The Wanganui Chronicle THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 1938. NEW MOVES IN EUROPE

Wanganui Chronicle, Volume 80, Issue 28, 3 February 1938, Page 6

The Wanganui Chronicle THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 1938. NEW MOVES IN EUROPE

yV/ r ITH customary bombast Signor Mussolini has announced

that lie intends to move a highly-mechanised army into Spain in order to secure a victory for General Franco’s side. This will give to the world an opportunity for seeing how the Spanish people have been able to banish their Government. Signor Mussolini is able to engage in his filibustering adventures because of the delicately-poised condition of European peace. He is probably right when he states that neither England nor France is willing to intercept his army going to Spain, and he is probably equally correct in his view that discussion won’t matter because the army will be in Spain when the discussion starts. The conditions which are favourable to Signor Mussolini’s intervention policy may, nevertheless, change at any time. Germany is moving fast to its crisis and may break at any moment. The German High Command appears to have a more real assessment of the European situation than has the Chancellor, and as the High Command has all along insisted that the economic condition of Germany is so critical that to risk warfare, even with Poland, is folly, there is a probability that a divergence deep and lasting may open up like a chasm between the Army and the Nazis. The German Army is also opposed io the hitervcntion policy in Spain, first, because it is not likely to produce an adequate return for the costs involved, and second, because it is not possible to wage war on the limited liability plan. The German Army realises that Germany is best served by'•friendship with Britain, from whence financial strength cometh: the Nazis realise that with Mussolini as the chief troublemaker they are likely to win concessions from the main Western Powers. The former realises, however, that Germany lacks financial support and trading opportunities, both of which are unlikely to be forthcoming if the Nazi foreign policy is persisted in. The German Army may be stern in its discipline, but it is still the unifying force in Germany to-day, it is still the greatest of German institutions and its patriotism is beyond question. But it is not blind, nor is it uncritical. The marriage of General Blomberg to his private secretary evidently contravenes the social code of the German Army, a code of which the Army is extremely sensitive, for on it is based the whole structure of the Army’s prestige in the eyes of the nation. The incident of the marriage may not be much in itself, and yet it might easily provide the spark to the tinder which shall set aflame the whole nation. In any conflict between the Army and Nazism it is difficult at this juncture to forecast where public support would go. It would all depend upon the personalities which were thrown up by the course of events. The Army, however, would be organised for immediate action, and its leaders would not be caught at a disadvantage as were General Roehm and his co-vietims in the terrible purge of blood which removed so many from Hitler’s path. Further, the Army would not lack resources for both quick and for sustained action, and it would only require the semblance of success in the initial stages for the whole of the Nazi readme to 'mlbipse I’ko a house of cards.