THE COLONIST. PUBLISHED EVERY MORNING. MONDAY, AUGUST 17, 1914. GERMANY'S PLAN OF CAMPAIGN.

Colonist, Volume LVI, Issue 13549, 17 August 1914, Page 4

THE COLONIST. PUBLISHED EVERY MORNING. MONDAY, AUGUST 17, 1914. GERMANY'S PLAN OF CAMPAIGN.

The events of the first fortnight of the Avar in Europe have borne- very striking testimony to the soundness of judgment of the British military experts who have been, discussing in the Press,,for a long time past the probability of such a campaign and the line of action that would be adopted by the aggressive Power. Some of these authorities, it is true, have found their calculations somewhat disarranged in consequence of their not having anticipated the degree of perfidy to which Germany has shown her willingness to resort to advance her schemes, while others underestimated the powers of resistance of the Belgians. The. first of these developments has widened the scope of the conflict, while the rapid advance Germany had planned through Belgium has been utterly ruined by the second. In the main, however, the opinions., expressed by such writers as Mr. Hilaire Bellocf Earl Percy, and Colonel Pollock have been verified by events. Another well-informed contributor to the "Fortnightly Review," who conceals his identity under the pen-name "V," has discussed the German" plan of campaign in an article which in the light of the j latest cable news, is of especial interest at the present juncture. He .also makes insufficient allowances for Belgian determination and valour, as the Germans have done. The main German idea upon which the plan has been formed,.he says, is that Frapce must be seriously damaged in the first three weeks of the war, so that Germany may find herself in the position of victor in the first round, before England and j Russia'have entered the field. Such a^ f situation she considered would prevent British participation, and confine Russia's activities to a defensive war on the Vistula. Germany has been disastrously disappointed in both expectations. "iV," rightly assuming/that the commencement of hostilities would precede the declaration of -wfar, said the object of the invader would be at'all cost to get well established on French soil, and concentrate as large an army as possible behind, that is to say west of, the line of the Vosges, so as to fight a decisive ' battle somewhere in the neighbourhood of Rheinis or Chalons. There was a time when it was thought that the chances of a direct attack on the line of the Vosges were not inconsiderable, and that weak spots might be found between Belfort and Verdun. But this point of view is now held in only a modified degree, for it is considered that the best chance of making the frontal attack a success will be by

executing a disconcerting and menacing movement through the comparatively open country betweon Verdun and Sedan. All the French plans being based on the concentration of the national forces at Neufchateau, behind Toul, one of the objects of the German strategists has been to seek a line of attack which would evade that base- of concentration, render it inapplicable to the situation created by their strategy and embarrass the French to find another- in time. With this end in view the Germans have, for the last fifteen years, been making the necessary preparations to secure that broadened front for their advance which is essential for the accomplishment of their | purpose, and., these preparations are I now practically completed. The line of the Vosges is not merely exceedingly formidable as a fortified position, but it ,n also exceedingly narrow. From Belfort to Verdun, the two extremities, is no more than 145 miles, and although Belfort might be turned by the

violation of Swiss territory, the invading army could only operate against Lyons, which would take time, and exercise little or no interest on the first phase .of the war. In any case, there is no necessity ior any overwhelming anxiety on the part of the French authorities with regard to what may happen south of Belfort. Here, if anywhere, the. opening for an offensive movement seems more favourable to France than to Germany. The contracted front of the Vosges is almost as serious a disadvantage to the enemy acting on the offensive as the formidable character of its defences. The lines of advance for any considerable body of troops are also further diminished by considerable stretches of impossible country. For instance, any advance between Belfort and Epinal, speaking, as we are, only of large operations, would be out of the question. There are, indeed, only four lines of advance open to the Germans in this quarter. They are from Metz to Verdun (two roads), through Pont-a-Mousson to Commercy, through Chateau Salins to Nancy and Toul, and from Strasburg to Luneville. The last two named are •available for a combined attack on Toul and its system of dependent forts. The total frontage for the German advance : between Verdun and Luneville is then no more : than seventy miles. In this restricted, space it would be impossible for the Germans to employ more than half a million : men, and in the event of any reverse or breakdown in the execution of the plan of attack the Germans would find themselves exposed to heavy : loss before they could get outside the range; of the French fortress artillery. "Although the German authorities are set on putting the efficiency of N the .Vosges forts to the test, and also of experimenting with some of their new theories for the capture of fortified places," continues fY,'\"it is to the widened front that ,they are mainly looking as the scene of their first victories, From Luneville to Verdun they have 70 miles of fortresses, fort and battery in front of them. From Verdun to Givet there are 75 .miles of undefended country. Longwy vand •'Montmedy do ngt. count as fortresses. Givet-Charlemont and Mezieres, both on the Meuse/are most up-to-date, but from Verdun to -Mezierea i stretches open-country with a frontage lof 50 miles. This is Germany's objective."