THE WAY OF THE WAR.

Star (Christchurch), Issue 12404, 23 August 1918, Page 4

THE WAY OF THE WAR.

THE POSITION ANALYSED. Tho French have hitherto hiul the continuation of th o hip; Allied offensive to themselves, but the British have now taken n hand, attacking 0 n a front of nine or ten miles north of the Ancre. This attack belongs to the same category ns tho French actions between the Matz and the Oise and between the Oise and the Aisno, in that it is a movement on tho flank of tho main offensive, hut it has additional important characteristics- The German front after the Allied offensive had reached the end of the first phase made a pronounced bend at Albert. From Arras to Albert tho trend was south-west, from Albert to Chaulnos south-east. There was therefore an obvious invitation to the British to continue tho battle by striking between Arras and Albert, in the hope ultimately of compelling tho Gormans to abandon Albert. As a matter of fact, the enemy anticipated just this development, for lately ho evacuated his advanced positions west of the Ancre and between the Ancre and Hobuterne, obviously to avoid being caught at a disadvantage. He seems to have assumed, however, that tho British would attack from Albert northwards, and it looks ns if he had determined to fall back t 0 the difficult high ground that ho occupied in 191b. further north his positions were irregular because they were overlooked in places by the British, and although ho also had the benefit in places of direct observation tho front could not bo regarded as a sound one. General Byng attacked under cover of a thick fog on the front between tho Ancre and Moyenville, and the early .reports indicate that ho achieved an advance to a depth of two or three miles, capturing a few villages. But the early -messages do not carry tho story of the battle very far. Acbiet lo Botit is a couple of miles cast of Bucquoy, but it is still four miles from Uapaume, which would bo tho ultimate objective in such an attack as this. Obviously the plan did not contemplate any considerable advance, since the front of tho offensive was restricted, but if the surprise were complete and- the success immediate the push might bring the Britisli within striking distance of Bapaumo. This, it must bo admitted, would bo an unexpectedly large result from a small offensive', but the conditions rendered it possible. Tho Germans had shown a disposition to withdraw from advanced positions, and there was reason to suppose that their front lines were held rather weakly. If the Tanks and the infantry could get through to the main defensive positions before tho enemy recovered from his surprise, a penetration of four or five miles du a front of nine or ten would not be altogether out of tho question.

Tlie Now Zealanders who hare so long been on tho sector north of Albert and between the Ancre and Hebulerne were given their opportunity in this now offensive. Their loft would be somewhere about Pusieux. and their right would bo below Serre. The village of Achict lo Petit would be their capture, supposing that they remained on tho sector in the same relative position, and a brigade of them may have been swung south in the hope of outflanking Muauraont, which would he perhaps the most formidable obstacle. It was just to the east of tho new British front here that th© Germans established themselves after the battle of the Ancre in the bopg of covering Bapaumc, and it goes without saying that the enemy is now turning to the best possible defensive use all the strong points that he selected for fortification eighteen months or more ago. The New Zealanders had broken the back of tho advanced enemy resistance in a series of small affairs which had forced tho Germans back on the Serre-Pnsieux ridge, and in tills attack they would have conio early into contact with the main defensive lines. Beyond the fact that they were engaged, however, nothing is yet known of the part they played. •

Regarding the French offensive on. either side of the Oise the earlier reports yesterday were not particularly informative, but the fuller communique covering the second day of General Mangin’s attack came to hand. This attack was briefly mentioned in a from the High Commissioner’s office yesterday. It was bnlliantly successful, for the French were able to push through Carlepout to Oaisnes on the left, they crossed the Audiguicourt ravine in the centre, and on the right, they reached Tartiers and Osly. The Audignicourt ravine is the valley mentioned m yesterday’s notes, across which the French had to advance under the direct observation of the enemy in order to reach the northern plateau at Morsain and Vassens. It forms the western part of the double Osier valley. Up the eastern valley the attack was pushed as far as Vozaponiu, half a mile from Epagny, and although the French were still on tho lower ground hero they must have had a footing on the slopes of tho plateau on a front of more than ten miles. In the continuation of tho attack they reached Cuts, which is well beyond Oaisnes, and it was doubtless this fact that tempted the New York newspapers to declare that Mangin was outflanking Noyon. Of course that stage had not been reached, and could not be reached unless tho German resistance broke down badly.

_ th's fighting, which on occasion has involved desperate attacks m strong positions, tho Allies are persistently turning to account the obvious irregularities of the German front, producing fresh irregularities and pinching out the resulting salients, the process brings no immediate sensational results, except when, as in tbo offensive south of the Somme, the enemy’s front is definitely broken! 13ut in the aggregate the local attacks have a very important influence. They prevent the enemy from organising for a fresh offensive, they u so up his reserves and they win from him first of all useful tactical positions and then bring results of strategic importance, the enemy has to exercise infinite patience if, in face of persistent local offensives, he is to proceed with his own plans, and however patient he may be he is risking a loss of morale in his divisions It, is probably not generally realised that the Allied local attacks and counter-offensives have involved a from of no less than 150 miles, or even more ,f Flanders is counted. Possibly 120 Gorman divisions have been concerned in the defeats and reverses that the enemy lias suffered, and many of them have sustained terrible losses.