NAVAL STRENGTH

Wanganui Chronicle, Volume 79, Issue 212, 10 September 1935, Page 8

NAVAL STRENGTH

BRITAIN AND GERMANY APPLYING THE NEW RATIO. FUTURE BUILDING. Renewed interest in tho question of relative naval strength between Great Britain and Germany has been occasioned by the statements of Mr. Lloyd George in regard to the attitude taken towards the abolition of submarines, writes the naval correspondent of The Tinies. There is a possible danger that public interest should be concentrated oh this matter, which is, after all, among the least important of those under discussion between tire two countries. It does not appear to be generally understood that the exchange of views and information which began during the talks with Herr von Ribbentrop has been continued. Any idea that the June meetings were in the nature of a conference similar to those which resulted in the. Washington and London naval treaties is erroneous. They were informal talks which resulted in an agreement between Britain and Ger many in outline only. There remains the more important and difficult task of applying the principle of this agree ment to actual strength ami building programmes. Progress in this is bound to be slow, but it is proceeding quite satisfactorily. The British Government is still hopeful that a conference between the five Powers interested in the Washington and London Treaties —Great Britain, tho United States, Japan, France and Italy—may be summoned this year, but the talks previously held, first with the United States and Japan, and later with France and Italy, resulted in few points of agreement. It seems more likely that a general naval conference may meet after the ground has been prepared, and the importance of the\ Anglo-German talks in this connection is obvious. The prospect of another naval treaty which would limit total tonnages, and include a continuance of the ratio as a guide to relative naval strength, is remote. What is hoped for is that each contracting party will unilaterally declare its building programme for the next five years. This it could do without being tied down to a definite figure of limitation which might prove irksome in practice. It would have the advantage of eliminating surprises such as have served to stimulate competition in the past, when frequent new programmes, led to increased construction. Such long-term programmes, mutually exchanged, can also be more definitely related to the individual needs of nations than when these have to be made to conform to total tonnage limitations. The Total. Much more important. than any quantitative limitations would be an agreement for qualitative limitation, whereby the maximum tonnage and power of individual ships could be controlled. An agreement along these lines is urgently needed to replace the Washington and London Agreements, which have been of definite value in saving expenditure and discouraging competition. The chief of these limits are:—Battleships, 35,000 tons and 16in. guns; cruisers, 10,000 tons and Sin. guns or, for category (b) cruisers, Gin. guns; aircraft carriers, 27,000 tons; flotilla leaders, 1850 tons, and destroyers, 1500 tons, both with guns not exceeding s.lin. In every case the British Government has suggested re ductions in these limits. In he talks las* autumn the Japanese declared themselves unable to accept any qualitative restrictions unless quantitative limitations were also imposed. In their view the two things could not be treated separately. Yet the difficulty of overhead or aggregate tonnage limitations. which involves the question of ratios, remains. Further discussion appears to have brought more support for the view that reductions of size by classes, combined with programme limitations over a term of years, ought to render unnecessary the working out of quantitative figures to which a nation nas to be bound. German 35 Per Cent. The great gain when Germany voluntarily decided to restrict herself to 35 per cent, of British strength is the more apparent when the abortive meetings with other Powers on the subject of ratios are recalled. But at the time of agreement, on June 18, the 35 [•er cent, was only a broad idea. How it was to be translated into ships, tons, and guns was left to be decided. The first important point was the figure of British strength on which the 35 per cent, was to be calculated. It might be supposed that the Washington and London treaties supplied such a figure. But these, treaties cease to operate after 1936, and, whatever happens after then, it is unlikely that the standards will be renewed in their present. form. Nor is it satisfactory to take the actual strength of the Royal Navy at the present time. It includes a large amount of over-age tonnage, and several types which will disappear in the near future. The immediate need is thus to project a figure at, which British naval str I gth will stand at the end of, say, five years. Before this can be done it is desirable Io know at what rate the Germans intend to build. They, of course, arc in a different position from ourselves in that they are building up, whereas British programmes are concerned with replacement. 'The future German programme has been very largely a matter of speculation. It is known that two battleships recently laid down, the ErsatzElsass and the Ersatz-Hannover, are to be. of a tonnage exceeding the 10,000 specified in the Versailles Treaty. It seems tolerably certain that Germany will enter upon the building of air-craft-carriers now that she has her own air force again. As to cruisers and destroyers, these types are classed ‘together in the French and Italian navies under one heading as 4 ‘light surface vessels.” and provision for variation of the 35 per cent, ratio in the one category or the other h made accordingly in the recent German agreement. Parity in Submarines. The concession of the right of Ger many to parity in submarines with this country is explained by the fact that Japan was granted parity in this class at the London Conference of 1930. ami France and Italy might also have had it had they subscribed to part 111 of the London Treaty. Both are now superior to Britain in submarine strength. But, while, obtaining the right, Io parity. Germany is content with 45 per cent, of our lor’age at present. Tho two standards are not contradictory, for the. submarine is dif-

ferent from all other types, in that submarines do not, as a rule light sub marines. There is a definite limit of requirements for submarines as defensive weapons fixed by length of coastline, numbers of ports to be protected, or patrols to be maintained, and judged by these Germany is satisfied that -15 per cent, of British tonnage will provide for her requirements. But if Britain were to reduce her submarine strength by one half Germany could not. maintain such requirements if she had to reduce proportionately. There is no direct relation between the submarine strength of the two countries. Hence the reservation of her right to parity, even though, so far ns can be foreseen at present, she may have no need of it. On the question of the abolition of submarines Germany is at one with this country. She is pri'pared to abolish submarines if other nations will agree to do so. The criticism that no declaration to this effect was included in the recent agreement ignores the nature of the conversations which led up to it. They had not the status of a formal conference, and here was a question concerning not Britain and Germany only but all nations with nnvies. There would have been no point in putting a common aspiration into the bare statement, of what had been agreed upon between the two countries. Although there is but a faint hope that it will be accepted by the Powers, the British authorities intend to pursue the question of the abolition of submarines, first advocated by them at Washington nearly It years