Shipping Losses

Southland Times, Issue 24057, 22 February 1940, Page 6

Shipping Losses

According to a message printed yesterday British and neutral shipping losses for the week ended at midnight on Sunday were the largest of the war. They amounted to 86,000 tons. The message rightly pointed out that this total, heavy as it was, was well below the weekly average during the worst period of the unrestricted U-boat campaign of 1917. There is a temptation also to derive some consolation from the fact that neutral shipping accounted for the greater part of the Iqst tonnage; but the advantage here is more apparent than real. Neutral losses are of as much concern to Britain as the sinking of her own ships, for every ton of shipping of any nationality that is lost means a weakening of her total position—it means that there is less carrying capacity for the imported foodstuffs and materials on which she depends. If last week’s rate of destruction could be maintained, Britain would ultimately face a grave situation. Her present replacement rate of 2,000,000 tons a year, which is being achieved by the standardization of merchant ship building under the supervision of the Admiralty, is more than sufficient to cover her own maximum rate of loss so far, but even with neutral construction added it would fall a long way short of making good losses of the order of 86,000 tons a week. There is, however, no reason to believe that Germany can continue sinking British and neutral vessels on this scale. The effect of the neutrals’ heavy losses will be to drive more and more of their ships into the shelter of the British convoy system, where the rate of loss is still only one-fifth of one per cent. Moreover, Britain is now engaged on the laying of a vast mine barrage, 500 miles in length, covering the east coast from the Orkneys to Dover. This minefield, which will be from 30 to 40 miles wide, is intended to act as a protective screen for British coastal shipping and for vessels plying to British ports from overseas. A similar minefield was a major factor in overcoming the submarine menace in 1917-18: mines accounted for more U-boats in the Great War than depth charges, gunfire or any other single weapon of destruction. When this barrage is laid (it may take from six months to a year) and the convoy system is in full operation Germany should have the greatest difficulty in maintaining even her present minimum rate of destruction, much less last week’s maximum.