MAHAN'S WORDS.

Timaru Herald, Volume CI, Issue 15456, 19 September 1914, Page 3

MAHAN'S WORDS.

AN AMERICAN VIEW. FAMOUS EXPERT'S ' JUDGMENT. IN FAVOUR OF BRITAIN. During the past few weeks the name of Rear-Admiral Mahan, United States Navy, retired, must have become fam.i'iar to New Zealanders who have read the newspapers closely. This dis-. tmguished Amur can is a naval authority whose opinions are tiioroug'hly respected among the world's fleets . In an mtorv.cw with a representative of the New York "Evening Post" on 3rd August (the day before war broke out between Britain and Germany), Admiral Mahan declared that Eng.and must at once throw her preponderating fleet, against Gennany for the one chief puvposa of maintaining her own position as a world Power. For England, he said, it was a question,- if she remained out of the war, of sacrificing her Empire in the nest generation to the interest of this generation. A DUTY OF POSTERITY* "Great Britain as the third member of the Entente," he said, "finds herself in the position of Prussia in 1805, when she permitted Napoveon to strike down Austria unaided, and was herself struck down the following year at Jena- Or of that of France m 1886, when she stood by while Prussia crushed Austria, and was herself overwhelmed in 1870. "Germany's procedure is to overwhelm at once by concentrated preparation and impetuous momentum. If she fails in this she is less able to sustain prolonged aggression, as was indicated in the Franco-Prussian War, during and after the siege of Paris." Mahan holds the unusual -view that Italy must join the war within a week's time, not as a partner of the Triple Alliance, but as an ally of France and Russia, Italy must take this step, he stys, and hold the Austrians in bheck for the salvation of the Balkans which are already threatened by Turkey and are sure to be the prey of the Turks unless the Austrian Navy can be kept from the shores of Greece. "CALCULATED AGGRESSIVENESS." Admiral Mahan regards the present war qs one of calculated aggress veness by Germany, and an inexcusable act. lie ventured the opinion that the abscond of the German Emperor from Berlin at the time of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia was an act cleverly designed to deceive. The Admrial also gave several important opin ons upon the probable strategy of the naval powers of the nation. BRITAIN'S TACTICS. | "The British fleet, which is superior to that of Germany," he remarked, "has tSie power to prevent all commerce under the German flag, and, by blockade, to close against neutrals ail the rivers properly German those emptying into the Baltic. Tiie British fleet is not strong enough to divide for blockade in both Baltio and North Seas. The Rhine, empting through neutral Holland, cannot be blockaded. J ' 'lf the first German rush proves indecisive or prolonged, the financial press fere thus in the power of Great Britain may determine the issue or may force the German fleet to fight, in. which case the issues will- be determined by battle. "If Germany succeeds in downing both France and Russia, she gains a respite by land, which may enable her to build up 'her sea force equal, or superior, to that'of Great Britain." "In that case the world will be confronted by the naval power of a .State, not, 'like Great Britain, sated with territory, but one eager and ambitious for expansion, eager also for influence. This consideration may well effect American sympathies. , "In my judgment, a right appreciation of the situation should determine Great Britain to declare war at once. Otherwise, her Entente engagements, whatever the letter, will be in sprit violated, and sire will earn the entire distrust of all probable future allies. IN THE NORTH SEA.

"Undoubtedly, the North Sea will be the theatre of the naval battles," he said. "The German fleet, so far as we know, steamed immediately from Kiel' to the North Sea, ready to stride. For a long t.me it has been the German policy to keep her navy ready, and virtually cleared for action, and we may expect any minute, apparently, to get word of a great engagement, and should expect the British fleet to win. "The Kiel Canal will undoubtedly be used in Germany's naval as affording access to the North and the Baltic Seas, but not as the dec ding movement. England cannot, as I have said, throw a preponderating fleet into both seas, and Germany's liope is to strike immediately. It is a question of existence for her. The stagnation of her carrying trade on the seas must threaten her very life, and the neutral shipping, already taxed to its 1 mits, cannot bear the additional burdens of supplying Germany. "The suggestion made that Germany might demonstrate with her fleet in tho Ba."tic is not tenable. The Russian fleet with only eight pre-Dreadnoughts and no Dreadnoughts and battle-cruisers—-however much of an absurdity that type may be—is negligible. Germany could achieve nothing' w.th her fleet in the Baltic, for it is a principle of warfare that under modern conditions no na.t on can afford to waste its navy in operations against fortifications." As for the question of the science of naval warfare to be answered in this fin;d test of a.ll theor'es of war, RearAdmiral Mahan sa : d that the most important, undoubtedly, would be those of the increased efficiency of submarines and torpedoes, and of air craft. ABOUT SUBMARINES. "And bslleve me," he said, "the English fleet, which sailed with sealed orders, is at present in the North"Sea, with the purpose ot' being just out of the effective range of submarines. Ido not know, definitely, what the effective cruls ng range of such submersible craft is, but I should est mate- it to be 200 miles. To accomplish that d.stance they must travel a long way upon the surface, and so be in sight of the scouts which the British fleet, of course, has posted. "Th'squestion of the use of the in-' creased efficiency of the submarine is assuredly one of the most important to be tested in actual warfare. They had, of course, no opportunity in the RussoJapanese war, but in the present confined theatre of operations .should be seen at their best. Ido not share Sir Percy Scott's views of the surpassing power of the submarine to the complete cffacement of the battlesh r>. "The torpedoes, as used m the Russo-Japanese war, were util'sed chiefly to put a finish to a ship almost already by pin fire, and for such purposes were effective in daylight against modern guns. Germany, apparently does not place much faith in them. "But most of these prob l ems„ of the techn cal science of warfare are too abstruse for the general observer. They are really even too techn:eal for the experts to agree on. As General Sherman said: 'One may demonstrate something in manoeuvres, but you really need the element of human fear to be conckis;ve.' "The mooted quest-'on of the guns will also be tested. For my part, I have always believed that the volume of fire was the determining fact. Thu number of hits, and not s ngle shots, : s the most important element, I believe. However, all these things wo shall soon know, perhaps any minute."