RIVAL ARMED FORCES

Southland Times, Issue 23921, 13 September 1939, Page 3

RIVAL ARMED FORCES

DEFENCE LINES OF THE WEST PROSPECTS OF AIR WAR Conditions of modern warfare have changed so greatly since 1918 that it would be most misleading to' speak in terms of big aggregations of manpower. /. mere statement that 11,000,000 men are standing to arms in Europe tells us little, and it is futile to equate rival armies In terms of millions. The antiaggression front will certainly include the British Empire, France and Turkey. On land most emphasis. will be placed on the French Army, with its bulwark of the Maginot Line. Whatever may be the position in other arms, the French Army is the best equipped and best trained in Europe, writes Professor S. H. Roberts in The Sydney Morning Herald. (Professor Roberts is the author of the best-known book on Nazi Germany, “The House That Hitler Built.”) Although France’s metropolitan army in peacetime comprises only 480,000 men, the use of the “war-baby” clauses and the two-yearly period of conscription gives France 525,000 recruits this year. She has a total of 2,000,000 mobilized earlier in the week before the general mobilization added 5,000,000 more, and- all are well trained and equipped. The army is divided into two distinct strategic units, a field force and a garrison force to man the Maginot Line. One important fact about the Maginot Line is often forgotten—that it possesses a marked offensive value, which the Siegfried Line cannot have. Its guns are a greater menace to the industrialized Rhineland than aerial bombing, and the Germans have always been aware of this. Conditions 1 eing what they are, it is difficult to see what could be achieved by frontal attacks on the Maginot Line, or, as far as that goes, on the rival Siegfried Line, even admitting that it is less formidable. The old stalemate around ’ 7 erdun must now be intensified a thousandfold. “General Concrete” has immobilized land warfare in western Europe, especially with the superioritj always enjoyed by the defensive.

THE MILITARY POSITION Although her main initial contribution will be at sea and : the air, Britain is also pledged to support France on land. It is true that, since the creation of the Polish and Turkish fronts, the French need for British soldiers is not as urgent as it was a few months ago. Then it appeared as if Germany and Italy could launch 165 divisions against France’s 110; but now Italy’s stand is doubtful and German forces must be split up on several fronts.

Nevertheless, France still wants an army of at least half a million Britons to supplement the “couverture” she deems so essential on her eastern frontier. It is incontestable that these forces would be more useful on the Polish front, but, with the Baltic sealed, how ' uld they get there? Britain certainly has the men ready. Ever since March she has been building up an expeditionary force of 19 divisions, and today she has at least 788,000 trained men for the Army, not counting the 220,000 militiamen who are to be called up under the new conscription law. Ex perts say that Britain’s effective army has doubled in this year alone, and, in addition, 2,500,000 persons have been enrolled for civilian defence.

TRAINED RESERVES But it is Poland which must necessarily bear the brunt of the first landattacks, for there Germany expects her most resounding victories. At a strategical exercise on the map, the overrunning of western Poland looks easy; but the poor communications and the rains are Poland’s best allies in time of stress. The Poles have enormous manpower, but their difficulty is to maintain equipment. Great secrecy has always been maintained about the Polish Army, but it is believed that they have just over 500,000 in their standing army, and almost 10 times that number of trained reserves of all kinds. The army is adapted to local conditions, and is thus especially strong in light cavalry (the famous Uhlan Eagles) and mobile local units of irregulars. Mechanization is not so pronounced, for the Poles believe that an over-mechan-ized German army will only encounter difficulties in their frontier marshes.

Germany can muster 160 divisions, but, owing to the ban on conscription between 1919 and 1935, she has not the trained reserves possessed, say, by France or Poland. She plans to “mop up” Poland in a few weeks a. J then swing back to the west; but, if this expectation of an easy victory over Poland is not fulfilled, she must soon encounter great difficulties regarding her man power. She holds that her Siegfried Line and her new scattered eastern fortifications protect her from any grave risk of invasion by land; but it is known that the General Staff have for long feared the effects of unwisely dispersing her man power over central, southern and eastern Europe, for this detracts from their plan of concentrated attacks by highly mechanized formations. French strategists, however, think that both German striking power and German mechanization have been exaggerated, although no Frenchman is under the illusion that the morale of the German army will crack unless a war is very protracted.

The role of Italy is uncertain. Italy has a powerful army of 80 divisions, but it is at present in course of complete reorganization. From a military point of view Italian development uas been very one-sided—a mere aggregation of more and still more units. The main problem, apart from equipping' and feeding them, is to know where they could be employed. The gruesome phrase “Abyssinian meat” best explains the predicament of their 120,000 men in Ethiopia. They have always had to correlate their military with their naval problem, and now they have the additional complication of the Turks, who have 25 divisions of good regulars and 250,000 reservists trained in each of the last 20 years. The Turks were good fighters last time; now their equipment and morale are infinitely better, and great expectations are held of a firm Balkan front.

PART OF THE NAVY The part of the Navy is much easier to estimate. The British and French fleets vastly outnumber any aggregation that can be brought against them; , and Spain’s neutrality makes the position as. hopeful in the western Mediterranean as in the North Sea. Nothing can stop" the relentless fc~ce of a naval blockade, and this, rather than pitched battles, is obviously the Navy’s major job. The aerial position is more obscure. Britain and France have, however; left far behind them the state of unpreparedness of last September, and there is no reason to believe that the lightning air-strike in which Germany lays such faith, "could conceivedly win a war. The relative strength of the rival air forces is very different today from what it was six months ago, when it was admitted that Germany had as many aeroplanes.as Britain and France together. At that time Britain aimed at a front-line strength of only 2370

machines by next March, but this 'obiective has since been enlarged out of all recognition. It is believed that British factories are now producing 1000 planes of all types each month, and even this figure will doubtless be speedily improved upon. LIMITATIONS OF AIR ATTACK Gross numbers of aircraft are, however. extremely misleading A noted strategist recently concluded that, even if the German command were prepared to lose all of its first-line machines and men in the first month of war, the absolute maximum that could be seht against an enemy country, counting a 10 per cent loss, would be 500 machines a day. Another vital factor is that British and French production is increasing far more rapidly that the German. Official statements in France said that, in the last three months, Britain and France were outstripping Germany in this matter of aeroplane production, and that the margin in our favour would grow still further. Heavy air attacks from Germany must be expected, but Sir John Anderson is organizing the A.R.P. in Britain on • the assumption that German resources would not permit a. “Blitzkrieg” of more than a few weeks. After that only sporadic raids are expected, and both these and the first “lightning stroke” can best be countered by civilian defence, it is now believed. Roughly speaking, we musi in the early stages envisage land warfare in Poland, naval warfare in the North Sea and Mediterranean, and air warfare across Germany’s western frontiei on both sides. Experts in each service agree that, unless Germany’s, theory of a “Blitzkrieg” ,is correct (and the arguments of Fritz Sternbere and Liddell Hart against it seem conclusive) Hitler has no hope of winning; for every consideration of strategy and resources tells against him in the long run. His only chance would be to win in the first month, and no Englishman or Frenchman admits for a moment the possibility of such a conclusion.