LOAN FOR METALLING.

Taranaki Daily News, 13 May 1925, Page 8

LOAN FOR METALLING.

RATEPAYERS’ OBJECTIONS SPECIAL ORDER INVALID. SUPREME COURT JUDGMENT. A decision of considerable importance to local bodies in the raising of loans is contained in the judgment of Mr. Justice McGregor in the case of Robert Brewer v. the Patea County Council and the ♦State Advances superintendent. The case was heard at the December sittings of the Supreme Court at New Plymouth, and further argument was heard at Wellington on May 8. The history of the litigation shows that in October, 1924, the Patea County Council made application to the State Advances Superintendent for an advance or loan of £2900 under the Local Bodies Loans Act, 1913, in terms of a special order confirmed by the county council on August 12, 1924. This application so far has not been granted. The plaintiff, as a ratepayer of the part of the district affected, on December 4. 1924, filed his statement of claim, alleging that the special order was defective and invalid on several grounds, and claiming from the court an injunction restraining the defendants from proceeding further with the application for a loan. An interim injunction was granted. In December 8 the plaintiff filed a further motion, claiming on the same facts a certiorari to remove into the court and to quash the special order and all proceedings thereon as being defective and invalid on the various grounds already referred to. In delivering his judgment, which was given for the plaintiff, His Honour raised two main questions, viz. (1) Was the consent of the necessary majority of the ratepayers duly obtained? (2) Was the special order itself properly passed by the county council? The special order was attacked by the plaintiff in two separate grounds, viz. (1) That the public notice of the “time and place” fixed for the confirming meeting was not and (2) that the “object or purport” of the resolution was not stated in the public notice given of the confirming resolution. It was quite clear, His Honour said, that the public notice of the “time and place” fixed for the confirming resolution was not in fact given. The notice published by the county council did not state the time or place when and where the meeting would be held. The second objection to the special order was not so obvious. The “object or purport” of the resolution was stated as follows:—“For the purpose of metalling for the first time the Hukatere and Otautu Roads.” It was admitted on behalf of the county council that the “ob ject or purport” of the resolution was not accurately stated. The real object was admittedly to metal a part only of the Hukatere Road. It was clear law that the provisions of an Act of Parliament regarding procedure by special order were mandatory and must be enforced. From that it would appear that the special order was invalid on both the raised. Was the consent of the necessary majority of the obtained ? For the plaintiff it was contended: (1) That the consent prescribed by section 16 (e) of the Local Bodies Loans Act, did not at any time contain the consent of three-quarters of the ratepayers in the special area affected by the proposed loan; and (2) that in any event before the confirmation of the special order the signatures of several of the ratepayers were definitely withdrawn by notice so as to leave less than a three quarter majority in favour of the proposal. His Honour was not satisfied that there was sufficient evidence bearing on the first point, but upheld the second as it was clear that there Were left fewer than the required majority of consenting ratepayers. It was clear also that the county council proceeded to pass the confirming resolution in the knowledge that in so doing they were actwithout the consent of the required majority of the ratepayers. “I am of opinion that plaintiff is entitled to an order for a certiorari and a perpetual injunction as claimed,” concluded His Honour. “Judgment will be for the plaintiff accordingly in terms of his respective notices of motion. The defendant county council is ordered to pay to the plaintiff as his costs the sum of £l5 15s and disbursements in addition to the £lO 10 costs formerly allowed at New Plymouth.”