KITCHENER'S HALT UP THE NILE.

Star (Christchurch), Issue 6126, 12 March 1898, Page 7

KITCHENER'S HALT UP THE NILE.

> NEW DANGERS AHEAD. [By Geo. C. Craig.] Author of " Federal Defence of Australasia," Sydney. The events and manufacture of history on the Upper Nile, iv the Lagos or Niger hinterland, along the Indian frontier or in China, have now all a direct bearing and interest for the colonists of New Zealand and Australia. The British policy in those Xiarts is also that of Australians, so interwoven are our best interests with those of the rest of the Empire. We have seen new foreign aggression in the Pacific, together with the Russian march upon India and China, which have brought the colonies into line with the politics of the world. Recent affairs in China prove how two or three hostile powers can combine to upset an old and densely populated Empire like China. China is disjointed in defence — so are we in Australasia. It is high time that our statesmen and people took time and opportunity by the fcrelock, and prepared to meet the coming storm, lest we be too late, and " lest we forget " our common duty. There are three lines in sight, all of which will, more or less, influence both the Asian and Austral Pacific, i.e., the Canadian, Siberian and CapeCairo lines. Already the London papera state the shortest road to New Zealand or Sydney will be by Siberia. But if we are true to ourselves, we must develop the Cape and Canadian lines. If France, Russia and Germany resolve to play a trump card against the trade and colonies of England, England and her Pacific colonies must play the "Joker" against their treacherous policy and aggressive ambition. At present we must look to the African policy of Mr Rhodes to play the " Joker " or a qriid pro quo for Continental blackmailing of British interests. Sir Herbert Kitchener, who spent his youth in New Zealand, is one of our great modern commanders. His military services on the Nile and meritorious battles from Fesket to Berber stamp him as a brave, yet cautious, G.O.U. It was said that ho would reach Khartoum with success, carry the works at Metemneh, Soboloka, and Omdurman in -smart style, "and 'a that," but having heard the strength of the Khalifa's forces, and the mounting of the respective fortifications from Gabut and Shendy to Khartoum, together with the action of France, Russia and Abyssinia in operating upon the Upper Nile after the Sirdar got to Khartoum, I knew that the campaign could not be gloriously finished without at least one strong British and one Indian Division. The London War Office said so last ye?r. The Simla War Office had actually prepared maps of the Soudan to suit the officers of an Indian Division — one of which I have just received — and cables inform us that the British officers of the Egyptian army state that Khartoum could not betaken without 12,000 British troops. Whilst the public is wrapped up in the advance of Sir William Lockhart upon Tirah, the advance of Sir H. H. Kitchener and his Egyptian army, conducted by Generals Rundle and liuuter, is almost dwarfed ; but from a military point of view this advance of the Sirdar upon Khartoum, if successful in capturing Omdurman and defeating the Khalifa's army, will be a greater feat of arms on the part of British officers than the expedition of Lord Wolseley up the Nile, or the march of Roberts from Cabul to Candahar. If ever there was an expedition with a far reaching object, it is the " touch and go march " to the junction of the Blue and Wliite Niles. It is true tbat England considers it to be her duty to reconquer the Soudan and Nile Valley for Egypt, to open them up to trade and civilisation, and to avenge the death of Gordon, which has long stood unavenged. But that is not the true object of the advance upon Khartoum, noi* is it only to destroy once and for ever the power of the Mahdi, or to restore that of the Khedive from Alexandria up the Nile to the Soudan provinces of Darfur and Kardufan. The advance is part of the great Imperial policy of tKe Salisbury Government and of Cecil Rhodes, of South Africa. The secret of it all is that Slatin Pasha discovered that, if England did not advance to secure the Upper Nile valley, France would do so at once, pushing towards it as she is, by fair and foul means, from the Niger and the Algerian hinterland. Khartoum is the objective per se, but the unmistakable possession of the Nile valley is to keep France out and England in, which is the true point strategique of the whole campaien. The visit of Russian - envoysto King Menelik, of "the brave Prince Henry of Orleans to Abyssinia; ot , French semi-governors and lieutenants .to , the chiefs of Central Africa to undo treaties I made with England, the ; rapid^PF^oh l ot , French escorts to the Nile Valley, together ( with "the sheer cussedne_s ".of Germany ; to British interests, are items m diplomacy , ! . whioh have eaoh and all forced the hand ot .

Lord Salisbury. The French knew the ; real object of England in Egypt to be tho . re-conquest of the Upper Sou dau. Napoleon ; taught France the striitegotic Talue of ! Egypt to hamper the expansion of the j Indian and Colonial Empire of Groat • Britain. Colonies, he knew, made an empire great, and though England bad driven Dupleix and other adventurous French soldiers out of India, Napoleon lauded an army in Egypt to recapture India in time. But Nelson destroyed the French fleet off the Nile, whilst Sydney Smith, Abercrombie, Hutcheson and Moore compelled the French Army to leave Egypt after being badly beaten. Although the French left Egypt under the ban of cruel naval and military defeat, French egotism still thinks it has a right to Egypt— an idea amounting to strange hallucination. Not only do the French want Egypt, but since Alexandria and Waterloo they gained Algeria. They have practically annexed Tunis. France went against England in the affairs of Egypt in 1840-41, and again in 1882, therefore France has no right to Egypt, without its being given to her by England — which is not likely. It is well known that the British policy in Africa is to construct an overland or transcontinental railway from Capetown to Alexandria, which will secure the trade of Central Africa for the British race, and provide a shorter route to the Pacific and the Far East. This is the policy of Mr Rhodes, to which he is devoting his life, reputation and fortune to accomplish, and to which the British nation was long ago pledged to go on with against all impediments — Boer, German, French or otherwise. Already Dr Jameson has erected tho telegraph line along the new railway route to the Zambesi. • The railway to Buluwayo is opened. Mr Rhodes is on his way homo to raise money to oxtend it to the Nyanzas, and .£20,000,000 have been subscribed to build up railways in Upper Egypt to meet the Rhodesian scheme. In a short time he will look across that Livingstonian River, and erect his poles and insulators through thatnarrowslripof British territory between German East Africa and the Congo Free State into British East Africa, and thence into the Upper Soudan and Nile Valley of Egypt, whose capital is Khartoum. The French, in order to counteract this British policy, have sent expeditions from the hinterlands of Tripoli, the French Congo and Algeria, through the great Sahara and Libyan deserts, to what they call "No Man's Land," with orders to annex right down to the Upper White Nile, and thus cut the British railway line and sphere of influence from the Cape to Cairo. But Captain Lugard, D.5.0., rendered this aggressive and "unfriendly act" too late, as in 1884 all the territory became British by virtue of treaty rights. Colonel Lugard and other officers have got to "smell out" what the French are about in the said hinterlands, and it is not likely that Lord Salisbury will recall the advance upon Khartoum or tell Mr Rhodes and "Dr Jim " to erect no more posts north of the Zambesi. This work of British energy and civilisation through Central Africa must go on; indeed, Salisbury, Rhodes and Kitchener have crossed the Rubicon of their policy, and there can be no retreat. Still African affairs are agitating France, and no doubt the " rovarry" Moscow editors. But Lord Salisbury and Mr Chamberlain see a wonderland of commercial business in the British African policy ; whilst the mercantile and industrial genius of England will hot be robbed of its legitimate trade. The navy and army of the Mother Country have always paved the way and found markets for British goods and commerce. The united services, if necessary, can do so again despite dual alliances. Meantime, history is being manufactured at a rapid rate. Since 1896 the advance of the Sirdar from Astereh to Dongola, and last year from Dongola to Abu Hamed and to Berber has been something marvellous in Soudan warfare. Sir Herbert Kitchener has fought his way up the Nile against great odds, difficulty, and a host of obstructions— natural, military and political. The task of sending an army to Khartoum to destroy Mahdisni and burst the iron bonds of the poor Arabs was considered too gigantic and foolhardy a task •; for the Egyptian Army without the support of at least a strong British division, the whole commanded by Sir Redvers Buller or Sir William Butler. The Egyptian troops had certainly fought well at Ferket and Kerman. Ihe cavalry under Colonel Burn- ' Murdoch, the infantry and artillery under Brigadiers Hunter and Rundle did all that was required of them. They fought in beautiful formation, " as if on parade," were * under fair fire control, and withstood the ■ fiery onset of Dervish chiefs and impetuous ! war tribes of the Khalifa army, with some i loss in killed and wounded. It was evident i in the short, yet hard-working campaign, 1 that wise counsels prevailed in allowing i the Sirdar to fight the Dervish army in his 1 own way without a single red coat. Sir f Herbert is not only well served by such an | ( intelligent officer as Colonel Wingate, the 3

local knowledge of Slatin Pasha fresh from Omdurman itself, and an able staff, but the Sirdar himself possessed a profound knowledge of the Arabic nature aud language ob- \ tamed during his surveys in Palestine, and in camping out with the wild tribes of tho | Soudan. This knowledge of the tribes and terrain, and a large range of military intelligence, observation and experience have been useful in the carrying out of his almost forlorn advance into the deserts of Father Nile. He must have convinced the War Office in London after his capture cf Dongola that lie could, without a red-coat, carry out the campaign of 1897 to a victorious issue. He has with him in the fighting front line only 14,000 black troops, well officered by Britishers, drilled, disciplined and led to the perfection of any native Indian regiment now fighting in Swat and Afridiland. Ho is assisted by half-a-dozen small, flat-bottomed stern-wheeled steamers of the Zambesi Herald type, manned by Royal navy men, aud a mcd with new rifled 12 and 15-poundei, •, and Maxim machine guns. They havo already proved equal in value for Nile river warfare to two brigades, as they rush the gauntlot of river bank entrenchment fire, and take the enemy under a powerful raking and flank fire. Since last year the Egyptian army has been increased by 10,000 recruits, thus making the present war strength of tho Native army up to 40,000 men of all arms. But the Sirdar had only 15,000 men when he started from Dongola aud Korti far Abu Hamed. These 10,000 recruits have been placed at the disposal of British engineer officers to make the railway to this point. j The sharp and serious street battle at Abu Hamed, and the unexpected easy fall of the great rebel centre of Berber, were great military successes. The operations by land aud river were carried out with an heroic exactness, and conquering ardour, step by step, reach by reach, that never failed. Street fighting is always attended with heavy loss, as Delhi and Lucknow proved to Wilson, Nicholson, Havelock nnd Clyde. The black disciplined troops of the Khedive went at their enemy with a splendid dash, courage and execution. This battle of Abu Hamed proved that the force of the Khalifa was not in strength in the Berber district, and Sir Herbert Kitchener, with Hun ter and Rundle, pushed on, partly escorted with the gunboats towards Berber, which fell, after a few shots. One would think that the Arabs by this unuaccountablo fall back from Berber meant the carrying out of an ambuscade, or the long counter-march through desert country to strike at the Sirdar's roar and long line of weakly-guarded communications on the Atbara river, there to fall upon our store supplies and those engaged in the construction of the railway, which the Mahdi knows means the easier conquest of Khartoum and the Nile Valley. The occupation of Abu Hamed opened up a second road to Cairo, via Korti and Dongola, and by Murad and Korosko, whilst that of Berber opened up the road to Soukin, on the Red Sea, and Kassalla, now about to be handed over to the Khedive and England. It is likely that part of the .£20,000,000 of steei rails will be laid from Soukin and Berber, thus making British trade and influence supreme iv the Soudan. I am certain that King Menelik will not send 20,000 of his army to assist Sir Herbert Kitchener in the expected and great sieges of Metenineh and Omdurman. The result of Mr Rodd's mission to Abyssinia has yet to be seen and felt. The King will not move, perhaps, until asked by the Sirdar, when he discovers what is wanted after inspecting the fortifications ' of Metemneh and Obdurman. Then his treachery will begin. Metemneh is at the end of the desert track from Korti, about opposite to Shendy, and 111 miles from , Onidurman-Khartoum. It defied the gnns , of Sir Herbert Stewart |and Sir Redvers ; Buller in 1886. It was from this point '. that Sir Charles Wilson left in the steamer i to rescue Gordon when "Too late" was : written on the wall. It is said that ( the Mahdi will make his first firm stand at Metemneh, . which is well ( fortified. The naval flotilla is now above the cataracts, and if the naval and j military forces move and appear together ■ before this place, the gun or bombarding ' power of the united force may be sufficient J to defeat the Khalifa troops and take the fortifications, the nature of which must now be well known to Colonel Wingate. The Madhi is not likely to boltfrom Motem- * neh without a fight. The Sirdar may ] take this place, but I question if his force, J without Abyssinians or Britishers, is strong l enough to invest, bombard and storm the ( now powerful Plevna lines of Omdurmau. E The Madhi must have at least from 50,000 1 to 60,000 troops between Metemneh * md Khartoum, and which, if' placed behind the entrenchments of Omdur- ( nan, with his reported 42 guns, would c cave the Sirdar the problem to solve ; is his i; 'orce strong and heroic enough to storm I )mdurman in Badajoz or Delhi fashion? a ; think not, taking every military rule into d

• consideration. Kitchener is an engineer officer of great daring, resolution and courage. He has not onlyto successfully storm the stronghold with its inner lines of defence, but he has to invest it so that -the Dervish troops will not have a back door of i. escape, which simply means the prolongation of the we into Darfur, Le Obied, the Nile Valley, . id a costly campaign in the next cool wea her. It will be a thousand pities if the Mahdi aud the bulk of his troops are not caught in their Omdurman trap and made to surrender unconditionally. The capture of the Mahdi would end the war, shed a blessing over the land, restore peace and trade, apd open up the Nile Valley for the operations of Mr Rhodes and Lord Cromer, and the ory of "hands off" la belle France. I forgot to state that tho great river pass, of Shobolola, if defended with guns by the Madhi, may sink some of our gunboats, but I daresay that Generals Hunter and Rundle will be able to outflank the defenders, when the Mahdi will return to Omdurman to find his Sedan-Kismet. I fear the weak army strength of Sir Herbert, and it iB idle to predict the events of next week up the Nile. If the Sirdar succeeds in storming Omdurman, Khartoum will be entered without opposition, and Sir Herbert Kitchener will have conducted one of the most gallant, determined and victorious marches of the last fifty years of military history. In the meantime, where is h«P Like Roberts on his march through hostile country — far from a base. In the meantime he is undergoing the most anxious, desperate aud thrilling practices of war, whilst Sir Francis Grenville, in Cairo, and Lord Wolseley, in London, are more than usually anxious over the result of this daring advance. This task will be too risky for Sir Herbert to attempt without 6000 British troops of the Dargai type, not only as the backbone of the storming army, but to stay a short time in Khartoum until Sir Herbert and Colonel . Macdonald join hands in the Lake County, where the sturdy genius of Rhodes is cramped between Uganda^and the Zambesi. Before Omdurman is stormed the Sirdar must be reinforced, as the lines of the Atbara river and Kassala wil alone employ 6000 good troops. The .delay or "halt" of the Sirdar upon Khartoum is bad. It proves his weakness" 5 to the Mahdi, who has already despatched an army in the field to fall upon him. The Sirdar has divided his troops, and is far away from Cairo and Suakini. If he gets the Dervishes in the open desert they are sure to meet a thorough defeat.