THE MAORI WAR.

Star (Christchurch), Issue 265, 19 March 1869, Page 3

THE MAORI WAR.

The following is from the Government paper (Advertiser) of March 15 : —

Taranaki shares in the intensest degree the evils which beset the colony. It is to the inhabitants cf that district almost as bad as the absolute abandonment of the place by the Government to say, after nine years of war and uncertainty, that a defensive attitude must still be maintained for a time. Yet it is obvious that the colony cannot raise an army for all tbe msnaced points, and ought not to go into the field anywhere to incur greater risks of reverse than it has yet incurred. To deal with the most aggressive tribes aggressively, requires au amount of organisation and a number of trained men that has never yet been at the disposal of the colony. The Urewera and Ngatimaniapoto country can only be penetrated by forces as carefully provided, trained and equipped in reference to the native extent of the operation as Lord Napier's Abyssinian army. The impossibility of getting accurate information of the whereabouts of the enemy in such countries entails the necessity of entering with several parties, each equal to coping with the united enemy if they should fall in with him, and means for such operations do not spring up spontaneously from the soil. It is not true, however, that the condition of Taranaki is so defenceless as some writers for the press in their blatant folly assert. There are, including the two companies of the 18th Regiment stationed there (say 120 strong), upwards of 500 men on pay. They consist of, first, a special bush-ranging force of 40 men embodied for several months past, and actively engaged all the time in cutting lines for military purposes in the forest from the Waitara to the Hangatahua or Stony River ; second, a division of Constabulary, 100 strong, sent down from Wanganui on news of the murders at White Cliffs, third, a new levy, 50 strong, made at the Thames at the same time, and including some old Taranaki bushmen; the remainder of the force being militia garrisons, native scouts, and contingent, and volunteers. The place might be counted on to hold its own in its present state of preparation against any force that can be brought to bear from Ngatimaniapoto side. The real anxiety, however, is that the settlers may prove so broken in spirit, with hope deferred, and the new disasters and alarms certainly find the place in a state of deep depression. The broken spirit of Taranaki would be a public misfortune, but it would be regarded with a serious regret and deep sympathy, but no shade of blame.

The Hawke's Bay paper which draws its inspirations from the local Government, is convinced that Rewi is bent on war, and that the East Coast settlements, as its writers vaguely describe them, are his aim. In a moment of crisis, supposing that is that a rising of King natives is really going on or imminent, the Colony would not be able ti exhaust its strength in garrisons for Wairoa and Poverty Bay. There is little or no mischief for Rewi to do at those posts, and they do not protect Hawke's Bay. At least, so much concentration of force will be requisite as may put the agricultural part of Hawke's Bay in a secure condition. Ths militia ought to be in training. It is their own fault and that of their local lenders if they are not. Opotiki and Tauranga may have to share the same fate for a time as Wairoa and Turanga. Wanganui may have to be placed merely on the defensive, and the moveable force under Colonel Whitmore transferred to Taranaki, Waikato, Hawke's Bay, or even Taupo, at a moment's notice. Meantime it would be unpardonable in the Government if they should allow themselves to be induced by' every alarm to interrupt active operations against a foe actually in front. Titokowaru is at Patea, and has only a few days back attacked an escort close to the garrison there. His destruction is one condition of peace, and should be steadily pursued. Colonel Whitmore's force are getting at home in the district, and may deal conclusively with the enemy any day. The reports of Rewi's intentions are still open to doubt ; they proproceed from sources which have long been discolored by local excitement. The Taupo laud quarrels prevent the natives theretaking a cool view. Vigilance, the improvement of our force, and such measures for recruiting the resources of the Treasury as can receive no possible aid from press comments, or sensation telegrams, are the war measures open to Government. The confirming of the faithful natives, the reassuring of the doubtful, and the drawing off of the more moderate from the ranks of the rabid enemy by all honourable means are the pacific duties which ought to be pursued pari passu with preparation for strife and defence.

A letter from Major Mair, dated Opotiki, March 3, was received by the St Kilda, which visited the place on that day to obtain information. Te Kooti had left the Waioeka Valley on the 20th ult., for Maungapohatu to unite his forces with those of Eru te Maikowha, known in Opotiki as " the murderer " from the fact that all the murders committed in the district for two years paßt were his work. The Waikato party, said to have joined him, consist of about sixteen Ngatiporou (the wandering gang who destroyed the _rith-Thompson monument at Mata mata), and as many Urewera ; Anaru Matete, of Poverty Bay, Te Munu, Te Kewene, and Te Popata were the leaders of the party. They joined Te Kooti before he left Waioeka. He

endeavoured to get Urewera to join in an attack on Opotiki before he left, but" they replied by inviting him to Maungapohatu. Kooti had talked of returning to Poverty Bay, but Major Mair had no idea he would do so, whilst a garrison of constabulary remained. He was more likely to direct his attention to Opotiki, Ohiwa, or Wakatane. Major Mair seems to have been at ease about Opotiki, but expected one or the other places to be attacked. On the day of writing it had been learned that the enemy were at Otara, on the Waimana Kiver, evidently menacing Ohiwa, from which place they were twenty miles distant. Their force was estimated at 130 to 140, or, if the Ruatahuna people had joined, somewhat more. Of these upwards of fifty are believed to be Chatham Island men. The garrison at Ohiwa is sixty strong, and these are friendly, besides Major Mair thinks the loss at Ngatapa has been over-estimated. The Government, however, possess a nominal return drawn up by refugees from Kooti's camp, which brings the number up to a higher point than Major Mair's calculation.

This letter is bo far satisfactory that it proves the garrisons at Opotiki and Ohiwa were not in the dark as to Kooti's movements, and could hardly have been surprised by his force. It is in the last degree improbable that Rewi had joined, or, indeed, would join. His game, if warlike, is higher, and Kooti is not likely to accept a secondary part after his late career of absolutism.

The Hawke's Bay Herald of March 9 says : — "

While, in Auckland, immediate sources of apprehension were disappearing,— in Napier and the East Coast it is'differeut. We referred in our last to the latter received from Hoihipi and others, which has since been confirmed by a communication from a trustworthy settler. From the letter of the native chiefs we gather that Rewi has made no mystery about the matter, but has pretty plainly intimated his intentions to the Taupo friendlies. March having arrived, and, with it, war resolved upon, it is possible the wily Ngatimaniapoto chief may have balanced in his mind the comparative advantages of re-enter-ing the territory wrested from the Waikato tribes, or of assailing the comparatively unprotected settlements on the East Coast." But whatever the process of reasoning by which he arrived at a conclusion, he has decided, we have little doubt, upon joining Te Kooti on the one hand, and advancing towards Ahuriri on the other.

The Government, we understand, have received similar information by way of the West Coast; yet they make no sign. We need not say how serious a calamity would be an invasion by Ngatimaniapoto into this or any other settled district, or how strenuous should be the exertions of Government to avert it. The true course, if it could be carried out, would be, on the commission by Rewi of a single overt act, to invade his own territory aud give him enough to do at home. It would not take much to turn the whole strength of the Thames diggings in the direction of Rewi's homestead. In the absence of such vigorous measures (which we can hardly look for at the hands of our supine rulers) surely some preparations, beyond the tardy appointment of an extra scout or two, should be made. But until Waikato crosses our northern frontier and invests the homestead of a certain distinguished officer (which might happen any hour) we have little hope that anything will be done. In such case no doubt we shall see the redoubtable Tito left to follow his own bloody courses, and a " new rush" to Titiokura, a perfect stampede. But it may be too late; infinitely better to anticipate the evil either by prompt measures of self-defence, or by bearding the lion in his own den. We now perceive the many advantages attending the plan of Sir George Grey — to establish a regiment in the very centre of the island — had he been permitted to carry it out. It might not yet be too late to place a strong garrison in Poibipi's pah at Lake Taupo.