THE DEFENCE OF THE COLONY.

Colonist, Volume XII, Issue 1175, 29 December 1868, Page 3

THE DEFENCE OF THE COLONY.

To the Editor of The Colonist. Sib,—Your article " Troops for the Colony versu. Self-reliance" in the Colonist of the 18th instant, si evidently refers to my letter in the Examiner, that;. cannot refrain from making a few remarks on it. You seem to think that what I said about everj man in the Colony going to the Front, &c, &c, wai an outburst of enthusiasm, which might hare beer excused if spoken excitedly from a public platform but was too absurd to be committed to writing. Yov appear to forget that at Taranaki in 1860 every mar in the Province capable of bearing arms was in activf service at the Front, which, thanks to an Imperia gurrisouj was close to the town. It was the same ir Auckland during the Waikato campaign, thougl: from its position the town itself was 40 miles frorr the seat- of war; but the whole civil population was under arms, and a large proportion at the Front where they did a great deal of the rough work' and the luvrd fighting. No, sir, I used these words advisedly, and in speaking for myself I believe I echc the sentiments of a. large .proportion of the settlers in the North Island. Bather than ask for troops, ] would shoulder the rifle and march against the Maoris as full private of Militia (though I have nc great stomach for fighting, and am rather old to begin), and spend the last shilling I have in assisting to restore peace to the Colony on a permanent and satisfactory basis; but I would grudge every farthing spent to pay for Imperial troops, or sugar and blankets. True, we came here "to better our condition and find room for our children ;" but we also came as the advance guard of civilisation against barbarism, and I trust we shall not be the first of the British race to abandon the outposts in the hour of danger. Though we have for a time been shamefully deserted by the mother country, still it is our duty to guard her honor and our own, at the extremity of the empire. But, sir, suppose we had an army of 10,000 Imperial troops again in the country, what would be the use of them, as they would only be allowed to garrison our towns, which could surely be done by the third class Militia. What has been the history of the British army in Now Zealand, but disaster and disgrace to itself, and debt and ruin to the Colony; and what has been the cause ? Certainly not want of pluck in the soldiers, but. a want of military genius in the commanders; they hud not the tact to adapt themselves and their men to the circumstances of the country they were in, or the enemy they had to encounter. Their only idea of fighting Maoris was to allow them to choose their own battlefield and intrench themselves strongly there; then, a great flourish of trumpets, to bombard the place with heavy guns (which, by-the-bye, seldom did much harm), and then before a practicable breach was made, to march up large bodies of men in regular military order, to be mown down like grass by the enemy's fire from intrenchments into which our poor fellows had no chance of getting. A no'able example of this style of fighting took place at Oheawai, near the Bay of Islands, in 1845, where Colonel Despard, in a passion, ordered an assault before there was any "breach in the pah, and in seven minutes lost upwards of 100 men, the dead and wounded being left on the field, the latter to be tortured within hearing of their comrades. For this exploit Despard was knight?d! Then we have General Fratt's celebrated sap at Waitara, where many weeks were spent in approaching the front of a pah in the most approved style of military engineering, while the rear was left open for the escape of the enemy, when the works were far enough advanced to annoy them. • Turning to Waikato in 1863, we find General Cameron at the head of an army of 10,000 or 15,000, after a successful skirmish at Koheroa (which, by-the-bye, the General made successful by his own personal gallantry), sitting down for fifteen weeks before advancing on the great Maori stronghold of Meremere, only three miles in front of his position. When at last every military arrangement was made for striking a crushing blow, the army advanced over this terrible three miles, and had the satisfaction of seeing the enemy escaping, bag and baggage (without having the chance of firing a shot), leaving nothing but a pair of old trousers. But to make up for this, we hnd plenty of bloodshed at Rangiriri, where General Cameron, emulating the exploits of Colonel Despar'd, ordered the place to be stormed before it was breached, and with no appliances to enable the stormers to cross the ditch, 9 feet wide, and climb the parapet 20 feet high. In this brill'ant affair, which, of course, was unsuccessful, though I have no doubt "the operation was perfect," we lost 135 men, killed and wounded, including the gallant Captain Mercer. Next morning, the garrison, 185 in all, with about 200 stand of arms, surrendered at discretion, which they would have been forced to do in a few days, after being driven into the inner redoubt, from which there was no escape; so that the lives of these men were actually thrown away for no' purpose, as there was no chance of the enemy being relieved from without, and the delay of 15 weeks before Meremero showed that time was not an object with the General. These prisoners, after costing; the Colony a large sum of money, were at last, through the negligence of Sir George Grey, acting on his own responsibility as an Imperial officer, allowed to escape from his private property at Kawau. It appeal's to me that if, instead of attacking the natives in their pahs, our forces had done everything possible to keep them there, and cut off their supplies ; and at the same time scour the country with small' parties, destroying cultivations and all the property they could find, and cutting off all stragglers who fell in their way, the enemy would have been much more effectually punished. They would soon tire of building pahs if they found that, instead of attacking them at a disadvantage to ourselves, we were destroying their crops, driving off their cattle and cutting tracks through the bush, while they were skulking in their rifle-pits, and never getting a chance of a shot. It is true our. bush parties could, be attacked, but it would be on equal terms, an,d not from rifle-pits and impregnable en^renchmonts. ■ This plan has been successfully tried at Taranaki, where from 50 to 100 Bushrangers for months kept the whole district free from hostile natives; whereas; under regular military rule, with an army of 2000 or 3000 at New Plymouth and Waitara, no one's life was safe a mile outside the lines. And even the military communication between these two places (10 mile 3 distant) was kept up by sea instead of by the good open road. In short, the whole country was abandoned to the enemy, the troops keeping constantly within the intronchments, except when sent out with flourish of trumpets to attack some stronghold within which parties of natives 'ha/A been quietly allowed to fortify themselves. If in these expeditions Maaries were unexpectedly met, our men were not allowed to return thoir fire; and 1000 regular troops have been known to fly from 50 savages, On all occasions the bush, where the enemy was likely to be found, was religiously avoided. But it is too humiliating for an Englishman to record the-disgrace of his nation, and I feel the whole miserable history a personal degradation. It is useless to repeat the list of disasters which have befallen th'j unhappy country since 1845 ; they are, alas, too well known to all old settlers; and those who wish for information on the subjeot will find it in files of tlys local newspapers; but in a condensed ajicl interesting form in many books, particularly "T-he Story of New Zealand," hy Dr. Thonison, of- the 58th regiment; "The War.in the North, translated by a PakebaMao,r.i," by Mr. Manning, a .Tudfje in the Native Land** Court; and " The War in New Zealand," bj Mr. Fox. After reading these bopks I cannot understand anyone wishing for Imperia,! troops if ; ,the same game, is to, be played oyciv agaui at oiir expense. . .;. .;!'" Doubtless, if we could have,such me^ d,s Sir.Eenrj

Horse," ol' Garibaldi* they would soon train regular tt'oops to irregular warfare; but Unfortunately our military leaders have had no military genius, -though some of them, doubtless, were thoroughly good routine officers, and, with a few notable exceptions, they were personally brave. * It is very true that, man for man, colonial troops cost perhaps four times as much as British soldiers; but man for maii, or perhaps more correctly, bodies of men for bodies of men, our experience shows that dolonials are infinitely superior for the rough fighting and rough living needed in this country. Ido not mean to disparage British troops, but their training seems to unfit them for bush fighting, and none of our commanders have had the moral courage to burnt the bands of military routine and make use of the men who form the machine of a regular regiment, instead of the machine itself. You say that the "self-reliant policy has failed." I titterly deny this, for it has never been fairly tried, and why? Mr. Stafford, after basely supplanting Mr. Weld, on tho false pretence of saving money (which he has not done), as basely yielded to the pressiire of those members of the House of Eepresentatives who cried out for false economy, and. as Mr. J. C. Richmond says, ~',' starved the Defence department." But it is unjust and ungenerous for the Editor of the Colonist to turn round on the Ministry, for this paper .always advocated reductions in that very direction. I will quote from the very able paper you read to the "Nelson EeformLeague" in March last, and then leave it to yourself whether you have any right to blame Ministers for the disasters which have taken place in consequence of carrying out your suggestions. Under the head, " Are reductions possible ?" you say:—" It seems to me that the item of Armed Constabulary, Militia and Volunteers might be reduced from £130,000 to at most £30,000 or £35,000 a year. Since this war commenced, in spite of,i being thoroughly unprepared, and in spite of all disasters, I believe more has bjen done to punish and cow the natives than the British army ever accomplished in twice the time. True, much property has been destroyed, but not so much as at. Taranaki, under the very eyes of a large Imperial army, where I myself have seen three homesteads burning at the same time within three miles of New Plymouth, and though the town was full of troops and armed settlers, no one was allowed to interfere. At Poverty Bay Te Kooti and his people have suffered terribly at the hands of native allies, which, together with Captain Newland's little affair, where eight of the enemy fell before a party of our irregulars, and Finnimore's dashing settlers' raid, will have a more wholesome effect on the native mind than a regiment of regulars landed at Wanganui. If they find their crops destroyed; their cattle driven off, and their stragglers shot down, by small parties of people in all sorts of unexpected places, they will soon tire of a war which must, if continued with even our present force, lead to their absolute starvation. It is perfect nonsense to say that the Maoris can live for any length of time on the natural resources of the country, even if left to themselves; but if they are constantly harassed for the next six months,- they will either die of starvation, or sue for peace on any terms for the sake of rest and food. Hitherto, war has been a profitable speculation to the Maoris, as they have been allowed to take the settlers' property with impunity; nnd when tired of fighting, wero invited to swear allegiance to the Queen, and then go quietly home to enjoy the spoil " which their good swords had won!" But if they find, as please God they will find, that no terms will be mode with Tito Kowaru and Te Kooti and their bloody bands', the Maoris generally will not be so anxious to amuse themselves nt our1 expense. Now that Sir George Grey and Bishop Selwyn have left New Zealand (for which let us thank God !), I trust that insurgent natives will not be entreated to make peace whenever they tire of fighting, and food and ammunition runs short;. In speaking of self-reliance you seem to forget.that it was forced upon us, os was the government of the the natives, and we had no option in the matter. For if troops' were dqly" to be allowed to stay in the country on condition that they should not be employed in bush-fighting or attacking pahs, of what possible use could they be, ..even if they cost us nothing, but to think of paying £40 a man for tho honor of having her Majesty's troops lounging about our town while we are fighting the Queen's enemies, is too absurd to think of; and Mr. Weld would have been mad to have accepted the offer. You say if we ask for troops the "Imperial Government will be a lenient creditor." That has not been our experience in the past, for England has rigidly exacted the pound of flesh legally, but not justly, due from the Colony, and why should she be more lenient now. I say legally, but not justly due because I do not consider that we have nre under moral liability to pay for wars which were purely Imperial and over which we had not the slightest control. But, because we loyally supported the Imperial Government, shed our blood, voted our money, and contracted debts, which are now dragging us down to ruin, we are called bloodthirsty settlers, who involve the British taxpayer in expensive wars, by our greed for native land and commissariat expenditure. On this head I will take the liberty of quoting from the admirable letter of Mr. F. D. Greenwood, published in the Examiner: — "No people, I believe, ever more loyally did their duty to the Home Government than we have done, and seldom indeed have trust and confidence been more shamefully betrayed. We borrowed three millions, believing thafc tie English Government would do their part; they spent our money (for to say that we had the control of affair*, when the Governor had the power of veto, and not an armed man could move without the consent of the Imperial commander, is absurd), and having signally failed in everything they had undertaken, they threw tho burdens on a young Colony, already staggering under the immense sacrifices it had made, and left the work still to be done. Let us dismiss from our minds any hope of assistance from England. The sympathy we shall receive will probably amount to an article in The Times, blaming ns for not keeping on foot the 20,000 men considered needful by General Cameron ; and probably an allusion in the Queen's speech, regretting the unsatisfactory relations between her native subjects in New Zealand and the settlers." No Sir, if we nsk for help, England will exact the uttermost farthing, and insult us into the bargnin ; and I, for one, would suffer almost anything rather than endure more of the w proud scorn and cruel injustice of the mother country. Possibly in time England may see how shamefully she has treated us; but she is more likely to do so if we are independent of her assistance, and at present I foel sure we can help ourselves better than she will help us. I think there are some indications of a better tone of feeling in Fngland with regard to national duty awl honor, for afewyearsago she voluntarily went to war, not for the purpose of opening a market for soft goods, but, to vindicate her honor and protect her citizens, Possibly she may discover that her honor requires vindicating in New Zealand, and that she owes something to the people here for tiie dire injustice she has clone them. But in the meantime I cannot look on our position here so gloomily as many people are inclined to do; I feel convinced, that if we only continue the war with even our present force, and hold no communication whatever with the insurgents, they will be driven, to desperation before very long; and, i£ they are. properly punished, others will be. shy of' following, in their steps. I believe tha^t fjax). ma,ny yeai^3 it will be. necessary to keep n,n efficient; Defence fprce, and arm the out-set'leys, as they ought to, have been from the first; but if we do,not call in forpign aid we will have no, great wars, though we may. expect a, little, fighting.now n,nd.then. ' This letter hajS extended far beyojid' the. bounds I at first intended, but I am very jmxio.us to, speak freely and fully on this question, as I consider it of vital importance.to, the Colony, and,! dread the.idea, of asking, for British tropps. leap assure, you, sir, 1- have, written this, in, no, spjrjt pfopppsitipp to you, bu,t Jj would; lik^e tp, e»ssi} th,e services of a, paper, of such, w,id>e. oirouja,tio» and powerful: influence, as th#. C9to*^, on tho side of a policy whjph, l^w'oerfca.ha ia ttie only one to carry ns tiOTs* 9Wft4w*wV mi future difficulties., A»d I

feel convinced that; you; Mvo.the jjiiblid spirit) not i'O oppose great national questions merely becaiise tlley ai'e advocated by nien with whom you disagree on many points. This isa national question, and for G-ods sake let us all combine to prevent its becoming a party one. I am, &c, James Bttenett. Nelson, Dec. 21, 1868. [Mr. Burnett's ably written and interesting letter calls for some remarks which we delay until some future issue.]