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PACIFIC WAR

CRUCIAL STAGE COMING JAPANESE PREPARING FOR DEFENSIVE (Special Australian Correspondent—N.Z.P.A.) (Recd. 7.40 p.m.) Sydney, Dec. 29. “During 1943 the Pacific will reach its crucial stage. Some time during the next twelve months our ‘holding policy’ will end. We hope then to find ourselves pursuing the yellow men towards Tokio." The roles in the Pacific war are being reversed and it is clear the Japanese are strengthening the outer defences of her new' empire in preparation for the big Allied offensive. Time to complete these defences in the South Pacific is the stake for which the Japanese are playing in the desperate delaying actions she is now fighting in Papua and the southeast Solomons. New Japanese aerodromes are being rushed to completion to form a powerful chain of aerial bases stretching from Sumatra half-way to Hawaii. These statements were made by Jack Turcott, New York Daily News war correspondent in the South-west Pacific, who adds: "Japan already has major aerodromes or is building sizeable strips in Medan, Batavia, Sourabaya, Koepang, Dilli, Tenimber, Madang, Lae, Salamaua, Gasmata, Rabaul, Buka, Buin, Munda, Nauru and Nonoiti- an arc completely hemming in the Allies within the Southwest Pacific area. “These new Japanese aerodromes in the conquered territories are the main bases at which the enemy is able to maintain, supply and repair large fleets of warplanes,” declares Turcott. "This aerial chain places the Japanese within 700 miles of every Allied outpost in the South-west Pacific, enabling the enemy squadrons of medium and heavy bombers to harass the Allies, while the Japanese naval superiority westward of the Solomons prevents effective retaliation except by air.” Turcott points to Timor as an excellent illustration of Japanese strategy. The enemy there is secure, he says, so long as the American Fleet is tied down in the Solomons, since the United Nations could not undertake the invasion of Timor from Australia without a powerful task force crossing ihe Arapura and Timor Seas. Allied bombers have been delivering blows against Timor aerodromes, but the damaged runways have been repaired within a few hours and planes destroyed on the ground have been quickly replaced from neighbouring bases. The Japanese as yet have no need to maintain large air and naval forces around Singapore, Java, Borneo, the Moluccas and the Philippines, because the Allies lack bases in these regions, says Turcott. Thus the enemy is able to concentrate warships and planes in the New Britain and Bismark archipelago area, keeping American naval units in the Solomons and the Allied Air Force in the South-west Pacific engaged indefinitely in lighting local actions not materially affecting the Japanese position. That the Japanese "holding” strategy is being implemented rapidly is indicated by the recent heavy aerial reinforcement of their Rabaul base as well as fresh aerodrome buildings and activities. But some chinks in the armour-plated plan have already become apparent. The Sydney Herald military correspondent to-day emphasises that Japan is now losing combat planes and merchant shipping beyond her replacement ability. The qualitative as well as quantitative superiority of Allied aircraft will give the United Nations a striking power which must eventually crack the Japanese defensive ring—but the enemy strategy is sound in that it imposes maximum delays on the United Nations. Inefficient general staff work and the inability of the Japanese High Command to plan and execute war movements or cope with unexpected reverses will be a main reason for Japan’s loss of the war, according to Richard Tregaskis, American correspondent in the South Pacific. Although her initial campaigns were wonderfully successful because they went according to prearranged plan, much of the later enemy military and naval manoeuvring has been notably stupid, says Tregaskis in an analysi* of Japan's failures in the Coral Sea and Midway battles and subsequent efforts to retake Guadalcanal "When he has met unexpected resistance the Japanese has faffed,” declares Tregaskis. "Too often he comes into battle arrogantly confident only to crumple rapidly when he has been surprised. The fundamental defect of Japanese mentality seems to be that when he is surprised he loses his head. That, is not to say he is not capable of putting up a terrific resistance. He will give us a wearing fight but his recent failures are the writing on the wall for his eventual downfall.”

Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/WC19421230.2.93

Bibliographic details

Wanganui Chronicle, Volume 86, Issue 307, 30 December 1942, Page 5

Word Count
713

PACIFIC WAR Wanganui Chronicle, Volume 86, Issue 307, 30 December 1942, Page 5

PACIFIC WAR Wanganui Chronicle, Volume 86, Issue 307, 30 December 1942, Page 5

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