THE SUBMARINE MENACE.

Waipawa Mail, Volume XXXVII, Issue 7912, 28 July 1917, Page 4 (Supplement)

THE SUBMARINE MENACE.

Mr Charles Grasty’s despatch to “The New York Times," a summary of which appeared recently, even if it should be proved that he has somewhat exaggerated the seriousness of the position, will serve a useful purpose if it enables British colonies to more clearly realise their own position in relation to the submarine menace. Last week’s developments in connection with the political crisis in Germany are sufficient in themselves to indicate the extent to which Germany now relies upon her submarines to find a way out of the difficulties into which the ambitions of the War Lords have led her. In a recent issue of the “Saturday Evening Post,” Carl W. Ackman gives a very interesting summary of the reasons which influenced Germany to stake her chances of success on the submarine weapon. He describe?-the village of Pless, in Silesia, :.nd the Rhine industrial valley, as being of more importance militarily and politically than Berlin, which Fes about midway between them. Pless is the headquarters of the German Emperor and his General Staff, and here Field-Marshal von Hindenburg has every available atom of military information. “But,” adds the writer, “when ‘Excellenz’ wants to know the political ar J war business borometer level, he was to send an envoy to the Rhine industrial valley; for in war-time the opinion of ammunition makers is much mere important than that of under-nourished politicians, beer-hall stiategists, or curious Reichs'.ag members.” After referring to the growing military and economic difficulties which Germany had to face last year, Mr Ackerman states that th a German leaders saw th t something had to oe done immediately, and, as a result, General Ludendorf was ordered to go to the industrial centres along the Rhine to sound public opinion. “What these business leaders told Hindenburg’s envoy,” adds the writer, “they repeated to u«?. ‘Look here,’ they said in effect, ‘this war is a war of transportation. k So long as England can get supplies and export them to her Allies the war will continue. Wo cannot win unless we shut off the British Isles from the rest of the world.

Ships are to tre Entente what railroad trains are to use. If England could de-

stroy as many trains .as we can srips, we should be crippled—absolutely broken, and at England’s mercy. Now apply that to the oceans. We must sink the Allies’ ships—crew’s, cargoes, and all.’ Without stopping at Berlin, Ludendorf i -turned to Pless and placed his report before the German Emperor .and Hindenburg. . . Ludendorf convinced Hindenburg that the war could be ended successful!v this year by the unrestricted use of submarines; and Admiral von Capelle, successor to Grand Admiral von Tirpitz. presented figures to show that there were TJ-boats aplenty.” The writer then refers in the German peace efforts, and the decision to declare the blockade in February Inst. “Was it madness and desperation or cold-blooded war business, ’ he asks, “which caused Germany to defy the whole world? No one. knew exactly until Rear-Admiral Carl Holweg published, no February Oth of this year, a book entitled “Our Right to the Submarine War.’ Holwmg’s book was to explain the German naval programme as von Bernhardi’s volume, ‘Germany and the Next War,’ had explained the military plans. . . . He was to prove to the people how the U-boats would wdn the war. He based tho text of his sea sermon on the song V Herr Ernt V;.*!:.• Are i'. < te-

ing the f illowing words:—“Rather an end with terror than terror without end.’ How well Holweg reflects German officii opinion {to-day by this phrase is shown by the frank statement Germans before I left Berlin that, “win or lose, we must end the war.’ v This view is endorsed by Mr D. Thomas Curtin in liis most interesting book.

“The Land ot the Deepening--Shadow. ,; Mr Curtin has spent many months .’n Germany during the war period, and has enjoyed exceptional opportunities of getting at the heart of things, hi Mr Curtin’s opinion, Verdun marks the supreme encminatio.. of German milii jtary offensive in the West; and the West,he snys, is the decisive theatre -,f war. Assuming that Hindenburg realises that another colo.sal German offensive in the West would not bring .i victorious peace, there remains only the alternative of building up a defensive against the Allied attacks, and—tlse U-boats. And now, as Mr Curtin predicted, Germany’s last card is on the table, and, as lie said, “it will be a war to the knife. Either she will starve Great Britain or Great Britain will starve her.” We in New Zealand are crying out for ships. We want them badly; but according to Mr Grasty, “the changes at tho Admiralty have brought out the fact that at the prorent rate of construction and deestrucion, unless British commitments elsewhere are considerably curtailed, there will not be enough shipping at the end of a few months to feed Engand and France, and maintain their armies.’’ And beyond all question, tho feeding of our Mother Country and France, and the maintenance of their armies, must ho the first and main consideration.