The Wanganui Chronicle TUESDAY, OCTOBER 15, 1940. THE SECOND PHASE OF THE WAR

Wanganui Chronicle, Volume 84, Issue 243, 15 October 1940, Page 4

The Wanganui Chronicle TUESDAY, OCTOBER 15, 1940. THE SECOND PHASE OF THE WAR

first phase of the war having concluded with Germany dominant in western Europe, and the British Empire dominant on the sea, the second phase is in part, at least, conditioned by those circumstances. Germany attained to dominance in the air in the Polish and French campaigns, but has been unable to attain to a temporary dominance over England, and that being so, it is necessary for Germany to contemplate the prospect of the invasion of England as a diminishing one. The future, therefore, is less certain for the invasion effort. Notwithstanding these conditions, Germany continues to mass shipping and barges on the coasts of Holland, Belgium and France. There they are subjected to aerial and naval attack, which must be effective to a considerable degree. Why is this costly procedure persisted in? There are several explanations, any one of which may be the correct one: It may be that the Germans are persisting in their plans to invade England. It may be that the damage done to the land transportation systems by British bombers has been so great that transportation of supplies down the coffist is an imperative necessity for the maintenance of the garrisons in occupied territories. Again, it may be merely a bluff to impress Britain of the possibility and probability of an impending invasion effort, thereby immobilising a considerable portion of Britain’s military strength. The last possibility should not be. lightly discounted. The more British troops that are immobilised by the fear of invasion of Britain, the weaker is she overseas, and the greater relatively is Germany’s strength in Europe. The problem which confronts General Keitel is how to use his strength in Europe in such a way as to minimise the, effectiveness of Britain's air and sea strength. For Keitel to strike at the heart of (lie British Empire is good strategy, provided he can |fc’ike effectively; but it does not appeal’ that he can do this. He is therefore forced to consider putting into operation his alterantive plan. The plan, however, must not ijierease his commitments of the present time. He must not add to his enemies by bringing in .Russia, for instance; nor may be attack the Dardanelles until he is aware of how Bulgaria will act. Conflict with Greece and Yugoslavia could be avoided until a more opportune time. But Turkey would not relinquish her hold on the Narrows without a conflict. The Turks are good fighters, and so if they arc to be attacked they must be separated from Russia on the one side and from Brtiain’s Middle East Army on the other side. If the army in Egypt could be engaged by a sufficiently strong Italian army, then the whole of Lower Egypt might pass to Italian control, in which case the Suez Canal would no longer afford a channel through which could pass British aid for Turkey. Egypt is obviously the focal point of attack during the second phase of the contest. This action, however, falls entirely upon the Italians. Their aim was to attack Egypt while the invasion of Britain was in progress, repeating the stab-him-when-he’s-(lov.n technique which was applied Io France. The Italians have therefore been committed to their adventure, but the Germans have not embarked upon theirs. The whole situation is therefore very different from what the Italians expected it to be. Further, there are some very grave difficulties in the way of Germany helping Italy in the North African campaign. The first difficulty lies in the Italians inherent, dislike of serving under German commanders, or even of Italian officers being .seconded by Germans. Germany is not, likely to provide the Italians with supplies to any extent unless German officers are in command of the operations in which the supplies are to be used. The second difficulty lies in the insecurity of Italian sea transport across the Mediterranean Sea, while the third difficulty is presented by the difficulty of the terrain in the western Egyptian area for successful military manoeuvres. With these difficulties present, General Keitel’s mind would naturally turn to the possibility of creating a diversion, so as to draw off from Egypt some of the British troops stationed there, hi contemplating such a diversion he must keep the already, mentioned need for not increasing his commitments steadily in view. The ideal diversion would be to support Spain in an attempt to capture the Rock of Gibraltar, and so achieve a closure of the western end of the Mediterranean. Spain, however, does not appear to be susceptible to German and Italian blandishments, and Franco refuses to commit his country to a policy of belligerency. The only other course open is to engage in a manoeuvre in eastern Europe. Hungary is with Germany and Italy already; Rumania, however, is not such a certainty. The peasant population has tasted the sweets of the ownership of the soil for twenty years, pud unless delicately handled the flames of war at any time may burst forth in the Balkans. Further, Russia has always been sensitive concerning any disturbance of the status quo in the Balkans. The problem which is presented by Rumania, therefore, is how to secure control of the country without ranging the peasant population against the German garrison, and without offending Italy’s amor propre in respect to this area, and without causing Russia to object.

The method adopted has been that of infiltration, using the Iron Guard as a Rumanian facade behind which to build up the German garrison. The manoeuvre is fraught with grave risks and it is obvious the Germans hope that by moving gently they will avoid a rupture until they are in a position to deal with it.