THE WAY OF THE WAR.

Star (Christchurch), Issue 12408, 28 August 1918, Page 4

THE WAY OF THE WAR.

THE POSITION ANALYSED. Reuter’s correspondent with ilio British Headquarters, who commonly takes, a conservative view of tho situation, repeats the warning that in spite of tho marked British successes of late tho public optimism ought »lo ho tempered with caution. Possibly the warning is not needed, because tho public have suffered too many disappointments during tho last four years to bo over-eager now to jump to optimistic conclusions, but somo of tho messages that arc coming through nowadays aro unwarrantably dated in tone. M. Clemcnccau has declared that tho Allies arc gathering tho first sheaves of dm harvest, and Marshal Foch pronounced tho operations to bo going well, and with such authoritative assurances tho reader can afford to watch and wait. The big results have still to come, for, after all, it is only the first sheaves that have been gathered, and tho harvest may be interrupted. Indeed, it would bo folly to suppose that entirely favourable conditions will exist continuously for the. rest of tho year. There aro two full months of fighting weather ahead, and one docs not know what capacity tho enemy may have to strike back. Tho Allies have him moving and their policy is to keep him moving, to compel him to shift reserves from one sector to another and to prevent him from massing forces for another offensive. Tlie'expectation that General Byng would extend the front of his attack northwards has been justified, for ho is now moving in, tho valley of thoScarpe and has reached the outskirts of Ptoeux. The British were over this ground last year, and their present advance brings them very close to tho position from which they retreated at the end of March. South of the Scarpe they have captured Monchy-le-Preux, which they held after the battle of Arras last year, and in the valley of tho Cojeul they hold Wancourt and are facing Guemappe, which one report says they have captured. Between tho Cojeul and Bapaurao there have been only minor alterations of the front, partly because tlie resistance must have stiffened and partly because tho troops need a brief respite. But a significant incident is the capture of Favreuil, about a mile and a half north of Bapaumo. Tho British success at this point ought to mean that Bapaume is under attack from west and north, and that the Cambrai railroad is already out of operation. Indeed, but for the downpour of rain, which would delay all transport and communication and would interfere with work in the air the Germans would before this have been turned out of Bapaume. If the conditions render tho continuation of tho operations at all possible the fall of tho town should not be far distant, even though tho Germans have been pouring reinforcements into it. . South of Bapaume the British on Monday held Thilloy, from which point the Perrono road would ho under fire, so that at that stage the Germans must have been deprived of tho uso of ono main road and a railway, leaving them dependent on the road from Oambrai and various indirect routes to supply the place. Tho rea},. danger to Bapaume, however, threatened from the north, where tho advance had been made on a wide and regular front, whereas to the south Thilloy represented the furthest east of tho British movement. The direct road south from Bapaume to Longueval had not been reached. Martinpuich had been captured, but not Flers, Mamets but noh 'Montauban. _ On this sector tho struggle was raging over tho familiar ground of the Somme battle, but under conditions very different from those of 1916. It must be borne in mind that south of Bapaume the Germans aro retreating to conform with the line they are endeavouring to establish to the north. They came back ■ from the Ancre under pressure, it is true, and they are still under pressure, but there is no reason to suppose that they have not been retiring in perfectly good order. An official report states that the French have captured Fresnoy, north of Rcye. In the original Allied advance south of the Sommo Canadian and British troops were on this sector and their patrols reached Fresnobub when fairly .stable lines were established tho advanced British parties were drawn in and the Allies entrenched in the neighbourhood of le Quesnoy and Parvillers, a couple of miles to the west. As the French advanced from Montdidier General Humbert extended his loft wing northwards and took over the front ns far as the Amiens road. How much further north he extended has not been stated, but he has been able either to relieve British divisions on his left or to spare troops for tho reserve, because bis own front has been very appreciably shortened. Humbert formerly held the front from the Oise west to Montdidier and then north to tho Luce. When tho Canadians were transferred to the Fourth British Army they went into line on tho right of the Australians and took over the front as far south as the Avre. That left Humbert still with a full thirty miles of front and possibly a little more. If his right flank still rests on tho Oise his front will have been contracted to about twenty miles, assuming that his left links up with the British somewhere between Boyo and Lihons. Another report, at present lacking official confirmation, states that the Germans are withdrawing from the Vcslo. This may bo an intelligent anticipation. Mangin’s success between the Aisno and the Oise has placed tho Germans in a dangerous position, for between the Aisno and the Ailetto they have ten miles of an exposed flank and the French are established on the high ridge overlooking the Ailetto, so that tho advantage of ground is no longer with the enomy. It was mentioned in earlier notes that the Germans would have to take measures for tho protection of this flank or they would have to withdraw from the line ■of tho Vesle. Tho French communique shows that they strongly attacked north of Soissons and were repulsed, and Mangin’s counter-attack ■pushed them back to tbe east of Bagneus v ith the loss of 400 prisoners. This failure may have convinced the enemy that his position between Soissons and Rheims was untenable without drastic rectification, because verv soon the French would be resuming the offensive and the results of delay miriit bo disastrous. However, the the rotioat from the \esle at present- is mi con (inn eel, ’ i