No Weightier Decision Ever Made.

Star (Christchurch), Issue 18772, 30 May 1929, Page 8

No Weightier Decision Ever Made.

DOUGLAS HAIG HAD RESOLVED TO ATTACK.

EVEN THOUGH FOCH WAS DOUBTFUL OF SUCCESS.

On the day preceding the big attack in September, 1918, Foch visited Haig, and made no secret of his doubts. The whole responsibility thus rested on Haig, and to him alone must be ascribed the whole credit. With absolute confidence in his own judgment, with unflinching determination, and that steadfast faith in God that was his mainstay, Haig resolved to commit his armies to the attack. No weightier decision has ever fallen to the lot of any British soldier; none had greater results.

(Special to the “ Star.”) LONDON, April 18.

Mr John Buchan remarks in his foreword to General Charteris’s “ Field Marshal Earl Haig” (Cassells) published to-day, that the “ compulsion which a great man places upon the world is to understand him.” Certainly such compulsion is upon us of our race to know what manner of mar was that Douglas Haig who in truth saved us and our Allies. That he did no less by his military genius than by his real greatness in subordinating himself to the French Generalissimo, leaving all petty personal feelings aside—when as we know he did not believe the French were in a military sense better than or even as good as the British. He saw clearly that without unity of command there was no hope of success. This compulsion on us to understand Haig lies all the more heavily on us because he was one of those great men about whom the Press built up no romantic figure, dug up no senti-

mental stories. Instead there was the legend of his dour, unsmiling hardness, which did not express the real man. It is true he did not suffer fools gladly but General Charteris says: “Yet the deep underlying sympathy with humanity in all its weaknesses and frailty was continually evident. He was ruthless in removing those whom he considered incompetent for the task required of them, but he would be at great pains to soften the blow by a kindly word. ‘You have done your best, none of us can do more.’ There is work elsewhere that you can do, and will do well; wherever you may be you will be helping to win the war. “ There is a picture that will always remain vivid in the minds of those who were present when Haig chanced to meet, returning from the trenches in the early days of 1915, a battalion in which almost every man was suffering from trench feet. They could only move a hundred yards or so, then rest for some minutes, but with unconquerable spirit they were singing and whistling as they struggled onwards.

“A Weary March.’* “ He stopped the column, and passing slowly down the ranks exchanged a few words with each man. Then mounting, he watched the men resume their weary march. He was deeply moved. ‘ What right have we. he said, ‘to any credit, when these men are enduring so much ?’ ” It is characteristic of the man that in his general orders to the Army he did not, as was usual, address them tc officers and men, but “ all ranks.’ eßooks about great soldiers dt not usually interest everybody. But General Charteris has contrived to write a life, which although dealing largely with war, everyone can read. Indeed the four hundred pages of this book are as engrossing as a novel. Never before has this reviewer obtained any clear idea of what the objectives of the big battles were, how far they were achieved or how far they fell short. The accounts of them are most lucid and easily understandable by the layman. General Charteris is peculiarly fitted to write this life, for, as Mr John Buchan relates in his foreword, when the official history of the war was being planned Lord Haig was asked whom he would like to go through it. The answer was “ Send it to Charteris. He knows as much about it as I do.” A Convinced Westerner.

There is much in this book to help us as reassuring the value of the various campaigns. Lord Haig never wavered in his belief that the issue would be decided on the Western Front, and while he was inarticulate in council, he set forth his views in no uncertain language with his pen To single out but one hotly debated point —the value of the battle of the Somme.

“ Lord Haig maintained,” says General Charteris, “ that although it had not resulted in the complete and immediate breakdown of German resistance, yet it had achieved results which had justified both the inception and the pursuance to the uttermost of the battle. The German fighting power had been greatly reduced. The wear ing-out process was in full course Our own armies, both officers and men. had gained experience which was to be of primary service to them in their future battles. They had acquired confidence in their own powers, and they had earned for the British Army, for the first time, the complete con fidence and respect of the Allied leaders.

Necessity of the Somme. “ Apart from purely military considerations, Haig considered that a Russia, Italy and Rumania had loyally broad view of the international situation proved the necessity of the battle There had been an agreed plan for the year’s campaign for all the Allies, played their part. France had endured the martyrdom of Verdun. Was Britain to fail, even when the pro-

bability of final success in the battle became less? Might not any reluctance to commence the great battle of the year or any premature breaking off of the battle, have weakened the faith of the Allies in Great Britain, and endangered the whole outcome of The war? Might not France herself have grown weary of the struggle, in which she would have borne far the greater share, both of effort and of JOSS?” General Charteris goes on to say: “ This, review of the battle may be Iread in-conjunction with Ludendorff’s remarkable statement that ‘ I cannot see as I look back how the German General Headquarters could have mastered the situation, if the Allies had continued cheir blows as they did in 1916.! ” Again in the beginning of 1918, when a smashing offensive by the Germans had to be looked for on the resumption of active warfare: “It is noteworthy that even at this early date Haig advanced the opinion that Germany could not continue fighting after the autumn of 1918, on account of the internal state of the country, but nevertheless the next few months would be critical.

War Council Breaks Down. “Immediately on his return to France he found himself involved in the perennial problem of the relative fronts During November he had come to agreement in principle with Petain that the British front should by the conclusion of the year’s operations be extended as far south as Barisis. Haig, while he did not wish to infringe the terms of agreement, had found it impossible to complete the extension as early as Petain desired; and Clemenceau (who had succeeded Painleve as Prime Minister during November) and Foch intervened with the demand that the extension of the British line should extend as far as Berry-au-Bac. Clemenceau even threatened to resign if the demands were not met, but ultimately agreed to refer the matter to the Supreme War Council. “The War Council, after the fashion of all councils, resolved on a compromise. The British line was to be extended to the River Ailette. Haig at once protested, and in a letter of January 13, asked that he might be relieved of his command rather than be forced to agree to an extension which would, in his opinion, endanger the security of his armies. (Ten days previously Ludendorff had proffered his resignation for somewhat similar reasons). “The Supreme War Council was now faced with a dilemma; it had no power of enforcing its decision, nor could it accept Haig’s resignation, even had it so desired. The machinery had in fact broken down at its inception, and the council had to direct its attention forthwith to evolving some more workable method.” As we know the appointment of Foch as Generalissimo brought this dangerous condition to an end. Of the final battles of September. General Charteris writes: “It is difficult to appreciate the responsibility which at this stage Haig assumed. By the definite instructions which he had received .on April 3 he was not only authorised, but directed, to decline to comply with orders from Foch which, in his opinion, would imperil the army. Even had he wished to take refuge behind any order which Foch had issued or might issue, he was bereft of that safeguard. The Government at home and the chief of the Imperial General Staff, were plainly hinting that they did not wish him to attack the formidable entrenched line now in front of him, and had bluntly informed him that he was too ‘optimistic.* Nor r 'as Foch himself confident of success.

Haig’s Judgment. In summing up Lord Haig’s place in history. General Charteris says: “When the opinion of all leaders, both civilian and military, not only in our own country, but, so far as is known, in all countries, anticipated a short war, Haig’s prescience and accurate gauging of the military resources of the nations enabled him almost alone to foresee the severity of the struggle, and its inevitable duration through a long period of years instead of months. His assertion was no kind of blind guess-work; no man ever guessed less than Haig. It was the result of careful and laborious study and a deliberate weighing of every known factor. “It may well be that Lord Kitchener, by a different process, arrived simultaneously at the same conclusion; nc one can now say, but it is at least established that it was Haig who first gave definite and responsible utterance to the view, and who urged it upon Lord Kitchener, before Kitchener had expressed his opinion. That the two greatest soldiers of their own time in Britain should indeed arrive simultaneously at the same opinion in these early stages would be in no way remarkable. Their minds—even though they approached every problem from a different angle, and by a very different process—again and again arrived at the same conclusion. * The historian of the future may indeed marvel that this prescience as to the protracted course of the struggle was not shared by other soldiers of all countries who had equal—if not indeed easier—means of access to the available date on which they might form their considered judgments.” / A cheap edition ought to be made quickly available. For this simply written, graphic biography should be within the reach of everyone who wishes to get an intimate picture, unspoiled by fulsome flattery, of one of the greatest men of our time. For cer tainly there can be few records of a life more single-minded in its devotion to duty, more ready to sink self in the pursuit of his country's good in the big job of his life, which, once accom plished, he then devoted to the welfare of his comrades who had suffered i in the titanic conflict.