WORLD SEA POWER

Taranaki Daily News, 7 April 1927, Page 9

WORLD SEA POWER

THORNY NAVAL PROBLEM PLANS FOR DISARMAMENT NATIONS AT LOGGERHEADS FRANCE AGAINST BRITAIN By Telegraph—Press Assn.—Copy :i;ht. Received April 6, 10 p.m. Geneva, April 6. The complexity and difficulties of the disarmament problem were revealed when the preparatory commission began its discussion on naval armaments. Lord Cecil, in opening the debate, contested the French viewpoint as expressed in their draft plan that, if armies are numerically limited, so must the naval personnel be limited. He said the British Government’s view was that the proper way to limit the strength of the fleet was to limit the number, size and power of ships. This Britain was prepared to do drastically and very completely, but she saw no necessity for limiting effectives, which would occur automatically with the decrease of the tonnage. The French proposal would complicate the convention and render a ratification less likely. He added that navies could not be made more formidable by increasing man power beyond their actual needs. Lord Cecil finally sprang a surprise by saying he was not prepared to discuss the point further, as he had telegraphed to his Government for fresh instructions. M. Boncour rather sarcastically remarked that this was the second time the discussion had been suspended owing to Lord Cecil’s necessity for getting instructions. He proceeded to argue that naval, military and aerial strength, ■ coastal defence and expeditionary forces were inevitably bound up, and if a single category was ignored, wholesale deception would be possible by camouflaging the nature of certain forces. He re-called the part played in wartime by the sailors, who were not merely employed as crews, but as landing parties. The American and Japanese representatives supported Lord Cecil’s viewpoint, but the Germans and Swedes approved of M. Boncour’s, pending the receipt of instructions regarding effectives. EMPIRE’S UNIQUE POSITION. Lord Cecil proceeded to discuss the limitation of material. He emphasised that the whole existence of the British Empire depended bn the security of its communications. The cessation of seaborne commerce would mean Britain’s starvation. Therefore the question was of vital importance to the British, whose programme envisaged an agreement which would (1) forestall naval competition; (2) secure the fullest publicity, so that every nation would be aware of the naval strength of its neighbours and (3) strengthen the psychology of security by eliminating “the surprise element.” Lord Cecil contended that the limitation of the number of ships was more important than the limitation of tonnage, numbers being an essential element in the strength of a fleet. (The French proposal is a limitation of the total gross tonnage). Lord Cecil added that Britain was convinced that the only effective measure was fixing the number of ships in each category. Unless such was known, competition was inevitable and surprises possible. Admiral Sarto favoured the limitation by categories and he opposed fixing the size of ships in each category. M. Boncour said France favoured limitation by gross tonnage because she wishes to retain the right of the disposal of the smaller classes of ships, according to her special needs. The Swedish representative suggested firstly, the limitation of total tonnage by all nations, secondly, a categorical limitation of tonnage by the Great Powers and thirdly, the advance publication of all naval programmes. This appeared to evoke the spirit of compromise, and the Commission ad jo limed on M. Boncour’s promise to submit a new proposal.