THE SOUTH AFRICAN WAR.

Star (Christchurch), Issue 8704, 18 August 1906, Page 4

THE SOUTH AFRICAN WAR.

A RECORD OF MISTAKES. i ""■"■ ~ ~~* The fourth velum© of the great history of the South African war, which Mr Amery planned six years ago, is as able, though not quite co startling, a work as ate predecessors. It deals with the operations subsequent to the capture of Bloemfontein, and carries the story down to the date when Lord Roberts quitted South Africa, under the impression that the struggle was over. Narratives of the sieges of Ladyeraitk, Mafeking and Kimberky are also included. The feature which strikes the reader, and which is emphasised throughout by the writers and the editor, is the unfortunate nature of the- consequences which followed from the British attempt to wage a great war without incurring heavy loss. Load Roberts, in his operations, aimed rather at the. capture or occupation, of places than at the destruction of the armed forces of the " He was more anxious to reach Pretoria- than to fight battles/ 6ays Mr Williams, who edits this volume. " This was partly due to the strong disinclination to shed the enemy's blood, which was felt not only by Lord Roberts, but alnicst generally on the English side. The reasons for this disinclination . . . ' were partly the belief that the Boers were readier to yield than was really the case, partly the feeling almost of kinship which undoubtedly existed among' the the combatants of both sides,, and partly the recollection that the Boers would have to live with the English hereafter." Yet ihe net result of this humanitarian feeling was «, " wearisome prolongation of the campaign," and (probably in the end greater Joes to both sides and greater animosity on the part of the Boers. At the same time, Lord Roberts gave his generals orders not to carry out operations which would involve heavy lose to the British troops. In consequence, great opportunities were missed and a spirit of timidity infused into the operations. At Diamond Hill, for example, the anonymous officers who tell the tale of Lord Roberta's advance to Pretoria hold that the British generalissimo " missed his chance of possibly concluding the war by a fear of staking too much on one throw." Fortunately, the Boers were unenterprising, and never followed up their successes, or it might have gone badly with the British Army. GENERAL BULLER CRITICISED. As in previous volumes, the strategy of General Buller is the subject of severe criticism. After the relief of Ladysmith Lord Roberts wasi anxious to withdraw a part of General Buller's force, andy employ it in the Orange Free State. This might have prevented many of the regrettable incidents which occurred in th© Southern Orange Free State during the halt at'Bloemfontein, and which were mainly due to the weakness of the British forces at Lord Robert's disposal. But General Buller resisted any a-eduction of his force, and yet himself made little use of his 50,000 rneja. His telegrams to Lord Roberts on the subject are thus described : — "It is difficult to trace in Buller's telegrams, which alternated in their tone between almost extravagant optimism and the profoundest pessimism, any attempt at a well-considered plan of operations to meet the situation. ... Instead, ha displayed a vacillation and at times a nervousness . . . which drove him backwards and forwards from one alternative to another, and finally led him to reject them all." . Two months passed in complete inaction in Natal, and even when the Natal army did move "it cannot be said that the operations were conducted with any remarkable degree of rapidity, or that Buller made full use of his opportunities." Though, in hi 6 operations against Alleman's Nek, h© displayed tactical skill, here again he is blamed for neglecting to make proper us© of his victory. He had the Boer artillery and transport at his- mercy, yet he failed to capture them. I The causes of the many " regrettable incidents" are dealt with at some length. First and foremost was the defective working of Lord Roberts's stag. ■ "There was no system at all; Lord j Kitchener was nominally chief of the staff, and his duty should have been to keep in touch with all the various heads of departments . . ! . and to work out all the details of Lord Roberta's 6chames; in reality, he waß employed as a sort of second in command, sent off to press forward an operation which seemed to hang fire, or take charge of a small collection of oolumns." That the consequences were not worse than they were " was due chiefly to Lord Roberta's own extraordinary energy and memory. All through the march he kept up a constant flow 1 of orders and telegrams, never flurried, rarely forgetting a .point, and alive to all considerations, whether political or ► military." Secondly, Lord, Roberts under-estim-ated the power of resistance of the Boers, and permitted small detachments of British troops to wander abcut the country far from support. The Boer forces parted, like the waves of the sea before a ship, when the British main armies or strong columns passed, but they closed up behind, and scored a series of easy successes aaainst thess small, isolated detachments. Thirdly, British officers in command of detachments too often failed to show initiative, and remained passive and inactive when only a few miles from them some other and independent British •force was fighting for its life. Thus, at Sannalv's Post, Colonel Martyr gave no effective support to Colonel Broadwocd. when/"' a direct advance with his brigade might even have secured a victory " for the British. At Nitral's Nek, again, Colonel Alexander failed to support the Lincolns effectively, though, in the opinion of the History, if he had taken prompt action the' British force which was attacked would have been able to withdraw, and would have been saved from surrender. A fourth point made by the History is the want of a proper intelligence BViytem. Before the Beer attack at Nitral's Nek full warning of the danger had been, received, yet reinforcements not instantly despatched. FINE MARCHING OF THE TROOPS. The pieasa ntest feature of the volume is the tribute which it pays to the marchine: TK" ver and general conduct or tha British troops: — "The advance to Pretoria was rapid and well organised; this ; was Lord Roberta's part. It is also distinguished for the magnificent spirit and discipline displayed by the men. _ This spirit and this discipline are not : indeed the exclusive attribute of Englishman ; on i th? whole, in th© France-German war the German soldiers displayed them equally with almost greater temptations, and more recently the Japanese soldiers have. shown them signally. But when\it is remembered' that + M a 'naWi

was one of the most rapid in the annals of war, that, the supplies of food and water were very limited, that the alternations of heat in the daytime and bitter cold at night were very great, and that the self-control of the men was maintained throughout, the words of Lord Roberta's fareAvell order to his Army will not seem undeserved." /

The absence of straggling was noteworthy. Marching a distance of nearly 300 miles, only 4 per cent of the infantry were left by the wayside, though the cavalry, owing to defective horse management, lest very heavily. An equally good performance was the marching of the Highland Brigade, which covered 130 miles in eight days with continual fighting about the date of -fiie Lindley reverse. The fine conduct of the Highlanders passed almost unnoticed at the time.

The general imwession- left by the volume is not a pleasant one. It 'is mainly a record of miscalculations, muddles and mismanagement, redeemed by some very brilliant passages and by Lord Roberts's successes hi th© larger operations. At times there are hints of extraordinary carelessness,^ as when a Boer column under De Wet, covering 5000 yards, of road, passed within a mito of a British camp near Senekal without "attracting observation.

The chapter on the eiege of Kimberley is interesting for th© account which it gives of the curious conducts Mr Rhodes, between whom and Colonel Kekewich great friction arose. The impression produced is that Mr Rhodes was seriously at- fault, and in his impatient demands for relief at any price, arid his scornful estimate of the difficulties which a relieving force would have to encounter, completely misapprehended the military situation.