THE NAVAL WAR.

Taranaki Daily News, 30 November 1923, Page 5

THE NAVAL WAR.

BATTLE OF JUTLAND. LORD JELLICOE’S TACTICS, HISTORIAN’S VINDICATION. London, Nov. 14. Sir Julian Corbett, the official naval historian of the war, vindicates Lord Jellicoe’s tactics at the Battle of Jutland. “In the face of Admiral von Scheer’s evasive tactics, and the poor visibility, it is difficult,” he says, “to see how an action which was so well begun, could be pushed to a decision. Lord Jellicoe’s deployment, which was his critical decision, gave him the tactical position he regarded as most desirable. “Lord Jellicoe, in October, 1914, informed the Admiralty that he would not follow an enemy fleet if it turned away, because he would assume that it was the enemy’s intention io invite the fleet over a field of mines or submarines. “The Admiralty then expressed the fullest confidence in Lord Jellicoe.” The Admiralty, however, furnishes a preface disclaiming responsibility for the views expressed, especially for the tendency to minimise the importance of seeking a battle, and forcing it to a conclusion. ERRORS OF NAVIGATION. THE POSITION O<F THE ENEMY. London, Sept. 18. One of the papers read at the British Association Congress, which created

much discussion, was by Dr. W. M. Smart, who took as his subject, “Mathematics as Applied to Navigation.” In this he showed some of the difficulties that Admiral Jellicoe had to contend with in the Battle of Jutland. The navigator, he said, who had no landmark to look at and no wireless to guide him had to fall back on dead reckoning to find his speed, course and position. It was very simple to work out in practice, but unfortunately, the position was often hopelessly out, owing to errors. Having obtained his bearings on stationary objects or the geographical position of a star, the most important part of a navigator’s job was to put the results of his observations on the chart. Having done that, he got them on his log table, and then the fun I began, for if any error occurred he did I not know how soon he Would be “in the soup.” Navigation observations involved an enormous amount of calculation, taking from 12 to 15 minutes, and in battleships during the la»te war the navigating officers had not time to at- , tend to the work, having to control 1 their ships while In the danger zone, and I navigation rather fell by the way. INSTANCE OF ERROR. As an instance of the errors that may occur through dead-reckoning, the lecturer quoted the case of a British cruiser, whose navigating officer, having ascertained his position by that method

at noon in cloudy weather, momentarily found the Pole Star at 8 p.m., and discovered that he was 20 miles north of where he supposed he was. The precise astronomical observation was, after much cogitation washed out, and faith was pinned on the first location by deadreckoning. The officer expected to reach port in three hours, but within an hour and a half he had run on the beach. An unsuspected current pushing the cruiser northwards was the cause of the discrepancy. At the Battle of Jutland and up to 1917 the eyes of the fleet were the light cruisers, whose chief job, steaming at 25 to 30 knots, was to get into touch with the enemy. When they discovered anything their first object was to report to the commander-in-chief, and the report must be accurate in the sense that it described the enemy—and not part of our fleet, as sometimes happened—stated where he was, what his ships consisted of, and at what rate Ihey were steaming; but. above all, although the point had not been sufficiently realised, it was essential that the

light cruisers should define their own position accurately. An .error in position of from 20 to 30 miles gave a report to the oommander-in-chief which I kd to confusion rather than definite information. LORD JELLICOE’S DOUBT. In clear weather, an error of 10 or 15 miles did not matter, because the two sides could see each other, and there was always plenty of time for the admiral to arrange for the deployment of his fleet in the right way and right direction, and to take into account all the advantageous factors, such as light. The danger existed when visibility was poor and object* could barely be discerned, and these conditions obtained at the Battle of Jutland.

The navigating officers, during the action, were busy conning their ships, and had no time to work out their positions correctly, ami the result was that up to 6.14 in the evening of May 31, 1916. Admiral Jellicoe was in considerable doubt and anxiety as to the position of the German fleet, whose presence had not been reported. But at that minute he had to act, and to act instantly. If the reports received during the previous hour had been anything like correct he would- have expected to find the enemy on has starboard bow, but instead found him right ahead.