The Wanganui Chronicle THURSDAY, APRIL 14, 1949 CHINA IN TURMOIL

Wanganui Chronicle, 14 April 1949, Page 4

The Wanganui Chronicle THURSDAY, APRIL 14, 1949 CHINA IN TURMOIL

T’lllj eviction of the Japanese led to no*respi,tc for the people of China because unanimity in the political Held could not be achieved. The Communists and the National Government could meet on no common ground, they could not trust each other, and they had no desire to come to a eompcoinise arrangement. .

American influence was exercised for a long time with the object of bringing the two factions into some working harmony. But this task, after being fully explored, was given up. It soon became evident that with no American backing that was sufficient to sustain the Nationalist cause. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek’s administration was destined to be attacked and defeated A last strenuous appeal by his wife to the .American people and Government for assistance fell on stony ground. Chiang thereupon had to face the invaders alone, that is without foreign aid. He had failed to crush the Communist movement and now it appeared to be fairly certain that it would crush him. His former military genius, when he was capable of bringing a degree of combination into the national life, seemed to have deserted him. As last year drew to a close the hopelessness of his position seemed to weigh heavily upon his mind. In his New Year message Chiang said that he was willing to conclude peace on the following conditions, it must not be detrimental to the national independence and sovereignty, the Constitution must not be violated, the entity of the armed forces must be safeguarded, and the peoples free mode of living and minimum living standard must be protected. If the Communists did not want peace, he continued, the Government would “fight to a finish”; the Nanking-Shanghai area would be held at all costs. He admitted that the military situation had entered “an exceedingly perilous stage” and added that he must study the wishes of the people, whose burden had increased, and who hoped for an early conclusion of the war. This statement was immediately answered by the Communists broadcasting that the revolution must continue and repeated its list of war criminals headed by General Chiang Kai-shek, who must be delivered up to stand trial.

The Communists make no secret of their aims, which is to establish a Soviet setup in China. They look to Moscow for their inspiration and while it is not proved yet it does appear that support in the way of materials of war and of high command officers have been forthcoming from the Soviet Union. The territory which has come under Communist control seems to be satisfactorily administered when judged on Chinese standards and where the Communist troops have misbehaved it appear! that they have subsequently been disciplined The Communists are not going to make the mistake of increasing their own difficulties by antagonising the general run of the population. Nor arc they going to place difficulties in the way of Nationalist soldiers deserting. All Nationalist soldiers in hiding who give themselves up will not be punished; property rights are respected; trade and commerce is facilitated. Where the Big Four Families interests are concerned, however, confiscation is the order of the day. As in every other country into which they have moved the Communists offer two attractive proposals, liberation from debt and redistribution of land among the cultivators. It was said of Europe’s peasantry that it exchanged the bonds of serfdom for the chains of the usurper and that saying holds strongly in the East. From a propaganda standpoint, therefore, the Communists are working on favourable terrain in China today. They could, nevertheless, nullify those advantages by pushing their programme of nationalisation too speedily. This mistake they are not making. It is realised that the family tradition and the natural conservatism of the tillers of the soil may not be disregarded. If a Communist setup is ever to be achieved it must come as a result of a leading not a forcing process. The peasant, wishing only for peace, and having lost confidence in the Nationalist Government, will welcome another Government no matter what is its profession of faith so long as it creates conditions wherein the cultivator will reap that which he has sown and if Government taxes are less than usurer’s extractions and landlord’s rent, as now appears to be the case, then that, too, will be an advantage. The Communists continue to denounce every peace move of the Nationalist Government as insincere, being designed only to continue the life of the Government and if possible to frustrate the revolution as they continue to call their movement. They denounce delays as only being but subterfuges for the consolidation of the Nationalist defence and appear tc use armistice periods to consolidate their own forces for further forward moves. It is improbable that with the prospects of success as encouraging as they arc at. present the Communists will prove to be willing to negotiate a real compromise peace. It is more than probable that in any coalition they will insist upon securing the reins and when this is achieved the elimination of the non-Communist elements can be expected to speedily follow. The eagerness of the Communist generals to eliminate the Nationalist leaders by requiring their surrender only underscores the belief that the customary Communist technique would be applied in China as it has been employed elsewhere. . f* China’s need, however, under a Communist and a Nationalist Government will remain the same. It is to employ economically its vast manpower so that the standard of living can be raised perceptibly. This is a mighty task to essay. The elimination of the old economy with all its faults is not possible no matter how desirable, for the simple reason that to establish a more efficient regime would require a long period of development in public administration (always; a weak link in China) in commercial organisation and in the economy of the country. To bring about such a development it would be necessary to import capital goods into the country on a large scale and that with speed. If China were Io look to the Soviet I nion for such assistance it. would most probably look in vain for Russia is weak in administrative ability and experience in organising, while its capital accumulations are scanty and insufficient for the Soviet Union's own needs. China, will, in the end, have to turn to the West for these things. Should the Communists, then, come to office they will be unable to solve the riddle of China without Western aid. It would appear, therefore, to be a reasonable expectation that just as the Kuomintang turned from Communistic doctrine tto more practical ways, so will the next wave of Communism go down before opportunism. The fundamental weakness of corruption in adminstrativc fields will, however, remain still to be solved.