A change of time, it should be remembered, does not necessarily mean a change of intention. • .