MAORI WAR IN TARANAKI

Taranaki Daily News, 24 September 1928, Page 15

MAORI WAR IN TARANAKI

STIRRING DAYS ALONG COAST EXPEDITION TO TATARAIMAKA TROUBLE CONFIXED TO PROVINCE. After the memorable fight at Waireka (March 23, I 860) there was a pause in hostilities, says the Nelson Mail in its narrative of incidents in the Maori war days in Taranaki. Both sides were waiting for reinforcements; the Maoris looking for help from their friends in the Waikato and Waipa valleys, and toe pakeha expecting help from Australia. Both expectations were realised, but not immediately. By the middle of April, Colonel Gold, toe Commandant at New Plymouth, had been strengthened so considerably that he determined to take the field, not so much with a view to fighting as to demonstrating his sirength to the defeated tribes of South Taranaki, and to conducting harvesting operations!—surely toe most extraordinary harvesting ever carried out in this or any country. Du the morning of April 20 was to be seen a strange procession issuing from New Plymouth. First came a column of troops, some 600 strong, with advanced and flanking guards complete and four light guns. Then followed dozens of carts, filled with civilians, harvesters, and drawn by bullocks, 250 in number! New Plymouth was going to cee what it could do to bring in crops toe Maoris had .spared. That day Colonel Gold’s troops reached Mr. Greenwood's farm at Tataraimaka, where, on some’ rising ground,' . a camp was pitched and entrenched; and next day the settlers, formed into working parties under armed guards, began to. thresh the wheat and save the root . crops. What a picturesque scene it must have been: toe settlers working in the fields, some of them accompanied by their womenfolk to do the cooking, and here and there at points of vantage sentries and outpost groups of red-coat-ed soldiers of toe 65th, hirsute and burly sailors of Beauchamp-Seymour’s Naval Brigade, and the workmanlike and deadly riflemen of Major Herbert, Stapp and Atkinson! What a picture it would make, and someday perhaps a New Zealand artist, anxious to illustrate the trials and staunchness of the pioneers and their children, will paint with brilliant colours the scene described. He could find no better subject, for it is of the very essence of those early days, positively typical of toe colonist's life in 1860. RAVAGING OF REBEL TERRITORY. After being encamped at Tataraimaka for a, few days, Colonel Gold determined to penetrate into the rebels’ territory further south. With three companies of the 65th Regiment and two guns, he advanced through rough, roadless country and across rapid, unbridged streams, towards Wareatea, where he sighted Ko-wene’s pa, some three miles inland, tat encountered no natives. Finally the troops reached Warea, “burnifig and destroying the flour-mills, grain crops, villages, and other property of toe rebels,” we are told. The only Maoris encountered (less than 100 strong) would not come to close quarters, but after opening fire at extreme range, disappeared into the bush. This reconnoitring and harvesting expedition lasted about a fortnight, and on May 1, Colonel Gold withdrew to New Plymouth; the settlers with their tai-loek-waggons preceding, and the troops forming a strong rearguard. Two hundred men, rowever, were left in toe entrenched camp at Tataraimaka, as an outpost, not so much with the intention of preventing the Maori’s advance,, tat for toe purpose of watching their movements and giving the garrison of New Plymouth warning of an impending attack. This expedition of Colonel Gold’s has, been criticised, especially the burning and destroying of Maori property, because it is argued that his action gave the Maoris toe excuse for the wholesale pillaging and burning of pakeha farmhouses and property; but this contention is hardly tenable, since the rebels in any case would have destroyed practically all' pakeha property in Taranaki outside o-f New Plymouth. One would have imagined that fhc time of Maori quiescence, after Waireka, should Eave been seized by toe Queen’s forces to bring Wiremu Kingi and his Taranaki allies to terms by means of forcible and aggressive operations. The Governor and the Government thought otherwise. They might feel themselves strong enough to deal with Wiremu Kingi and his friends of South Taranaki, but they did not feel strong enough to deal with the Waikato, Maniapoto and other tribes awning allegiance to the Maori King, who at any time might declare war. Therefore their ehief object was to come to some arrangement with King Potatau for confining the war to Taranaki, and to gain time in which strong, reinforcements might reach them from England. So they issued orders to Colonel Gold to act on the defensive, and ho issued orders to his subordinates to -engage the Maoris seriously only when they were attacked; and, as Wiremu Kingi was waiting for help from the Waikato, nothing of any great moment happened, from toe begining of’ April till the end of June.

NEGOTIATION WITH MAORI KING. During that time the Governor ami the Government, acting in conjunction, were conducting some very delicate negotiations with King Potatau, who was living at Ngaruawhia, on the River Waikato, and apparently they were successful. A runanga, or Maori co-uncil,. met at Kihikihi, which was the headquarters of Ngati-Maniapoto, and discussed toe •question of giving assistance to Wiremu Kingi and his Taranaki allies, and decided to send a deputation to Taranaki to inquire into the causes of the war there. This took time, but, when toe deputation returned, its report was that Wiremu Kingi was in the right, anil Rewi Maniapoto went to lay it before toe Maori King, and to ask his consent to a war party of Ngatl-Mamapoto being despatched to help Wiremu Kingi. Old King Potatau delivered his decision to Jiis leading chiefs in counsel assembled, in the following words: “NgatiManiapoto, go you as food for toe birds of the air. As for you, Waikato, toe Puniu River is my aukati, or border.” What he meant was that Rewi was free to take warriors of his tribe to assist Wiremu Kingi, but that the Waikato tribe must stop at home. Thu* there was to .be no general eqn.centis.tion and

combination of Maori strength against the pakeha, and, for toe time being, the war waa to be localised in Taranaki, a matter of immense importance to toe Governor and the Government, who more than anything else dreaded a concerted attack on Auckland, which was almost denuded of regular troops, and was dependent for its defence Upon volunteers and militia who had had no actual experience in warfare. How the old Maori King was broivght to his decision could make an interesting chapter of New Zealand history, which, so far as we know, has yet to be written. It was a momentous decision, because it meant the throwing away of the one ehance the Kingite Maoris had of striking a dangerous and perhaps decisive blow at the power of the palieha. Probably the inter-tribal difference made concerted action impossible to the Maoris, and possibly old. Potatau,. remembering the counsels of Sir George Grey, who was his. intimate friend, shrank from engaging in a general war with toe pakeha. His decision was a compromice. It satisfied for the time being the fire-eating Rewi and his Maniapoto braves. It maintained a sort of half-hearted peace between the'Maori King and toe: Governor. It restricted the war to Taranaki.

The situation, therefore, was favourable to the Governor and the Government, whe had every reason for thinking they could hold their own. in Taranaki, in spite of such. Kingite forces as might join Wiremu Kingi. But it was evident that the troubles of New Flymouto had only begun, that the winter of 1860 was to be. a sad and trying time for its brave citizens, and that there would be no peace till the forces of Wiremu Kingi and hie allies had been signally defeated.