The Southland Times TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 26, 1939. Will Germany Strike In The West?

Southland Times, Issue 23932, 26 September 1939, Page 6

The Southland Times TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 26, 1939. Will Germany Strike In The West?

REPORTS of German troop y movements at points near the Swiss, Belgian and Dutch frontiers have been followed by precautionary measures in the three neutral countries. Dikes have been opened in border districts of Holland and Belgium and an effort is being made to fill, gaps in the defence system, especially in the Netherlands. French military experts have suggested that the Nazis may shortly attempt a flanking movement through neutral territory. Action of this kind is by no means improbable, although there seems little chance that it could be successful. The invasion of Belgium in 1914 had the advantage of a surprise attack: if the Belgians had not made their heroic resistance and German troops had not been diverted to the east at a critical moment the movement envisaged in the famous Schlieffen plan would have been completely effective. But today the situation is different. The initiative on the Western Front has been taken by the Allies, who have established themselves on German soil and are working towards the Siegfried Line in the patient operations of a fortress warfare. Full precautions have been taken against a Nazi thrust into Luxembourg, Belgium or Holland; it seems unlikely that the German High Command will throw masses of troops into an action which, even if it led to an initial penetration, would almost certainly end in the stalemate and exhaustion of trench fighting.

A Defensive Strategy

A decision to violate neutral territory might mean that the Nazis were fully aware of their disadvantage in a war of attrition and that everything was to be staked on a tremendous effort to break through into France or to the Dutch coast. It is difficult to believe, however, that the Nazis have already reached the stage where desperate tactics are becoming inevitable. The fighting in the west has followed a course which indicates plainly that the Germans have adopted a defensive strategy. Their resistance is growing stronger as reinforcements arrive from Poland; but there is evidence that the Nazi leaders still hope to avoid a major conflict with the Allies. It will not be surprising, therefore, if the fighting in the west continues to take the form of an artillery duel, with occasional minor engagements, while the Nazis attempt to win the war on the diplomatic front. Repeated hints of a “peace offensive” may be followed shortly by the appearance of more positive symptoms. So many strange things have happened in the past three weeks that there is a danger of finding plans and designs where opportunism and necessity are the dominant factors. The key to the situation appears to rest with Russia, whose attempt to spread communism through* Europe, even to the gates of the Balkans, must be causing uneasiness in Berlin and deep anxiety in Rome. It is impossible to know if M. Stalin is behaving in the way that Herr Hitler expected, or if he is cynically making the most of a golden opportunity. In the absence of reliable comment from Moscow (where official utterances are usually cryptic, and frequently unintelligible) the guide to policy must be found in events.

Uneasy Allies?

If the Nazis invade a neutral country and risk a major engagement with the Allies it will be difficult to escape the conclusion that the German and Soviet, dictators have made a military agreement and that a totalitarian bloc has been established in Europe, in spite of an underlying conflict of interests. This development is unlikely, although only a bold observer would say that it is impossible. The most obvious explanation of the present position is that Herr Hitler distrusts his Russian ally, and that he hesitates to embark on a costly and risky offensive in the west while M. Stalin follows an inscrutable policy in the east. An invasion of neutral territory might have to be accepted as proof that the NaziSoviet alliance is far stronger than most critics are inclined to believe. It would also suggest that the Nazis had abandoned their attempt to drive a wedge between Britain and France. A third inference, that fear of the blockade and a failure to counter it by political and economic penetration in Eastern and SouthEastern Europe, were driving the Germans to rely on desperate remedies, might be premature at this stage. In the meantime the troop concentrations are continuing, and the world goes on wondering. The next phase of the war may be a German offensive in the west; but it should be remembered that an attack against Belgium or Holland would finally close the diplomatic avenues which Herr Hitler is obviously anxious to keep open.